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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 11 Nov

LD1111055793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0511 GMT 11 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 11 (TASS)—The Russian draft constitution and preparations for the upcoming elections remain in the focus of attention of the Russian press. The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA commenting on the draft cites President Boris Yeltsin as saying that "with the adoption of a new constitution we shall get a powerful instrument for solving problems of the state and society. We need order". The author of the article believes it is these words which expressed the key and the main ideological message of the recent presidential address to the nation. "Indeed, in the post-October Russia the field for creating a new society is quickly emerging", he writes.

The TRUD newspaper believes a referendum is not the best way for adopting such an important document as the constitution, but adds that there seem to be no other way out. "The time limit has been passed and the country can no longer live without the basic legal act which determines its state structure", the newspaper said. Russia is a unique federative country and the problems of federalism have been thoroughly analysed in the draft which proceeds from the necessity to ensure the state integrity of the federation and strictly divide powers between the centre and the regions, the newspaper notes.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that the new constitution is a document for the transition period. Even if the draft is approved at the December referendum, debates in society will continue, the newspaper said adding that the draft is the best document for the transition period as it fixes wide human rights. "It is for the first time that we have a document which accumulated international standards redarding human rights", it said.

The three newspapers report that 13 groups were licensed for parliamentary elections by the Central Election Commission. The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA stressed that "the Central Election Commission decided not to allow any of the patriotic (hard-line) organisations of the opposition to participate in elections".

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes extracts of the interview of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze to the TV programme "On a Visit to Authorities" which is to be aired tonight. Shevardnadze speaks on the current Georgian problems and the situation in Abkhazia. He believes Russia is now the only force capable of restoring justice in Abkhazia. "But another, a different Russia", he added. "I shall put it bluntly that without Russia, without the good neighbour, a worthy partner and state to whose people the latest decades of our life are linked Georgia cannot be guaranteed against serious cataclysms", Shevardnadze said.

PRAVDA publishes an interview with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on the results of his visit to Austria and prospects of economic cooperation with the country. The premier said that relations with Austria are developing "openly and honestly". He added that joint projects in metallurgy, machine-building and car-building industries are being discussed.

"If you want to live in peace ensure it first with your neighbours", Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin said in an interview with the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA dwelling on relations with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. "In certain conditions we agreed to see the PLO as a partner representing the Palestinian people at peaceful negotiations. I do not believe that at present there is any other such partner capable of supporting the peaceful process", he added.

The military KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes that little attention is being paid to the problem of upbringing of a new generation in Russia. It says that time is often lacked to care about the young and that the youth problem is mostly used as an argument in political debate while the young are often sent to face bullets. "Uprooting (communist) dogmas and (ideological) cliches we have uprooted upbringing itself. Today when our society lives through major shocks, when the basics of our common life are collapsing the young are stunned. They lost their moral compass while spiritual goals drowned", it said.

Press Review for 12 Nov

LD1211072893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0708 GMT 12 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 12 (ITAR-TASS)—Moscow and St. Petersburg newspapers continue today to devote much attention to the draft of a new constitution of the Russian Federation. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article on this subject under the headline "Pre-Election Passions Heightening." The newspaper writes: "It is clear already that leaders of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord will be elected to the new parliament. However, Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray has a plan of his own: He intends to become head of the State Duma in the new parliament. He is already trying to play the role of the speaker by establishing relations both with the democratic and centrist organisations..."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes a statement of Konstantin Borovoy, leader of the Economic Freedom Party. He believes that "there are honest and good people in our much-suffering society, which was raped by Communists and where all participants in elections to the post-Communist parliament (with the exception of one bloc) are former active members of the CPSU, who regard as normal lies and forgery."

PRAVDA also carries an article on this subject. It says: "As a result of the five-day intensive work of the commission, which checked (on a selective or all-out basis?) some three million signatures, the political make-up of the contender parties has changed radically. A whole sector of our political life, popular and rather influential in our society—the national-patriotic one—has been left out."

SANKT-PETERBURGSKIE VEDOMOSTI frontpages an interview with the city's Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak under the headline "We Cannot Move Forward Without New Constitution." According to Sobchak, "the putting to a referendum of the draft constitution is an extremely important event in the life of society ... The draft constitution was discussed by the councils (soviets) on all levels, by representatives of subjects of the federation and the business community. I think the majority of our people realise that without a new constitution we shall not be able to move forward, to overcome the state of laxity, uncertainty and the feeling of a dead end, to set things in order in our country, to implement the reform more calmly and easily, with minimum losses."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes an interview with former chairman of the Constitutional Court Valeriy Zorkin, who said about the draft of a new constitution: "The text itself has not confirmed my misgivings. The most important thing is that the constitutional court has been preserved. But it will no longer pass judgement on the constitutionality of political parties, on the compliance with the constitution of the actions of officials. The president will nominante candidates to the constitutional court. We are having a 'mirror effect': The president believed that the former constitutional court was accountable to the parliament and made it accountable to himself. The question arises: Is the draft constitution worth all the blood spilled for it?"

Touching upon the developments in Moscow early in October, Zorkin said: "October 3 and 4, 1993, will go down in the history of Russia as one of the most tragic periods. On those days the inviolability of person was done away with. Not only dual power, but also tripartite power, i.e. the constitutional principle of the division of authority, were finished. Actually the president staged an anti-constitutional coup and destroyed the state system."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comments on the reasons for the resignation of Andrey Makarov, head of the department for ensuring the activities of the interdepartmental commission for combatting crime and corruption under the Security Council. The newspaper writes: "No official explanation of reasons for the resignation has come so far. However, various sources come up with their own explanations, linking Makarov's decision either with the worsening of his health, or with the return from Switzerland of investigators of the Moscow public prosecutor's office. If the second version is not groundless, one can easily imagine what kind of information the Moscow investigators managed to obtain."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes a letter of one of its readers, who refutes with the help of facts the rumours that about a thousand and a half dead bodies were found in the "White House" during the developments of October 3-4, which later were transported out of the city and burned.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an article entitled "Army and Politics," which says: "One should realise that the army holds a special place in the political system of democratic society. Its nature is like that... during political crises some forces may try to use that special feature of the army in their own interests."

The incidence of infectious diseases in St. Petersburg is rapidly growing, NEVSKOE VREMYA writes. This is the result of a gross violation of sanitary norms during the sale of foodstuffs and the anti-sanitary state of the retail trade and public catering network, as well as city markets.

Leaders, Visiting EC Officials Discuss Agreement

Statement on Talks' Progress

LD1011211993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1951 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] The partnership and cooperation talks between Russia and the European Community are nearing completion after 18 months of patient work, says a Russian government statement made public Wednesday [10 November]. The document expresses the hope that at their meeting in Moscow Wednesday the two negotiating teams will agree that there are no unsurmountable obstacles to a successful conclusion of the talks.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the EC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors and Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene who holds the rotating presidency of the EC will meet on November 11.

The statement emphasizes that Europe will no longer treat Russia as a country with a state-controlled economy, thus subjecting it to trade restrictions. This used to be the chief reason why Russia was discriminated against by the EC. The relations between the two sides will comply with the principle of the free movement of goods, services and capital. The fourth EC principle, free movement of labor, will be incorporated into the bilateral relations at a later stage.

The statement also expresses the hope that the appropriate agreements will be signed next spring. Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin leads the talks on the Russian side.

Yeltsin on Meeting's 'Great Importance'

LD1111133993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1256 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov—Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a meeting in the Kremlin this afternoon with Jean-Luc Dehaene, the Belgian prime minister, who is current chairman of the European Union [EU], and Jacques Delors, the president of the EC Commission. The two men arrived in Moscow two hours ago, for a one-day visit.

Welcoming the guests, Boris Yeltsin noted that this is the first meeting between the Russian president and the top leadership of the EU. "I attach great importance to this meeting," he said, "since life is bringing us closer. Soon—probably within the next few months—an agreement will be signed between the EU and the Russian Federation. When this happens, Russia will, at long last, be officially counted a European state."

Shokhin Comments

LD1111161393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] [Correspondent Mikhail Aleksandridi] At a meeting in the Kremlin today with Jean-Luc Dehaene and Jacques Delors, the leaders of the European Community, President Boris Yeltsin said that the signing of an agreement between Russia and the EC, which is expected to ensure our country's trade and economic parity and to put an end to discrimination against Russian exports, was possible in the next few months.

[Begin Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin recording] The agreement ought to be ready to be initialled toward the end of the year, but it can only be signed nearer the spring. It is a major success of Russian economic diplomacy, because in the summer the EC Commission was intransigent and unwilling to compromise with us in areas that are very sensitive to Russia—above all in trade discrimination.

We have now attained a nondiscriminatory regime of trade with the EC while during the summer there were problems linked with the fact that the agreement lacked balance as a whole and that its individual sections also lacked balance. We have now managed to find compromises and we regard this agreement satisfactory, as a whole. [end recording]

Chernomyrdin Expects Membership 'Soon'

LD1111180293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1713 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation Victor Chernomyrdin held talks in the government building in Staraya Square with a delegation from the European Union headed by Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene and European Commission President Jacques Delors. The talks were held behind closed doors.

After the talks, Chernomyrdin told journalists that a wide range of questions relating to cooperation between Russia and the EC were covered.

A mechanism for Russia to join the European Community was discussed in greater detail. "This must be done in a civilized way, without jerks, in order not to disrupt the European market," Chernomyrdin stressed. Nonetheless, he expressed confidence that Russia would soon become a member of the European Community.

Dehaene, Delors Hold News Conference

LD1111185693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1823 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—The European Union and the Russian Federation have agreed to sign a treaty of partnership and cooperation before the end of this year, a press conference was told by European Union Council head, Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene and European Commission President Jacques Delors, who were in Moscow for a one-day visit on Thursday [11 November].

"We are so confident that it is possible to accomplish this task that we have already sent an invitation to President Yeltsin to arrive in Brussels on December 9, ahead of the European summit, in order to sign a declaration of intent," said Jean-Luc Dehaene. According to him, this makes clear the significance the European Communities attach to relations with Russia.

The confirm the importance of the development of trade and economic relations between the European Communities and Russia, Jean-Luc Dehaene said the amount of Russian products imported by Europe is 27 times greater than that from the United States and eight times greater than imports from Japan.

As concerns assistance to the Russian national economy by European Union member countries, it amounted to 65 percent of all aide to Russia by foreign countries. All this shows that the European Union is Russia's main partner, Delors stressed.

He praise the results of today's meetings with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, during which a wide range of problems were discussed relating not only to relations between the European Communities and Russia but also bilateral relations between Belgium and the Russian Federation.

Responding to questions from journalists, Jean-Luc Dehaene said political and economic support of reforms in Russia on the part of the European Communities must proceed along parallel lines. Political cooperation is needed on the one hand, particularly in he form of regular meetings between EC officials and their Russian counterparts. On the other hand, it is necessary for the European communities to help Russia create a stable economy. The openness of European markets is an important thing in this respect. However, the European markets must be opened to Russia "within the frame of civilized long-term agreements", he said. Jean-Luc Dehaene said "this meets the interests of the European Communities themselves, because it needs a strong and stable partner, which Russia can become".

Jacques Delors said the European Union was doing everything possible to help Russia and meet its half-way in its desire to become "fully integrated in the main line of economic development of the world and Europe".

The EC leaders are due to leave Moscow tonight after completing their visit.

Yeltsin Meets With CSCE Official, Views Election

LD1211113893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1117 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow November 12 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin met Ilkka Suominen, chairman of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, at the Kremlin here today. They discussed the participation of observers in the upcoming parliamentary elections and in the referendum on the new Russian constitution, scheduled for December 12. Yeltsin expressed full support to the CSCE efforts to send a team of international observers to Russia. According to Suominen, the team will include 500 people.

President Yeltsin noted during the talk that after lengthy arguments on whether the new constitution should be adopted by the parliament or by a constituent assembly, it was decided to use the most democratic method—to put it to a nationwide vote. All the voters, numbering 100 millions, will be free to take part in it. "The draft constitution," Yeltsin stressed, "meets the highest international standards."

The talk was attended by Russian Foregn Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Chairman of the Central Election Commission Nikolay Ryabov.

NATO's Future, Possible Membership Viewed

PM1211120193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 3

[Vitaliy Moroz article: "Are They Awaiting Russia in NATO? Reflections Prompted by Conversations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels"]

[Text] Secretary of State Christopher's recent visit to Russia and other CIS countries prompted surprising commentaries. The mass media carried a report that the eminent visitor was going to Moscow with an offer of NATO membership for Russia. During the trip itself the newspapers reported that such an invitation had been extended to Kazakhstan. The extensive report was bound to attract attention: Its author assured the readers that the official offer of full NATO membership to Russia would follow in January at the meeting of the heads of states and governments of NATO members in Brussels.

International life has been full of surprises in recent years. NATO, as is well known, is an open organization. But to what extent?

In October I was among a group of Russian journalists invited by the Dutch Atlantic Commission to visit the Netherlands and Belgium. The intensive program, carried out with typical Western punctuality, enabled us to meet with government members, parliamentarians, military chiefs, and business people in the Netherlands and visit the North Atlantic alliance's headquarters in Brussels, where there were also quite a few interesting conversations which sometimes took the form of a debate. The discussion centered mainly on prospects for strengthening European security, Russia's role and place in that process, NATO's future, and the possibility of expansion.

Dutch Foreign Minister Kooijmans gave us his country's position in clear, measured, and even terse formulas. Translated from strict diplomatic language into freer journalist language, it turns out like this. The Dutch believe that it is possible to augment NATO by admitting former Warsaw Pact member countries from East and Central Europe and indeed other European states. The minister sees this process as logical and natural. It is not just a question of the right of any country to seek what it sees as the most reliable and acceptable forms of safeguarding its own security. Europe is moving from political and economic partnership to a union based on the Maastricht accords. The countries of East, Central, and Northern Europe want integration into this process. If states become members of the economic union, this guarantees them protection in the event of aggression. The economic agreements will inevitably be followed by military ones. In Dr. Kooijmans' opinion, they not only augment but complement one another.

For some countries, the minister stressed, the path to NATO may be shorter, for others longer. Much depends on the compatibility of the European systems. A number of European states will have to pass through certain stages of harmonization and cooperation on the road to union.

Mr. Kooijmans considered it necessary to talk about the things that specifically worry the Netherlands. There is the possible influx of immigrants from the East European countries and in particular socialist dumping, as he termed it; that is, the release of cheap goods onto the Western market. We understand, our interlocutor explained, that at the moment it is unrealistic to expect Western-standard wages in other countries, including Russia. But we can and will insist on the observance of proper environmental protection and labor norms in production and will strive to ensure that they meet European standards.

Later, when the conversation had lost its official character, one of the Russian journalists asked staffers of the Dutch Foreign Ministry which Russian goods really do cause concern to local producers and could compete here. After some thought they said: "Lada cars." Given the very high prices for cars in the Netherlands, Ladas could be in great demand. However, you see Russian-made cars on Dutch highways extremely rarely. The same goes for Russian goods in the stores, big and small. Even in stores around the ports where you can read signs in Russian saying: "Any barter deals." So for the moment one can only theorize about economic expansion. Like the need for a cordon sanitaire.

I do not think that the reader will blame me for diverging from my text. Sometimes the details show whether various political decisions of strategic significance have come to fruition and whether they will be universally perceived as timely.

Each of our many interlocutors—in the Netherlands and Belgium—outlined NATO's future differently and presented supporting arguments but, generally speaking, they expressed a position which tallied.

Ambassador A. de Francis, NATO deputy secretary general—he is known as Secretary General Woerner's right and left hand man—described the alliance's new military doctrine which is aimed at preventing crisis situations. The bloc's coalition forces, he stressed, will now operate outside the limits of their countries but only with an international mandate.

On the possible expansion of the North Atlantic alliance, Mr. de Francis said that NATO does not have answers to all questions yet. It is clear that membership of the alliance would be a factor for internal stabilization for a number of countries. But how can you admit one country into NATO without isolating another in the process? Furthermore, the bloc cannot be expanded indefinitely. Experience shows that regional alliances cope better with security problems.

H.-J. Peters, director of the department for cooperation with Central and East Europe at NATO headquarters, a new and expanding department, expressed the conviction that the North Atlantic alliance will nevertheless expand through admitting new members and that ultimately Russia will join NATO, too. "What will stop Russia from saying 'no' instead of Luxembourg in an organization where all decisions are made on a basis of consensus?" he joked.

Understandably enough, there was much praise of NATO expressed at its headquarters. It was said that it is thanks to this alliance that peace and stability have been preserved for around half a century in Europe, which has been torn apart by wars before. It was said that that the North Atlantic bloc is a model of democracy in a coalition structure, an interesting and active discussion club. We also heard it said, especially from commanders of the branches of the Dutch Armed Forces, that NATO is a well-oiled, flexible, constantly improving military organization capable of rapidly adapting itself to the solution of new tasks.

Much was said about U.S. political and military leadership in this bloc. One interlocutor expressed his view on this subject quite plainly: Without the United States it would be hard to carry out even a limited humanitarian action let alone prevent a major military conflict. In his words, the United States is the transport, the intelligence, and finally the finance.

To be fair it should be noted that the future of the military-political alliance does not seem cloudless to everyone at alliance headquarters, which represents its think-tank and propaganda center. One high-ranking staffer, who said that he had devoted his life to NATO and made a career there, said half-jokingly that it will be difficult for his younger colleagues to emulate him. NATO's future, he went on in serious vein, is uncertain. For example, he finds it hard to imagine Russia's integration into the European alliance. It cannot be ruled out that NATO's future development, if Russia remains outside, could lead to the appearance of a new wall, a new "iron curtain," this time created by the West. In the opinion of this NATO veteran (a "product" of NATO, as he himself said), special relations must be formed with Russia in the security sphere, taking into account both its national interests and the interests of all Europe. A common yardstick cannot be applied to your country—those were the words used—and NATO is not eternal.

But, the reader will ask, what is Russia's position here? Is it waiting for an invitation to join NATO, which the Soviet Union asked to join when NATO was first set up? How does it view the very idea of the expansion of the alliance? Is it ready to participate and thereby enhance the alliance's reputation and potential?

It may be claimed, as was done at NATO headquarters, that there are no definitive and unambiguous answers to all the questions yet. To a large extent, however, our country has already made its decision.

Russia—and this was stated at the very highest level—recognizes the sovereign right of any state to choose its own method of safeguarding its security, including through participation in military-political alliances. At the same time it reserves the right to assess actual processes from the viewpoint of its own security and influence their development in a civilized way. It is well known, for example, that Russia does not consider it possible to give its blessing to NATO's rapid eastward expansion. It prefers other ways of forming a truly Europe-wide security system.

At present NATO is treating Moscow's opinion with respect and taking it into account. Although, as M. Woerner stressed in an interview, the alliance does not intend to give Russia the right to a direct or indirect veto on its decisions.

Admittedly, Russia is not claiming a veto but there are grounds for forthright assessments and comments. Would the selective expansion of NATO really not lead to the violation or, to be more precise, the destruction of, for example, the accords on conventional arms reduction which were the product of such agonizingly hard work? The parity enshrined in them no longer exists. But this does not mean that the imbalance can be arbitrarily and unilaterally aggravated. Meanwhile, is security the only issue here? The country's economic interests, political priorities, and social well-being are being affected. Thus, to attribute a special role to the military in the formation of Russia's position, as they are doing in the West, is to underestimate its politicians and diplomats.

Our country does not intend to oppose NATO as it reassesses its nature and aims. It agrees that this alliance, like other regional organizations, may be transformed in the new conditions. But why should the decisions be made hastily? What obstacle is there to Russia's participation in determining NATO's future destiny and the bloc's role in the system of resisting nonstandard challenges? Why is it not possible to rely on the CSCE and the peacemaking potential of the whole of Europe and make security equal and indivisible for all?

The answers to these questions will demonstrate how far we have the courage to move away from the coalition trenches of the "cold" war period and the conventional stereotypes. It seems that in this regard Russia is showing greater boldness.

Summarizing the results of the visit to Russia and other CIS countries, W. Christopher talked at his press conference about "partnership for the sake of peace" and about offering other states an opportunity to cooperate closely with NATO and enshrine that cooperation in specific agreements and programs. The actual spheres of that cooperation were listed. You will agree that by these comments the secretary of state did not justify the comments cited at the start of this article. There is nothing sensational in them. Russia does not intend to reject anyone in partnership for the sake of peace; it joined in that process long ago.

Nevertheless, the impatient reader will ask, are they going to offer Russia full membership of NATO or not? I do not know. The political Olympus is not always predictable. All I know for sure is that such an invitation and a positive reply to it would come as much as a surprise to many of my interlocutors in the Netherlands and Belgium as it would to the ordinary Russian in the street who has not lost interest in foreign policy.

Grachev Cited on NATO Expansion

LD1011190193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Unattributed commentary including recording of remarks by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev; from the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Defense Ministry]

[Text] Recently, quite a few arguments have emerged regarding NATO and the countries of Eastern Europe, and regarding NATO and Russia. Will it be possible for Europe to exist without NATO? I have repeatedly had to hear disputes about this subject among junior and more senior officers of the Russian Army. The refrain was usually the following: The old world can probably exist without that fruit of Cold War times. You see, another monster of that period, the Warsaw Treaty, has been consigned to oblivion. There has been no trace of it for a few years now. Nothing terrible has happened. At any rate, the heavens did not come crashing down. In that case, in what does NATO see its value? Previously it was clear—in military and political consolidation of the forces of the West in the face of the abstract threat of the East European countries, and first and foremost, a NATO document stresses, of the former Soviet Union. But all these fears are a thing of the past. Europe itself has become quite different.

What is NATO there for now? This is the question put by Russian military men who, failing to hit upon a definite reply, are continuing to reflect upon it. But one of the traditional questions is this: Is it perhaps that with its very presence NATO preserves fear in the the Russian military? But, on the other hand, Russia is directly opposite to the former Soviet Union. NATO and the Russian generals meet fairly often, and their conversations and accords show that they do not look upon one another as enemies. They are even talking about setting up joint forces. For the moment these are only peacekeeping forces. True, it is not quite clear how the whole of the extremely enormous military potential that both sides have—this is missiles, modern aircraft—can be used, but nonetheless, an accord has been reached on joint peacekeeping forces on the basis of the 27th Russian Division for the moment and the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division of the United States. But the fact is there. The small peacekeeping subunit works together, is creating the preconditions for mutual trust, and that is gratifying.

But here is another aspect to the problem that is causing greater fears and doubts. It manifests itself in the fact that in some countries like Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia one can clearly observe a striving to become members of NATO, plus the fact that the three Baltic republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—that were formerly part of the Soviet Union are seeking NATO membership, thereby creating their own kind of belt of direct inviolability with the bloc of countries along the northern and western frontiers of Russia, countries that intend to dictate their terms some day, drawing their strength from collective might. What this is in general looks like a prelude to the new partitioning of Europe, a struggle for influence in vitally important spheres in the old world. In general, it has happened before in its history and unfortunately at times it led to extremely cruel wars, but we should remember that two world wars did in general start in Europe.

But what position will the United States take toward this? Do they not see in this an attempt on their own interests. One might think that the political upheavals within the countries of the former Eastern Europe will end in the near future. It is already clear now that the whole of Europe will become politically uniform, to put it roughly. This by no means signifies in general that economic uniformity will be achieved. What is more, there are obviously differences in the economic sphere. This is a competitive struggle for the market, for the sales market, for the production market. What will happen if the competition should become especially acute? Will the heads of state know how to agree? Will the desire not emerge in them to resolve these differences with the help of the NATO bloc, with its military forces? Generally, here there are more questions than answers, and any political movement to expand the membership of NATO puts the Russian military on their guard. But true there is another variant. Perhaps Russia itself should become a member of NATO and then one could say that these fears are unnecessary.

Recently journalists put this question to Pavel Grachev, the defense minister of Russia. Listen to what he had to say about this issue.

[Begin Grachev recording] At the present time Russia is not examining the issue of becoming a NATO member. However, this is the second year now that it has taken an extremely active part in various kinds of conferences attended by representatives of the North Atlantic bloc, including the states that are not members of the North Atlantic bloc, but who are striving for membership. We are not in favor of the NATO membership expanding at present, since in actual terms we see it not as a political alliance, but a military-political one. This means that it is aiming at not carrying out political tasks alone, but purely military ones as well.

Therefore, the question is posed of what the aim is in giving membership of this military-political alliance to other countries and against whom it is aimed. We are not supporters of reinforcement, but we are supporters of concentrating our efforts even more deeply for cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance. We are prepared to, and are taking a very active part, in cooperating with other states in other political organizations of various types. At the same time, on the basis of bilateral relations, we are prepared to cooperate in the closest possible manner with those states that are not members of the North Atlantic alliance. [end recording]

Well now, judging from the words of Pavel Grachev, Russia's position with regard to NATO is quite obvious, and, in my view, such a stance does to the greatest possible extent, correspond to the military-political development that is taking place in Europe. Well, the question of whether the NATO bloc is necessary in Europe in general is an extremely pressing one at the present time, and the Russian military should probably have a correspondingly vigilant attitude to it.

'Big Disappointments' Awaits East Europeans

PM1111150193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Leonid Mlechin article: "Russian Diplomats Triumph. Big Disappointments Await East Europe"]

[Text] On 10 January, when the leaders of the NATO member countries meet in Brussels, the East European states will experience a big disappointment: The applications of all who dream of joining the North Atlantic bloc will be rejected.

So as not to annoy Russia, the United States has abandoned its original intention of enlarging NATO by admitting former Warsaw Pact members. West Europe does not wish to assume the responsibility of protecting young democracies either from Russia or from each other. Still less does it wish to lay out fantastic sums on bringing the East European armies and their armaments (of Soviet design) into line with NATO standards.

Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, about which the West has been so complimentary, will have to suffer all the torments of jealousy and outraged national dignity. Relations with East Europe are not a priority either for West Europe or for Russia, still less for the United States.

The Americans believe that a threat of war does not stem from Russia and that what the East European states need is not army modernization but economic development. They should seek to join not NATO but, rather, the EC.

Andrey Kozyrev has at last found an argument in favor of a close union with the West which not one patriot advocating a strong power [patriot-derzhavnik] is capable of rejecting.

"If it were not for relations of alliance with the West, we still do not know what military blocs would have formed around the perimeter of the CIS, or even still closer to Russia's borders," the foreign minister said.

Andrey Kozyrev's department considers Washington's pro-Moscow stance a major success for Russian diplomacy. "We have worked well with the Americans," a high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry staffer confessed to IZVESTIYA.

The secret letter protesting the enlargement of NATO, which was sent in President Yeltsin's name to the leaders of certain Western countries, was certainly not written by military men, as many people decided, but by diplomats.

Russian generals and diplomats have ended up in the same trench, albeit for different reasons. The generals believe that it is, in any case, desirable to keep such a mighty war machine as far as possible from their borders. Minister Kozyrev, who also enjoys tackling domestic policy, fears that the inclusion of Poland or Hungary in NATO will play into the hands of the extreme opposition, which will cry out: The enemy is at the gate!

Although it did not let it show, so as not to offend the guest, Moscow was skeptical about the plan of French Prime Minister Balladur—one of those fine-sounding ideas for which the French have a weakness. The Balladur plan consists of linking the states of relatively calm Central Europe by means of a network of bilateral treaties and a pact on stability and then trying to extend this treaty web to the whole of the Old World. Paris evidently cannot imagine the ease with which Central Europe could blow up—over the Hungarian minority in Romania and Slovakia, for example.

The chief threat to Europe stems from militant nationalism, Yuriy Ushakov, chief of the Foreign Ministry Administration for Security and Cooperation in Europe, believes.

But the present structure of NATO is not suitable for combatting nationalism, Yuriy Ushakov believes. The headquarters of the North Atlantic Bloc adheres to a different viewpoint: If it had not been for NATO, Turkey and Greece would have grabbed each other by the throat over Cyprus.

Russian diplomats are gambling on the permanently functioning CSCE.

This is an amorphous and powerless structure—unlike NATO, it does not yet have either manpower or weapons. On the other hand, Moscow plays a key role in it and hopes to gradually entrust to the CSCE the responsibility for restoring peace and order on the territory of the CIS. But NATO is superfluous to Moscow in this game. Russia intends, as a minimum, to receive from the CSCE a mandate for peacemaking operations on the territory of the former USSR, since the United Nations, as Secretary General Butrus-Ghali has declared, will not give it this mandate.

Kozyrev Surveys Relations With East Europe

PM1111103193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Federation minister of foreign affairs: ""East Europe Is Our Partner""]

[Text] Unlike many allies of the former USSR in the Third World, East Europe remains and will remain, I believe, a priority for Russia. Material or political support for our red-brown opposition, as we say, is hardly possible from there.

Ties with East Europe and the history of the ratification or, rather, the nonratification of the treaty with Hungary are very revealing in this respect. Not only East Europe but both the president's administration and the Russian Government have essentially ended up hostages of ideological scores. The treaty with Hungary was not ratified after a whole number of attempts only because the preamble records the long-obvious fact, known to everyone, of the inadmissibility of the interference in Hungarian affairs in 1956—in a form, moreover, which imposes no juridical or other obligations on Russia. A syndrome came into play which harks back to ideological approaches, when it was impossible not only to write but also even to know the truth about what was happening in the countries of East Europe.

This was probably why it came as a surprise to the Soviet leaders that the countries of the region did not wish to copy the halfhearted nature of "perestroyka" and, overtaking us, made directly for democratic and market institutions. Another lesson in political shortsightedness was the fact that, in their contacts, the Soviet embassies did not go outside the bureaucratic party nomenklatura until the very last days and did not know either the new leaders, although they were of world renown, like Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel, for example, or the serious problems they had encountered in the postcommunist period.

These were, however, essentially our problems too. The reform of the bureaucratic apparatus, whether of the economic, State Planning Committee type, the power structures, or the foreign policy department. I will say this not without criticizing ourselves. The difficulties of privatization and commercialization. Finally, aggressive nationalism, the mixture of envy and snootiness toward the surrounding world based on the inferiority complex partly felt by society. As a result, Russian diplomacy in East Europe had to start not just from scratch in many respects but from a minus intensified by the rupture of economic ties.

Today it is possible to speak of the end of the first stage—the stage of the development of new relations between the new Russia and the renewed states of East Europe. It is characterized by such features as the clearing aside of the obstacles of the epoch of the socialist camp and the creation in general outline of a new base for political ties and, on this basis, also mutually advantageous economic ties.

The top-level visits that the Russian president has made essentially to all countries and his meetings with the leaders of these states have resulted in the signing of a new generation of treaties and agreements. The withdrawal of troops from Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary has been completed in a civilized manner. The pages connected with the 1956 and 1968 interventions have been turned once and for all. An end has been put to the "Katyn affair," and a number of other "blank" or, rather, "black" pages of history have been disclosed.

It is important both for us and for East Europeans, first, to look to the future and, second, to gear ourselves to what draws us closer together: Common democratic and market aspirations, the desire to live in a stable Europe, the need for mutually advantageous economic ties. It is in Russia's interests for East Europe to be not a barrier to it but a bridge to West Europe—of course, given the intrinsic value [samotsennost] of ties with East and Central European countries.

Russia and its neighbors in East Europe are tackling virtually the same strategic task of occupying a worthy place in the "club" of highly developed democratic states. It is a question of achieving this by civilized means, not by elbowing each other aside. It is clear that we cannot prohibit anyone from joi[illegible] NATO. The time of diktat and of the "Brezhn[illegible]octrine" has vanished into the past. I believe that it [illegible] our friends also made the switch from inflating suspicion with regard to some of Russia's new aspirations to joining us in the quest for answers to today's complex questions.

No, we do not like the expansion of NATO without Russia's participation, even if this is not directed against us. We are trying to get the West to realize this. Not without success. This is evidenced by the U.S. concept of "Partnership for Peace," which is supported by many NATO countries. It is possible to reckon that the new relations with the West will pass a new test—the "test of Central and East Europe." This will be proof of the political shortsightedness of those who are trying to contrast partnership with the West and the East. Without one the other is hardly realistic.

I will put it still more bluntly. Without the timely and vigorous aim of alliance with the United States and its NATO allies, Russia would hardly have succeeded in preventing the expansion of old closed political groupings and the formation of new ones not only along the perimeter of the borders of the CIS but also, possibly, closer to the present borders of the Russian Federation.

This is the true worth of the loud accusations of "Westernism" from positions of so-called patriotism. But something else is understandable. We will not lag behind East Europans only if we ourselves advance resolutely along the path of internal reforms and an open foreign policy. We must be more actively involved in breathing life into such ideas as "partnership for peace" or the "Balladur plan," including through joint deeds, particularly in the sphere of peacemaking.

Relations among the East European countries themselves combine both elements of competition and rivalry and desires for integration. The extent to which we will be able to use such subregional structures as the "Vysehrad Four" or the "Central European Initiative" to resolve problems common to us depends on ourselves.

Diplomatic efforts in the East European salient will hang in midair unless they are backed up by specific economic cooperation projects. At present we are clearly failing to make use of the favorable conditions which have been created at the political level. Particularly as the very countries of this region have an objective interest in restoring economic ties. There are several areas. First, it is time to implement the bilateral accords that already exist. Second, to seek new forms of cooperation at the level of entrepreneurial structures. It is only a question of how to restore civilized ties, which ultimately would squeeze out wild mafia forms, and cooperation. On the other hand, they must not cause governments to be forced to return, as it were, to the old administrative methods in order to implement accords which have been concluded. Finally, three-way cooperation is also possible: among West Europe, East Europe, and Russia with, of course, the participation of the other CIS countries. But this can only be achieved if it is a question of an equitable partnership and not of attempts to resolve one's own problems at the expense of Russia, let us say. For example, by receiving financial transfusions from the West and selling goods to Russia which are not entirely competitive.

The quite ramified contacts among people and among scientific and cultural establishments were an important feature of the USSR's relations with its Warsaw Pact and CEMA partners, given their whole ideological basis. Today many of those ties are in jeopardy. We must endeavor not to lose them, and the scientific and creative intelligentsia is called upon to play an important role here. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will also support interchurch ties. This is the spiritual background for contacts between Russians and the peoples of a whole number of East European countries. The Foreign Ministry intends to encourage and seek new forms of cooperation at the level of Russian regions, including through structures such as the Organization for Cooperation Among the Countries of the Baltic and Black Sea Basins, which was set up with our participation.

We count on the active participation of the new parliament in our affairs. I must say that diplomats yearn for a parliament that will regulate our activity legislatively, direct it with the help of laws, and monitor both the Foreign Ministry and other state departments. At the same time, foreign policy and activity must be and must remain presidential. Incidentally, not one Central or East European country—and the scale of their problems fades in comparison with ours—has experimented with annual votes for nationally elected presidents or with their early reelection. The experiment of a two-year term set for the parliament of one of the countries also proved unsuccessful. But such experiments have become the tradition in our country. Instead of painstaking work, they smack of irresponsibility and a bolshevik tendency toward emergency measures.

Our task is to use the tools that already exist. These are a democratically elected president and, in the future, a democratically elected parliament. Relying on these, the Russians are obliged to work normally for at least four or five years, including in the area of East and Central Europe. This must be the task not just of the diplomatic department but also of our entire state organism and of society as a whole. Otherwise East Europe really will turn its back upon us and join NATO.

Kozyrev Writes on Polish Ties

AU1211133693 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10-11 Nov 93 p 8

[Article "especially for GAZETA WYBORCZA" by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev: "Let Us Not Harass Each Other Anymore"]

[Text] On 11 November, the Poles will celebrate their national day, Independence Day. Behind that date lies the history of a country whose fortunes have been among the most tragic in Europe.

Over the decades, anyone who was capable of determining the fortunes of the Poles against the wishes of the Poles themselves attempted to do just that. Today, the so-called Polish question, a prick of conscience for Europe for so many years, has finally ceased to exist.

The existence of a sovereign and democratic Poland is by itself a factor of stability and peace on our continent.

The fortunes of Poland and Russia have always been intertwined. They contained no shortage of issues which both nations are firmly condemning today. But there is also another tradition—mutual support for democratic trends, the essence of which was described by Aleksandr Herzen thus: "We are allies of Poland because we are allies of Russia. We want independence for Poland because we want freedom for Russia."

This tradition has been reborn today, now that Russia and Poland have vanquished totalitarianism and commenced radical democratic and market reforms. Perhaps for the very first time, both countries have a historic chance of building genuinely friendly relations without any diktat, paternalism, ideological conformism or hypocritical friendship.

We have already completed the first and perhaps the most difficult stage of establishing these relations. The meetings between our presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Lech Walesa, in Moscow and Warsaw played a key role in this.

By a joint effort, we have succeeded in removing the barriers erected by the past. The last Russian Army units have left Polish territory. The Russo-Polish "new generation" agreement concluded by the two presidents forms the political and legal cornerstone of our cooperation. The appendix to this agreement consists of over 20 bilateral agreements on varied subjects concluded over the post two years.

Each country is going through its own kind of transitional postcommunist state of development. The experience of Poland, a pioneer of radical economic reforms, is valuable and interesting for us.

Just like in other East European countries, the democratic forces in Russia and Poland are facing similar complicated social problems, and have to overcome similar dangers.

The greatest of these is the upsurge in aggressive nationalism, which calls for a domestic and foreign "enemy."

The euphoria of democratic revolution is giving way to a time of daily creative work. We know from our own experience how important it is not to succumb to the temptation of straightforward solutions and not give in to populist and nationalist demagogy.

Instead of the Soviet foreign policy, the hurrah-patriots are offering an explosive mixture of hatred and harassment of our friends, neighbors, and surrounding world in general. They are disguising their fear of future challenges and their inferiority complex in a cloak of independence. That is the reason behind the growing fear in Poland of a "rebirth of Russian imperialism" and the search for a panacea in the form of a unilateral pro-Western orientation. We too are not devoid of this way of thinking. The red and brown deputies inside the Supreme Council have imbibed it deeply. The suppression of the 3-4 October revolt has permitted the fulfillment of the worst scenario—the seizure of power by those who support the anti-Western orientation and wish to rebuild the Soviet empire by "fire and sword."

As we can see, the reapplication of false patterns does not make these patterns genuine.

During the dramatic period of revolt, we appreciated the value of the support and solidarity of President Walesa and the Polish nation. This solidarity reaffirms the fact that it does not lie in the interests of the young East European democracies to fear the past.

One should look to the future and consider the things that really unite us, such as joint democratic and economic changes, a desire to live in a calm and stable Europe, and mutually advantageous economic contacts.

This communion of interests should be translated into the language of practical moves.

What we need is a joint strategy of partnership between Russia and Poland and between Russia and the countries of central and eastern Europe. What kind of partnership?

First, we need closer cooperation in solving European and world problems, taking our mutual interests into account. Europe's future lies not in military-political alliances and opposing groups of countries, but in security systems that join these countries together for the purpose of solving joint tasks—mainly peace missions.

Second, it is necessary to strengthen the confidence between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The development of regional cooperation would encourage this. The experience provided by Russo-Polish contacts within the Baltic Council and between the Kaliningrad Oblast and the northeastern voivodships of Poland speaks in favor of this cooperation.

Third, we must reestablish bilateral economic contacts according to new market principles. The agreements that have been concluded so far are not functioning the way they should. And yet the prospects of our cooperation are really promising. An example of this is the agreement on the building of a gas pipeline from Russia to eastern Europe via Poland.

It is essential to lend support to cooperation on a private business level, which would increase not only trade on street bazaars, but also joint investments and entrepreneurial activities.

Fourth, it is exceedingly important to preserve the traditional spiritual contacts between our peoples. One must not destroy that which unites us. We should continue to exchange information, scientific achievements, and cultural assets.

Russian democrats were with the Polish democrats when Poland became one of the first countries to dismantle the totalitarian system. Now we have a common duty. We must not part. We should remain together at the difficult stage of building a democratic future.

Churkin Supports Gradual Easing of FRY Sanctions

LD1111223693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2022 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[Text] Belgrade November 11 TASS—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin arrived in Belgrade on Thursday [11 November] to help solve the Bosnian problem and facilitate the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia.

An interview with ITAR-TASS upon his arrival in Belgrade, Churkin said that new discussions involving all warring parties should be held before making a breakthrough to peace in the country. The talks will aim at ironing out disagreements over the programme of settling the Bosnian conflict.

The Russian side believes that the latest plan of settlement which is still being rejected by Bosnian Moslems is not doomed. It would be a mistake to ignore previous achievements and start looking for something absolutely new, Churkin stressed. He pointed out that the existing plan provides the most realistic way to reaching peace in the region.

Churkin welcomed a new French-German initiative calling on the Serbs to hand over several disputed areas to Moslems in exchange for gradual lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia. He said the initiative contains elements which have long been favoured by Russia, namely gradual lifting of sanctions.

The Russian diplomat also said that the talks in Belgrade and Sarajevo will also focus on Russian gas supplies. It is necessary to make clear how much gas will be supplied and to where, Churkin said, adding that "we do not want our gas supplies, which are in fact humanitarian aid, to become an apple of discord."

After Belgrade, Churkin will also visit Rome and Athens.

UN Battalion in Former Yugoslavia To Be Reinforced

LD1111174693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1405 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets has signed a decision by the Russian Government saying the Defense Ministry with the Foreign Ministry's agreement should take the necessary steps to reinforce the UN Russian military contingent in the former Yugoslavia by manpower (up to 400 people), by armored personnel vehicles, anti-tank means and by the military hardware.

U.S. 'Disquiet' Over Military Doctrine Eyed

PM1011114193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 pp 6, 7

[Vladislav Drobkov article: "'What Is Happening to Our Friends?' Russia's New Military Doctrine Causes Disquiet in Washington"]

[Text] Washington, 9 Nov—No, events in Russia will definitely not allow Washington's politicians to calmly tackle their domestic concerns like reform of the medical service or cuts in the state bureaucracy. Emotions following Boris Yeltsin's brutal dissolution of the Russian parliament and local soviets had hardly subsided before administrators, congressmen, military men, and commentators here once again entered into disputes over the true purpose and meaning of Moscow's latest initiative, the hastily completed review of Russia's military doctrine.

The reform of Russia's military doctrine, which had been discussed sluggishly for a long time, came as a surprise to many observers in the United States when it was formulated, submitted, and approved by the Security Council under B.N. Yeltsin at lightning speed. Approved without waiting for a new parliament to be convened.

This fact alone enabled some observers here to start talking about a return to the times when the most important issues in Russia's foreign and domestic policy were decided by a small group of Kremlin leaders without being discussed and monitored by any organs of representative power and without public participation.

The analogy with the recent past was so obvious that Senator Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, even asked whether Russia's new military doctrine is not a new version of the notorious "Brezhnev doctrine." And the influential Senator Richard Lugar could not refrain from remarking: "I think this is a black day, and it seems to be time to call a halt and ask what is happening to our friends."

THE WASHINGTON POST attests in an editorial commentary that these kind of statements reflect the "perplexity and emergent alarm" in Washington over the Russian Army's first official attempt during the post-"cold war" era to adapt to the changes in the world.

Abandoning Former Commitments

What alarmed the Americans so? First, many observers here pointed out Russia's renunciation of the principle of not being the first to use nuclear weapons, a principle proclaimed for many years by the former Soviet Union. To be fair, let us point out that the Pentagon and the administration as a whole are not particularly critical of this move by Moscow. People here have always thought that this pledge by the USSR was no more than a propaganda slogan.

"In practice, the change in Moscow's position was less a change in strategy than a change in public stance," Serge Schmemann, THE NEW YORK TIMES Moscow correspondent writes. "Brezhnev's declaration was perceived at the time as a propaganda gambit aimed at the antinuclear movements in the West and not as a credible policy." Other commentators and, particularly importantly, a number of administration officials also voiced similar opinions.

But they did at the same time draw attention to a noteworthy detail. While pledging not to use mass-destruction weapons against nonnuclear states, Russia does nevertheless stipulate that it is free to act against any countries which, while not having these weapons themselves, may be allied to nuclear powers.

People here in Washington saw this as a clear reference not only to the countries of East Europe, which are striving to join NATO, but also to Ukraine which, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, is coming up with "its own unfortunate nuclear aspirations."

Incidentally, the unyielding position espoused by Ukraine, which is totally unwilling to give up the nuclear missiles it inherited from the USSR, is causing increasing irritation in the United States. What is more, Kiev's refusal to start handing the nuclear warheads over to Russia has for two years now prevented the $800 million allocated by the U.S. Congress being transferred to "interested part[illegible] eliminate the nuclear munitions due to be cut back under the START I Treaty. I was told recently by Senator Richard Lugar that, because of the incessant disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the future of these arms, the $800 million allocated on his and Senator Sam Nunn's initiative back during George Bush's presidency is still lying idle.

But let us return to Russia's new military doctrine and the impression that it made in Washington. First, I must point out that official representatives of the U.S. Administration are now making efforts to allay the disquiet felt by some local legislators, political commentators, and military specialists over "Moscow's renewed aggressiveness" or the "revival of the Brezhnev doctrine." This is being done, moreover, not only as "part of the administration's campaign to back President B.N. Yeltsin," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes. This "tolerance" of the Department of State and the Pentagon toward Russia's new military doctrine is dictated by their own interests.

Is Russia Clinton's Only Foreign Policy Success?

It is no secret that over the last few weeks President Clinton and his administration have come in for harsh criticism from the U.S. Congress and press for their failures in the sphere of foreign policy. The humiliating losses suffered by Americans in Somalia, the breakdown of the accord secured under U.S. pressure to bring the president ousted as a result of a military coup back to power in Haiti, and the U.S. and NATO inability with UN participation to stop the civil war in Bosnia have all been a heavy burden on the reputation of the new administration. Matters have reached the point where Congress and the local press are openly calling for the resignation of Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and for a review of Bill Clinton's entire foreign policy doctrine.

However, many critics of the new Democrat administration say that it still does not have such a doctrine and U.S. foreign policy is a chance thing dictated by circumstance. And that is why it is so unsuccessful and inconsistent.

In this situation the White House's fairly constant policy of backing any actions that the Russian president takes almost seems the only evidence of a consistent policy on the part of the administration. And criticizing Moscow's actions in such a sensitive sphere as the military sphere is indeed an inadmissible luxury for Washington now. It is easy to imagine the storm of accusations of shortsightedness and naivete that would rain down on Clinton and his foreign policy advisers if they admit that Russia's actions are in some way violating U.S. interests.

Although criticism of the official authorities' policy toward Moscow is already being heard in Washington, even without their making that admission. Thus, Jonathan Lockwood, a former Pentagon intelligence analyst and now professor at the Defense Intelligence College, described the adoption of the new Russian military doctrine as a "sinister turn of events" and said that it even constitutes an indirect threat to the United States. People in Washington were also extremely upset by Pavel Grachev's statements to the effect that the Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuania and Latvia will be linked with these states' observance of the Russian population's rights and interests. Americans were also put on their guard by the news that the numerical strength of the Russian Army will no longer by confined to the figure of 1.5 million—1 percent of the Russian population.

Serious concern is being voiced here that the Russian Army and its leadership, having done the president the invaluable service of dissolving the Supreme Soviet and routing the opposition, will now be increasingly independent of Boris Yeltsin. THE WASHINGTON TIMES attests that "many top U.S., British, and German intelligence analysts are convinced that the Russian military are independent of Yeltsin's government in practice and, after routing the parliamentarians' uprising against President Boris Yeltsin last month, they are now able to dictate military policy to him." The same newspaper reports that a leading NATO security adviser described the new military doctrine as "a check that Yeltsin has paid the military" for their support in October. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR voiced a similar view of the increase in the Army's influence over Moscow's policy.

In this connection the U.S. secretary of state's attempt to gloss over the unfavorable impression that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev made in Washington with his recent fairly tough statement criticizing the desire of a number of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO. Commenting on this statement, Christopher said: "I see Defense Minister Grachev's statements on this issue as reflecting his personal concern...not as a change in Russian policy." And he hinted that these statements are being made in order to "maintain morale" among Russian troops...

"People in Washington now seem very afraid of creating the impression that U.S. and Russian interests may not coincide in some way," one "high-ranking administration staffer" who, in keeping with tradition, wanted to remain anonymous, said to me in private.

Right To Interfere, Or Application for Peacekeeping Role?

Whereas the renunciation of the old policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons did not overly worry Washington political and military circles, the new military doctrine's clear application for a Russian peacekeeping role in "neighboring countries" caused plenty of disputes and false interpretations here. A number of local commentators perceived this as the Russian military's desire to revive the "Brezhnev doctrine" in a new form, a doctrine that makes provision, the West thinks, for the USSR's right to intervene, including militarily, in the affairs of countries in the then "socialist camp."

These fears are making U.S. administrators act in a fairly cautious manner and so far not express their view of all Russia's new military doctrine. Although Secretary of State Christopher, as noted above, did not voice concern at Moscow's going back on its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the administration has still not by and large voiced an opinion of Russian doctrine. "It has only just been proclaimed," Department of State spokesman McCurry told journalists. "We have had no time to study it in sufficient detail to work out our attitude toward it." McCurry admitted that, during Warren Christopher's recent visit to Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev "mentioned" the new military doctrine at the talks.

I would remind you that the United States is displaying noticeable activeness in shaping new relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics, now independent states. A few months ago a minor scandal even flared up over "recommendations" leaked to the press for the U.S. White House and the Department of State to act as middlemen in defining these relations and even take part in the multinational armed forces that might be used in the event of military conflicts between the fragments of the Soviet Union.

After encountering blatant suspicion and even displeasure from Moscow, Washington rushed to repudiate these plans. But the problem remained, as did the keen U.S. interest in how Russia's relations are developing with the other "newly independent states" as the United States now calls the former USSR republics.

Admittedly, people in the United States are now extremely pleased with the role that the Russian Army is playing in the conflict between Eduard Shevardnadze's government and supporters of Georgia's ousted President Gamsakhurdia. Newspapers here are full of headlines like "Thanks to Russia's Support Shevardnadze Wins Victory." But people in the United States are afraid that Russian intervention will by no means always be in their interests. Senator Richard Lugar, for instance, is expressing blatant concern that Russia's new military doctrine allows its troops to be used for offensive operations "even outside its borders."

It would thus be no mistake to say that Moscow's adoption of a new Russian military doctrine has evoked considerable disquiet in Washington. Moreover, people here take different views of this. On the one hand, Americans are extremely worried at the obvious increase in the military's influence on the Russian president and are afraid that their aspirations will conflict with U.S. plans. On the other, people in Washington realize that it would be unrealistic to expect Russia to totally subordinate its defense interests to U.S. aspirations. The aforementioned WASHINGTON POST editorial quite justifiably points out: It is wrong to expect a "great country of the past and the future to humbly assume a role that suits Washington in every respect."

IZVESTIYA Assesses POST Editorial on 'Czar Boris'

PM1111205193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Nadein article: "Mr. Clinton at the Court of Czar Boris"]

[Text] Washington—An editorial in a recent issue of the capital's influential newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST has caused quite a ballyhoo here. It bore a conspicuous title: "Czar Boris."

Even if a most important point in "Czar Boris" had not been linked directly with a previous item in IZVESTIYA, this article would, all the same, have merited very close attention.

But a third point is probably most important of all. It makes sense to linger over it for a while.

In the opinion of observers here, the recent resignation of Clifton Wharton, the second-ranking person in the U.S. Department of State, began a series of inevitable personnel changes at the very summit of the Mount Olympus of U.S. foreign policy. Many people are arriving at the conclusion that the President has no intention of bearing undivided personal responsibility for the U.S. failures in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.

Clinton has enough cares on the domestic front, where the—for him—most important bills are being passed only with tremendous difficulty. He seems to be having a slight hassle with the reforms of the government structure, which were to have saved hundreds of millions. More and more voters are being disappointed in the health care reform. The ambitious project of a North American Free Trade Area is encountering fierce resistance.

The new administration's Russian policy was a gratifying exception against this alarming background. Despite certain criticism for its impetuous support for the Russian president in his clashes with the intransigent opposition, the White House's practical policy toward Moscow enjoyed bipartisan sympathy and was shared by the absolute majority of legislators.

The editorial "Czar Boris"—and this constitutes its fundamental novelty—is almost the first serious indication that the Clinton administration's Russian policy might also become a field of acute debate.

After pointing out that President Yeltsin is being pressured by very harsh circumstances, and his commitment to democracy prevails over relapses into an autocratic style, the newspaper asserts: "His political conduct increasingly troubles not only Russian citizens but also foreigners who have regarded him as the last and best hope for democratic reform. His latest gesture, repudiating a promise to hold a new presidential election next June, comes on top of a whole series of other steps which have aggrandized his power."

As regards the assessment of Boris Yeltsin, however, the language of rebukes was extremely cautious, and the newspaper accompanied its conclusions with reservations: Only the Russians, after all, have the right to judge their president's steps.

But with regard to its own government THE WASHINGTON POST is more precise in its definitions. It proceeds from the premise that the West wants two things from Yeltsin: first, a policy of democratic and economic reforms; second, a presidency which will be strong both as an institution of power and personally.

Alas, these things are far from always compatible. President Clinton, the newspaper believes, is absolving Yeltsin of all his sins in advance. "This is how," THE WASHINGTON POST continues, "the Clinton administration decided to express **in advance** (emphasized in the original—V.N.) its approval for the likely postponement or cancellation of an early presidential election. It did so even though this cancellation, which has now become a fact, does not meet the test by which the administration justifies all other constitutionally dubious acts undertaken by Yeltsin—that the matter be submitted to the people themselves for their judgment."

As a high-ranking government employee told me, the newspaper's assertion that the administration had in advance approved of Yeltsin's rescinding his promise gave rise to protests at the State Department.

When State Department staffers turned to THE WASHINGTON POST for an explanation, the editors referred to an interview which special envoy Strobe Talbott had granted to IZVESTIYA on the eve of his trip to Russia. Let us remind you that, in answering the IZVESTIYA correspondent's question about the likely reaction at the White House to Boris Yeltsin's possible cancellation of an early presidential election, Talbott, the architect of the administration's policy toward the countries of the former USSR, said that the United States considers the December elections to parliament most important and that the people of Russia should decide this question.

Citing that item in IZVESTIYA, THE WASHINGTON POST's editors asked whether the State Department considers it incorrect. And on hearing that there were no complaints against IZVESTIYA, they said that they consider their own conclusion to have been sufficiently proven and in no need of any amplification.

Of course, an editorial in the independent WASHINGTON POST should not be considered an indication of changes in government policy. The newspaper itself believes that in any event the United States should not create any sudden hurdles for Yeltsin.

Nobody in the administration, however, would dispute the concluding assertion of the article "Czar Boris" that the United States will be able to resolve its own problems amicably only with a democratic government in Russia.

Government Seeks Western Aid To Convert Naval Bases

LD1011224093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1820 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Frolov]

[Text] St. Petersburg November 10 TASS—Russian Vice-Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin sought Western assistance on Wednesday to convert military naval bases on the Black and Baltic Seas to boost the country's shipping business.

He believes this is vital for modernising the existing transport infrastructure which is hampering economic ties into a new developed one.

Speaking at the international news conference "Foreign investments in Russia: new regional possibilities" that opened in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, Shokhin named Kronshtadt, Oranienbaum and Tuapse as the top candidates for conversion. "Their dynamic 'reorientation' is being hampered by the Defence Ministry's position.

However, there is a hope for progress on this issue. We have submitted the project 'sea infrastructure' aimed at building new loading-unloading facilities to the European Bank leadership," Shokhin said.

The vice-premier said northwestern regions of Russia and St. Petersburg are crucial for expanding cooperation with Western investors. It is necessary to determine priorities in such cooperation and aim at projects which may bring quick profits, including gas production and gas equipment.

To exemplify his point he referred to a contract which had been devised to buy oil pumps in the United States. But while bureaucrats were busy with paper work, the Uraltransmash plant launched the production of similar pumps which were more reliable and less expensive, he said.

In another example he recalled that large sums were invested in the reconstruction of several enterprises in St. Petersburg with the participation of Italian and Finnish firms, but the results are not very encouraging, the vice-premier admitted. "We plan to attract foreign investors, announce a tender and with the help of their capital quickly finish the work," Shokhin said.

Speaking about "economic diplomacy," Shokhin said that it has allowed Russia to receive a status of a country with a transitional economy which will open up new possibilities for partnership with the world community.

Financial Help Necessary To Halt Nuclear Waste Dumping

LD1111101093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2139 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Voronkov]

[Text] London, 11 Nov—For over 30 years, right up to 1991, the former Soviet Union circumvented international laws by dumping radioactive waste at sea without notifying this to other countries and relevant organizations. This admission is contained in a report by the Russian delegation, which was issued on Wednesday [10 November] at the 16th session of the consultative conference of the London Convention on Protecting Marine Expanses From the Dumping of Waste and Other Pollution, which is being held in London. The convention was concluded in 1972 by 71 states.

All told, the Russian document points out, the volume of nuclear waste dumped by the former USSR in its northern and eastern waters was a little less than half the level of radiation emitted during the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in April 1986. It states that six spent submarine reactors and one atomic icebreaker reactor found their last resting-place in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya and in the depths of the Kara Sea. However, research has shown that no dangerous increase in the radiation level has been registered in this area.

Russia is prepared to stop the practice of dumping radioactive waste, but it will not be able to cope with the problem on its own, without financial help from the West. This dispiriting fact was stated by Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, head of the Russian delegation and minister for the environment and natural resources, at a news conference there today. He said Russia will be able to stop dumping nuclear waste by 1995 or even next year, depending on financial support required to build new storage facilities on land. According to the minister, negotiations on the matter are under way with Japan and the European Union, but the Russian side has not yet received any firm promises as regards allocating money. Danilov-Danilyan admitted the difficulties Russia is facing in trying to get rid of obsolete nuclear submarines.

In principle, the London Convention does not prohibit the dumping of waste substances with a low level of radiation and some industrial and chemical waste in deep sea water. A session of the consultative conference is to vote today on the proposal to ban the dumping of any nuclear products in the sea, because a 10-year moratorium expires at the end of this year. Japan and the United States support the initiative; Great Britain and France object to it but, as has become known in the corridors of the London meeting, their position could change at under minute under pressure from other delegations. Russia will probably abstain, because it will not be able to meet the requirements of the proposal within 100 days of the adoption of the document.

Team To Visit Nuclear Dumping Sites

LD1111220793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1745 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] At their two day meeting that ended in Moscow Thursday, Russian and Japanese experts agreed to send a joint team to sites where liquid nuclear wastes had been dumped in the Sea of Japan, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official told INTERFAX.

The two-staged expedition will take samples in the areas where Russian or Japanese waste was dumped. "South Korean and IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] officials will to some extent take part," the diplomat said.

He emphasized that the talks would continue. "We have to agree on specific forms of cooperation because for Russia the problem remains unresolved. Moscow has just said that it will not dump liquid nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan but we have neither storage nor decontamination facilities. We pin great hopes on the Japanese aid."

The Foreign Ministry official confirmed that another Russo-Japanese event would take place Friday. "The joint committee for cooperation on elimination of Russia's nuclear weapons in the framework of treaties with the U.S.A. will hold its first meeting in the Russian capital," he said.

The diplomat recalled that an agreement on the setting up of such a committee had been signed during the recent visit President Boris Yeltsin had paid to Japan. "The Japanese authorities have expressed their readiness to appropriate $100 Mn [Million] for this purpose," he said.

"The committee will officially start work Friday. Diplomats, military officers and nuclear engineers appointed by the two governments will set the priorities and goals of cooperation in this field," the official said.

To the best of his knowledge, the Japanese team will be headed by Ambassador to Moscow Sumio Edamura and Director General of the Arms Control and Technological Cooperation Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Akira Hayashi and the Russian team, by a Nuclear Energy Ministry official.

Novaya Zemlya Site Able To Resume Tests 'Quickly'

PM1111160593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 7

[Report by Aleksey Rakcheyev and Vadim Prokopenko: "The Bermuda Triangle Has A Rival... A Nuclear Rival"]

[Text] Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian Federation minister of atomic energy, together with representatives of the Ministry of Defense General Staff, is on an urgent visit to the nuclear test site on the island of Novaya Zemlya.

The visit by our specialists follows a decision by the U.S. President to prepare the test site in Florida [as published] for a new nuclear explosion within three months. The Americans are trying to put pressure in this way on China, which is testing its own nuclear bomb.

Georgiy Kauro, chief of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Public Relations Center, stated: "Our department naturally could not remain aloof from this decision by the White House, and a group was quickly set up to find own how soon our test site would be ready for a new test."

And so, if the United States and China are unable to agree on China's nuclear program in the near future, we will once again regularly be reading ITAR-TASS official communiques on the latest nuclear explosion on Russian territory. Moreover, in the United States-Russia-China triangle, our explosions will most probably echo the Americans'.

Incidentally, our test site is ready to resume tests far more quickly.

Russia Ties Seen as PRC Trump Card for U.S. Summit

PM1011211793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "Chinese Say Kind Words to Grachev in Preparation for Meeting with Clinton"]

[Text] Beijing—It is written in the West that three-fourths of the PRC's ground troops are still deployed in the north to repulse a possible attack from Russia. "But whom is the Chinese soldier preparing to fight?" reporters asked General Grachev, who is visiting China. Minister Grachev replied that since last December, i.e. since Boris Yeltsin's visit to China, "great changes for the better" have occurred in our countries' relations.

The Japanese press maintains that China and Russia have reached agreement on the joint production of new models of combat hardware. Commentators in Hong Kong even speak of the possibility of a revival of the alliance between the former communist allies.

Beijing is in no hurry to refute these suppositions. Prime Minister Li Peng, who received Pavel Grachev, emphasized that, regardless of the kind of internal political situation that takes shape in the two countries and who is at the helm, China will strengthen friendship with Russia. The Chinese head of government called for the Russian-Chinese border to be turned into a region of stability and peace. While in no way casting doubt on the sincerity of the Chinese leader's protestations, I would like to remind you that the visit by the head of our military department has come at a time of intensive preparation for the U.S.-Chinese summit meeting. Rapprochement with Russia will be a good trump card for PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin in bargaining with Bill Clinton.

What are the parameters of this rapprochement, to judge by the documents which Pavel Grachev and PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian intend to sign 11 November? The chief result of the visit will be an agreement on cooperation between the two states' Ministries of Defense. Its purpose is to protect the security of China and Russia and to strengthen peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Cooperation between the two departments is not directed against third countries, states the draft of the agreement, which will be valid for five years. It provides for "an exchange of experience in various spheres" between Russian and Chinese military chiefs.

There are many declarative points in the document, but as regards specific forms of cooperation between the two armies, the general refused to disclose them during a conversation with Russian journalists. According to him, the agreement contains articles not intended for publication.

Next year seven Chinese delegations at various levels—from a ministerial delegation to a song-and-dance ensemble—will visit Russia, while six Russian delegations will visit China. The sides have agreed to increase the staffs of the military attaches in Moscow and Beijing by three people.

"Were Russian arms deliveries discussed?"

The general avoided a direct answer, citing the fact that this problem falls within the competence of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, while it is his task to strengthen contacts with military circles. Incidentally, our hosts accorded our delegation an opportunity not only to talk with generals but also to observe Chinese soldiers at work. During a visit to the Beijing Garrison's 3d Division it attended firing exercises. The level of discipline, physical training, and fire skill is not bad, Grachev said.

Defense Minister Grachev Continues PRC Visit

PM1111113193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Tomilin: "Visit Continues"]

[Text] Beijing, 9 Nov—Regardless of the domestic political situation in the Russian Federation and the PRC, as well as certain ideological aspects, China has supported close relations of friendship with Russia and will strengthen them. PRC State Council Premier Li Peng stated this today at a meeting with Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who is here on an official visit.

Russia attaches great significance to the development of ties with China, Pavel Grachev stated at the meeting, and hopes for the further strengthening of bilateral friendship and cooperation.

On the same day, Pavel Grachev had a meeting with Zhang Zhen, vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission, during which the sides advocated the further building of fruitful ties between the two countries.

Commenting on his visit to the PRC, the Russian Federation defense minister expressed satisfaction with Russian-Chinese relations in the military sphere, stating that they are not directed against third countries but promote the strengthening of good neighborly relations, meet the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, and promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to the PRC last year, during which a record number of bilateral documents was signed, provided an impetus for the intensive development of our relations, he stated in a conversation with Russian journalists.

During the present meetings and talks with our Chinese colleagues, Pavel Grachev went on, we proposed to elaborate and sign in the future an agreement on averting dangerous military operations on land and at sea. The Chinese side greeted this idea with satisfaction, and it may start being discussed during the visit to Russia by PRC National Defense Minister Chi Haotian, whom we have invited to visit our country next year.

A five-year agreement based on the outcome of Pavel Grachev's visit to China will be signed by the two countries' defense ministries. According to the Russian minister, the document envisages the development of cooperation in spheres of mutual interest.

Answering a question from your ITAR-TASS correspondent as to whether the subject of the sale of Russian weapons to China was raised during the visit, the minister stated that "as of today, this question has not been raised."

Terms Trip 'Very Successful'

LD1111125393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1127 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Grigoriy Arslanov and Vladimir Fedoruk]

[Text] Beijing November 11 TASS—Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev's Chinese official visit finished on Thursday with the signing of a five-year agreement between the Russian and Chinese Defence Ministries and the talks protocol.

"It was a very successful visit," the Russian defence minister told Russian journalists. It will undoubtedly fill the Russo- Chinese relations with a new content, he said.

During the visit, meetings were held with Premier of the State Council of China Li Peng, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council Zhang Zhen, Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian.

The signed documents envisage exchange of visits, delegations, groups of experts, and also the conducting of consultations of the two countries' Defence Ministries leaders, the discussion of actions in the border districts areas, in particular, the Shengyang and far eastern military districts, the informing of the defence forces of military construction plans, a new military doctrine, experience exchange in armed forces construction. We exchanged opinion of perspectives for further relations between the armed forces of the two countries, discussed other issues of mutual interest, the minister said.

Pavel Grachev said the issues of military-technological cooperation, by the sides' coordination, were removed from the agenda, as arms sales are beyond the sphere of the Defence Ministry activity.

The basic content of our visit is that the Russian and Chinese sides agreed to restore the stable ties between the two states which existed in the past.

At the same time, asked by journalists, the minister said that "we are not going to conclude a union." "We decided to strengthen bilateral and equal ties, not infringing upon the two states' interests. That is a perspective for further development of the Russo-Chinese relations," he said.

Issues of security in the Asian-Pacific region were discussed in principle. "We agreed security in the Asian-Pacific region will be more durable, if our bilateral relations are strong," stressed Pavel Grachev.

The delegation visited military units, the Luishun Chinese naval base, never seen by either Soviet or Russian military men, as well as the town of Dalian and laid flowers to the monument of the Soviet soldiers fallen for the liberation of China in 1945.

"The fact of visiting Luishun (Port Arthur) is evidence of the Chinese side's respect for our state and its striving for strong ties with Russia," said the minister.

The Chinese visit of Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev facilitated the deepening of the mutual understanding and the development of normal contacts between the armed forces of the two countries, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin told a briefing for Chinese and foreign journalists on Thursday.

During the visit, the sides spoke for further development of friendly relations between China's and Russia's armies, he said. The signing in Beijing of the cooperation agreement between the defence ministries of the two countries concerns, mainly, delegations and experience exchange in specific areas and does not include issues of inter-action in manufacturing military equipment and arms sales, said the Chinese representative.

Russia To Supply Engines for Chinese Fighter

PM1111152793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "China and Russia Making the 'Super-7'"]

[Text] Nov 9—Japan's YOMIURI has reported that it has in its possession a photograph of the engine developed by Russia for the fighter which is being designed by China with Moscow's technical assistance. Military experts, the newspaper points out, had indicated the existence of Beijing's new fighter program even earlier, but this is the first confirmation of the fact. It has been learned from Chinese sources that this program has been included in the "Sino-Russian Agreement on Technical Cooperation in the Defense Sphere."

The implementation of this program could be an important move in stepping up the development of new military hardware between China and Russia. According to information from Chinese sources, the new fighter is called the "Super-7" (or "Chao-7"). Initially it was planned to use technology from the United States for the new aircraft's engine. But that plan had to be scrapped after the United States imposed a ban on deliveries of weapons and technology to the PRC in connection with the events on Tiananmen Square.

Official Comments on Relations With China

LD1111103893 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1525 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Interview with Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Afanasyev, first deputy head of the First Directorate of the Asia-Pacific Region at the Foreign Ministry, by unidentified correspondent in Moscow on the "Mir" program; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] In recent years, our perception of relations with various countries seems to have altered sharply, and we are, in general, interested in the following question: What is the fundamentally new approach in relations with the countries of the Asian region?

[Afanasyev] I would say that the fundamentally new thing is that we have shifted from a policy of relying on military force in that region, and building up our military might, to a policy of using diplomatic and political methods to have an effect on the situation and ensuring our interests. As part of that, we are trying to develop the economic potential of our Far Eastern areas, which would enable us to become a normal civilized member of the Pacific community. The Pacific area is now, as you know, the most dynamic economic area in the world. So for Russia it is extremely important to join in that economic dynamism, to ensure the integration of our economy with that region and thus to enjoy the fruits of that economic development together with the other countries.

[Correspondent] Are there any controversial issues in relations with China at the moment?

[Afanasyev] At the moment, following long searches by ourselves and by the Chinese, relations with China have reached a new stage. Some ten years ago, let us say, we had a very strong ideological factor in our relations: We regarded each other sometimes as ideological adversaries, at other times as ideological allies. But now we have gradually formulated a policy toward China, it seems to me, that is actually based on our national interests.

Russia's national interests, as we see them vis-a-vis China, consist, above all, in the fact that we are neighboring states. China is our largest neighbor in the east. Moreover, China is, in my view, our closest foreign neighbor. With China we have a common border over 4,000 km long, and a great deal affecting the destiny of Russia and our people depends on how our relations with that country develop.

We have now managed to reach, with China, a level that enables us to say that we are good neighbors and have established friendly relations, and that is enshrined in the declaration on the fundamentals of mutual relations that was signed by President Yeltsin last December during his visit to China.

Russia's interests vis-a-vis China also consist in the fact that we want to see a stable, strong, and developing China, undergoing market-orientated reform in the economy and becoming more democratic, and a China that is friendly toward Russia.

As you know, we held talks with China on the border issue for 30 years. The problem reached a point at which, as you know, bloody events were happening on the border—in the vicinity of Damanskiy Island, where Soviet, as they were then, soldiers and Chinese citizens were killed. But nowadays that problem in the east is all but solved. In 1991, an agreement on the eastern sector of the border was signed, and it was ratified by the parliaments of our two countries. Ratification documents were signed by President Yeltsin and Chinese President Yang Shangkun, and it came into force.

The main principle according to which the border is defined between Russia and China, since it passes through rivers, is the principle of international law. In other words, it runs through the middle of a river in the case of non-navigable rivers, or through the middle of the main channel when the river is navigable. Accordingly, those islands that are on our side go to Russia, and those islands that are on the Chinese side go to China. That fair principle is universally recognized in international law. Naturally, some islands will go to China, and some will go to Russia. A joint demarcation commission is now at work, precisely determining where the main channel lies and which islands should go where. It will be working for several more years. After that, the sides will definitively place border markers and thus settle a problem that was acute for many decades.

There is no need for any emotion here. It must be approached with a view to the long-term interests of Russia and China—namely, to have a stable, delineated and fair border. That will rule out any conflict between our countries and will create a firm basis for good-neighborliness. I think that we now have quite good prospects for relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Incidentally, that does not just mean the East for us; there is also, let us say, the United States of America. We are among the nearest neighbors of the United States of America. Our islands Big Diomede [Russia] and Little Diomede [U.S.] are separated by just a few kilometers. There is, of course, Japan. There is China. There are all the ASEAN countries, and there are the many other countries in the region.

It is a unique feature of the situation that Asia has now changed radically. In other words, the idea of Asia as being backward, downtrodden and second-class in the world, which was relatively true about 30-40 years ago, has changed completely. If you go to countries like Thailand, China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and many others, you will see a completely different, up-to-date picture: Powerful economies developing dynamically. China's growth rate, let us say, over the past nine months of this year, according to our information, is in the region of 13.3 percent—the growth of the gross national product. Their industrial production this year is growing by over 20 percent, with an increase in the real living standards of the population being ensured. Of course, they have a mass of problems, and they have inflation and other things, but all those economies are exceptionally dynamic.

Quite honestly, Russia missed the moment when Asia began to advance, and now we seem to be trying to jump on to the footboard of the departing train. But Russia does have powerful potential. There is every reason to join in the process. Politically and diplomatically, we now share common values with most countries in the region, and, even though we have, let us say, differences in our view of human rights, on some regional conflicts, on disarmament problems, nevertheless, we have common, positive directions.

But to bring all this about, we have to change our own psychology. We have always paid more attention to the West—to the United States and Western Europe. We now need to look to the East as well. As our president said, our eagle [the two-headed eagle, the national symbol] looked in both directions, and its westward and eastward eyesight was equally good.

One question that I think is very important is the coverage of China in our media, not just on TV, in the papers, and on the radio. Quite a lot of material has now appeared that is, I would say, superficial, very emotive and, in a number of cases, in my view as an orientalist, offensive and unfair to China. Of course, we now have freedom of the press, and everyone is free to write what he thinks. But nevertheless, it seems to me that, when it is a matter of relations between states, especially relations with a neighbor as great as China, it is necessary to observe a certain restraint, caution, and even-handedness in comments and appraisals. We remember the many years of polemics with China, during the sixties, as you probably know, which led to absolutely nothing. May God forbid, as they say, that we should ever again embark on that path.

Sources Cited on DPRK Troop Buildup

PM1011124393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[ITAR-TASS reports dated 9 November under the general heading: "Shadow of War Over Korea"]

[Text] Pyongyang—"Answer dialogue with dialogue, war with war," Vice Marshal Kim Kwan-chin, DPRK deputy minister of the People's Armed Forces, stated in an interview with the newspaper NODON SINMUN. With regard to the South Korean defense minister's statements on "plans not to be slow with a military response" to North Korea's nuclear research work [razrabotka], Kim Kwan-chin accused Seoul of wanting to bring the situation on the Korean peninsula to a state of war. "It seems that there is no possibility now of easing the acuteness of the nuclear problem by peaceful means or by means of talks," he said. "And we cannot rely the whole time on talks alone. We are ready for war, too."

The Japanese authorities have confirmed recent press reports that the DPRK is concentrating troops in the region of the border with South Korea. "This is a fact; we have the relevant information," K. Saito, Japanese first deputy foreign minister, stated at a news conference. However, he stressed that a number of points remain unclear at the moment. In particular, there is a lack of accurate information on how intensively Pyongyang has been building up its armed forces in the region of the South Korean border recently. In this regard, Saito noted, it is impossible to establish "what military significance the DPRK's present actions have."

According to intelligence data from the U.S. Defense Department, over two-thirds of all the DPRK's army subunits are now concentrated near the border with South Korea.

Regional Implications of DPRK Nuclear Arms Assessed

PM1111194993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Leonid Mlechin report: "Kim Il-song Is Too Old To Use Nuclear Weapons, Even If He Has Them"]

[Text] Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Yong-sam will decide in Washington 23 November what to do if North Korea does indeed have the nuclear bomb

Clinton has said that the United States will not tolerate the emergence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. And the question of whether the United States should not inflict a preemptive strike on the North Korean nuclear complex, as the Israelis did in the case of the Iraqi reactor in 1981, is already being discussed.

In reply Pyongyang has stated that it is ready for war. And spokesmen for the U.S. troops stationed in the south of the Korean peninsula have reported that North Korea has concentrated 70 percent of its army on the border with the south.

But does North Korea have nuclear weapons? And if so, is there a great chance that they will be used?

Cold analysis forces us to interpret this prospect fairly calmly. How does the mentality of Kim Il-song and his son differ from the mentality of the Soviet and Chinese leaders in the years when they developed nuclear weapons? Neither Stalin nor Mao took it into their heads to use their bombs, because they were least of all inclined to suicide.

Kim Il-song is now 81 years old. His main task is to serenely hand over the country to his son and heir. And the younger Kim cannot fail to understand that the use of nuclear weapons, and an armed conflict in general, would deprive him of the wonderful opportunity of ruling this little empire.

And most important—there is no precise information which could confirm the existence of a nuclear bomb in the DPRK.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no such information, nor does the intelligence service. Nor do the Americans have precise data. There are suspicions. There are grounds to suppose that North Korea may possess such weapons. The saga of the Republic of South Africa—which, as was discovered much later, was able to acquire nuclear weapons—of course strengthens such suspicions.

What do we know precisely?

North Korea has long been developing a nuclear program and has made sufficient headway down this road.

In the opinion of experts, scientists in Pyongyang do not possess the necessary scientific and technological potential to complete the program, and the nuclear theme will most likely be used to blackmail its partners.

A blackmailer is above all a pragmatist. If you want, you can reach agreement with him. Who should reach agreement with Kim Il-song?

Official channels of communications between Moscow and Pyongyang remain open.

But there is little that Pyongyang needs from Moscow. Kim Il-song's goal is to see a U.S. ambassador in Pyongyang. North Korea behaves like an old maid who does not know how to attract the attention of a nice young man, and hence commits a host of follies. The keys to the solution of the nuclear problem are in the hands of U.S. diplomacy.

Washington once promised to recognize Pyongyang if Moscow and Beijing recognized South Korea. But the United States did not in fact establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK, although it has retained its embassies in countries with extremely dubious regimes.

The presence of a U.S. ambassador in Pyongyang would be advantageous to everyone. Active U.S. diplomacy would also reassure South Korea and Japan, who fear Pyongyang.

There are still U.S. troops in South Korea, and South Koreans understand that they could not find a better defense against unpleasantnesses from the North.

When the issue of the possible withdrawal of U.S. troops arose in 1970, Seoul was on the point of adopting a secret decision to develop nuclear weapons. But the Americans quickly forced the Koreans to abandon this plan....

For the Japanese there is nothing more frightening than Korean nuclear weapons. Especially if they are possessed by a future united Korea.

Now everyone is watching Japan: How will it behave?

People are trying to see foul play in the fact that in the next five years nuclear power will give Japan between five and 10 tonnes of plutonium which could be converted into a component for nuclear bombs. And in the fact that it is expected to test the N-2 missile, which is comparable with Russian or U.S. ICBM's.

And it already seems to some people that Tokyo is moving away from a readiness to extend indefinitely and without any conditions the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (it remains in force through 1995).

In actual fact there are no grounds to suppose that Tokyo will really attempt to create nuclear weapons. In the first place this will not be tolerated by the Americans, on whom Japan continues to depend.

Pyongyang Urged To Remove Suspicion

SK1211031693 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 11 Nov 93

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Regarding the aggravated situation on the Korean peninsula, station commentator Yuriy Solton writes:

Tension between the South and the North has increased. According to some sources, Pyongyang has concentrated about 70 percent of its armed forces at the border area.

Seoul stated that it would hold a large-scale military exercise next week; 650,000 ROK soldiers and all of the 36,000 ROK-based U.S. soldiers will be mobilized in the military exercise, which is aimed at inspecting the ROK's capacity for defense in the event of the North's southward invasion.

Washington has warned that it will regard any invasion of the ROK as one of the United States.

Adverse developments on the Korean peninsula are a source of concern for Russia and other neighboring countries. Under this situation, all concerned should do their utmost to control themselves. They should obliterate the possibility of armed conflict.

I am not trying to make an excuse for Seoul's plans for the U.S.-ROK military exercise. I think, however, Pyongyang can make great contributions to easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang stated that it had no intention of invading the South or developing nuclear weapons.

Why then does the North's leadership refuse to accept nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency? The North's persistent refusal of inspections has aroused the suspicion that the North is developing nuclear weapons, and the suspicion is making the Korean peninsula's situation extremely cloudy.

Pyongyang should remove the suspicion. By doing so, Pyongyang will ease tensions to a certain extent and avoid the international community's sanctions against it.

Foreign Ministry Statement on UN Resolution on Libya

LD1211120193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1142 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 12 TASS—The Press and Information Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry circulated the following statement today:

"The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on November 11, which reiterates the need for the extradition for trial purposes of two Libyan citizens, accused of staging acts of terrorism, and provides for additional measures within the framework of the sanctions regime, imposed on Libya. The resolution was supported by 11 votes, with four abstaining. No one voted against it.

"Within the framework of a long coordination of the draft resolution Russia insisted on its balanced character and secured the adoption of the amendments it proposed. This refers, in the first place, to the need for Libya to pay its debts, which is clearly reiterated in the resolution. We insisted that the provisions, dealing with general tasks of the world community in combatting terrorism, should be made more prominent in the resolution.

"The diplomatic work done made it possible to uphold Russia's interests both in the political and economic spheres, including trade and financial relations between Russia and Libya.

"Those problems, including the payment of Libya's debt to Russia, will be discussed during the forthcoming visit of Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations O.D. Davydov to Tripoli."

Foreign Ministry Statement on Situation in Yemen

LD1111210893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1821 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry information and press department issued the following statement on Thursday:

"Recent reports from Yemen about the growing tension in the north and south of that country cannot but cause concern.

"In this connection we would like to stress once again that the Russian Federation favours the continuation and development of the process of integration of the two parts of the country on the basis of the 1990 agreement on their unity. The final say in the settlement of any disagreements over the questions connected with the methods and speed of integration should belong to the people of Yemen, without any interference in its internal affairs. We believe that the most positive (solution) would be the establishment of a special commission by the Yemeni parliament to study the causes of the crisis.

"It is important that integration processes in Yemen proceed on the basis of generally recognised democratic norms, taking into account the need to respect the principles of political pluralism which are taking root in the political life of Yemeni society. The national consensus in favour of the preservation of the united Yemeni state and democratic development of the country on the basis of equality should become a permanent landmark for activities of Yemeni political forces. We believe this would facilitate not only economic and social progress of the people of Yemen, but promote international authority, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country."

Foreign Ministry Issues 'Timely' Warning to Georgia

PM1111200393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Vitaliy Alekseyev and Sergey Prokopenko report: "Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Is Wrong, Tbilisi Believes. But Georgian Defense Ministry Main Staff Is Still Moving to Zugdidi"]

[Text] In connection with the withdrawal of Georgian Government troops to the line of the Inguri River, which divides the Georgian side and the Abkhaz side, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has warned that a river crossing by Georgian or Abkhaz armed formations is fraught with serious consequences.

This statement has prompted a stormy response from official Tbilisi. It has been viewed as provocative. The press secretary to the Georgian head of state has accused the Russian mass media of reporting, with reference to the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Abkhazia, alleged clashes between government troops and Abkhaz formations in the region of the Inguri River. A press service statement says that no clashes occurred, and Abkhazians and supporters of the ex-president take responsibility for blowing up a railroad bridge over the Inguri.

In an interview on Georgian television Eduard Shevardnadze said in this connection that "the statement could have been made, but without citing nonexistent incidents." Nobody in Tbilisi, however, mentions the fact that, if the information about clashes is a "canard," it was launched and picked up precisely by Georgian mass media.

Be that as it may, the Russian Foreign Ministry statement, if it was a preventive measure, was a timely one. In assessing the situation with Abkhazia, Eduard Shevardnadze, leader of the Georgian state, declared: "We must try to use absolutely every available opportunity. I do not rule out an armed solution to the question."

It is not yet known whether any connection exists between this statement by the Georgian head of state and the fact that the Main Staff of the Georgian Ministry of Defense is moving its base from Tbilisi to Zugdidi.

Observers point out that Russia's tough stand on this question could sharply change the attitude toward the Russian servicemen fulfilling tasks in west Georgia. We believe, however, that the Russian side has weighty enough trump cards in this game.

On 10 November Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived by warship in Batumi, where he met with Aslan Abashidze, chairman of the Ajarian Supreme Soviet. According to Baltin, the purpose of his visit is to acquaint himself with the leadership of the autonomous republic. He also denied rumors of a landing operation which is supposedly being prepared to guard the port of Batumi and the railroad. Aslan Abashidze in turn rated the presence of Black Sea Fleet sailors in west Georgia as a factor for stability in the region.

Kozyrev Comments Before Meeting on Tajikistan

LD1011175893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1430 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] The Interdepartmental Commission on Tajikistan held a session at the Russian Foreign Ministry today. The session was a closed one, but Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, described the situation before the session.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] When all is said and done, our measures are making themselves felt and are producing results. This applies, first and foremost, to border protection and the introduction, the beginning of the organization, the first steps toward the introduction of the coalition forces. It is a major political move to protect the joint interests of the CIS, to protect the interests of Tajikistan, and to protect the Russian Federation's national and state interests.

I think that we can and should express our gratitude, so that this voice can be heard loud and clear from here, from Moscow, on behalf of all the departments, and on behalf of the Russian leadership, gratitude to servicemen, border troops, officers, and soldiers serving there.

I must say that our diplomats are also taking an active part, visiting the most dangerous hot spots, but this is not to denigrate the political area of this work which, all the same, is still lagging behind the military measures, I would say and, at the same time, it is lagging behind the central issue: I do not think that the leadership of Tajikistan is in any doubt—I would not like them to be—that through our military measures, through the border or coalition forces, we are able to replace or will replace the political work to get a dialogue going, including with the opposition, including also the so-called irreconcilable opposition, I mean, naturally, not the opposition that is right now armed and fighting, for there is an altogether different dialogue to be had with this opposition, but I mean the Tajik opposition which is ready to have political dialogue.

A dialogue must be conducted. It is one of the most important tasks of the Tajik leadership to stabilize the situation. We are permanently in touch, and this also represents a part of the overall efforts that we are aware of, and that are now being made by the leadership, led by Rakhmanov and Abdullodzhonov, to stabilize the situation.

The situation is, of course, becoming stable in the republic, but it is important that this process should be enshrined within and underpinned by a full-scale and regular political dialogue. [end recording]

[Announcer] There is no information yet about the results of the session, but we can assume that it did not discuss the strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border alone, but also how to encourage dialogue between the warring sides in Tajikistan: Russia cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Tajikistan, a sovereign state. What happens in Tajikistan affects Russian interests and that is why Russia cannot be a side observer either. A policy of neutrality here is unacceptable. It appears that the same applies in equal measure to other CIS members.

Yeltsin Envoy Leaves To Mediate Karabakh Dispute

LD1111154993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1513 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS— "A personal envoy of the Russian president is setting off for Baku.

Yerevan and Stepanakert where he will discuss aspects of the settlement" (of the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh), a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Demurin told a briefing here today.

The spokesman said in a comment on recent talks between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev, and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Geydar Aliyev and Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and the Karabakh leader, Robert Kocharyan, that "we proposed to the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno- Karabakh that they step up efforts in their search for mutually acceptable compromise solutions, hold a series of meetings and negotiations aiming to reach as soon as possible an agreement on a complete end to hostilities".

Russia favours an immediate end to the Karabakh conflict and the withdrawal of the Karabakh forces to the positions they occupied before the ceasefire was broken on October 21, said the spokesman.

Statement on Monetary Union With Kazakhstan Released

LD1011202593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1739 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 10 November (ITAR-TASS)—In connection with the introduction of a national currency in the Russian Federation, intensive talks between delegations of Russia and Kazakhstan have been held recently in which issues of creating a ruble zone of a new type, based on using the ruble as the currency unit of the Russian Federation, were discussed. A statement by the heads of government of Russia and Kazakhstan was circulated today saying that in connection with the introduction of a national currency in Kazakhstan, since the bank and payment machinery for introducing it were being discussed in detail, it became clear that it is inadmissible to force the pace of uniting the two countries' monetary systems without a certain transitional period for creating the necessary conditions for a real unification.

It would be practically impossible to form these conditions under circumstances where banknotes issued from 1961 to 1992 are being circulated on Kazakhstan territory. These banknotes are simultaneously being used in a number of other states. This leads to an uncontrolled flow of the monetary mass, the document signed by the heads of the Russian and Kazakhstani Governments says.

The decision adopted by the Republic of Kazakhstan to introduce a national currency in the evolved situation is in the interests of both friendly countries. It creates preconditions for improving trade and economic ties between our countries and for achieving macroeconomic stabilization in Kazakhstan.

Guided by the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid the Russian Government supports this decision and will facilitate a strengthening of the Republic of Kazakhstan's monetary system, including the achievement of mutual convertibility between the two countries' currencies.

The Russian Government will in conjunction with the Russian Central Bank give the Government and National Bank of Kazakhstan technical assistance in the introduction of its national currency and in the development of an internal currency market and a number of other aspects regarding the functioning of the Republic of Kazakhstan's monetary system.

Soskovets on Kazakhstan 'Blackmail'

LD1011151693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1315 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow November 10 TASS—"The policy of blackmail in relations between former Soviet republics has no prospects", Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets told reporters on Wednesday commenting on the decision of Kazakhstan to quit the rouble zone.

He called to preserved industrial relations between the CIS states "to the maximum and in all directions". For this it is necessary to create conditions for clearing trade, set up joint banks for technical cooperation, jointly develop various industries, according to Soskovets who stressed that it is also desirable to lift customs duties and the value added tax on goods crossing borders within the Commonwealth.

Soskovets believes private and foreign businesses can act as mediators in restoring industrial ties within the CIS.

Shokhin Says Ruble Zone Not Finished

LD1111111293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0928 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Rumyantsev]

[Text] St. Petersburg November 11 TASS—"I do not think the single rouble zone has been finished," Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS.

In his opinion, we are moving through a transitional period towards the creation of the rouble zone of a new type. "Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have announced that they are rejecting the rouble and introducing their national currencies.

However, the rouble will continue to play the key role in financial transactions inside the CIS. In addition, along with the consolidation of the economic alliance of the former USSR republics, for which all of them are now working with the exception of the Baltic states, the exchange rate of national currencies with regard to the rouble will become more clear. So, it will be possible to cooperate in a more reliable and effective way," Shokhin said, referring to the European Union as an example.

Shokhin is concerned over the status of Russian currency in Armenia and Tajikistan, where banknotes of various types will probably be in circulation for a long time to come.

Negotiations Held With Moldova Yield Agreement

LD1111162393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1424 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—The seventh round of negotiations between Moldova and Russia finished in the Moscow region on Thursday.

Having emphasized its productivity, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department Mikhail Demurin told a briefing in the news centre that the parties practically agreed on the full text of the main document on the status and terms of the multi-stage withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.

According to the Russian spokesman, the parties did not reach a complete agreement earlier on Thursday only on one, very important issue—the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova simultaneously with the political settlement of the conflict over the Dniester area, which claims greater autonomy from Moldova.

As is known, the presidents of Russia and Moldova agreed on May 15 on making these processes simultaneous. Russia insists on respecting this basic accord between the presidents.

A representative of the Dniester area took part in this round of talks as well as in previous rounds, in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Moldova.

According to Demurin, apart from the document on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, the parties continued to work constructively on five other agreements in various fields: transport, air transport, moveable property and real estate, and Moldova's participation in building housing for Russian officers and ensigns, who withdraw from its territory.

Moldovans Make 'Surprise' Proposal

AU1011214493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2042 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Mircea Dascaliuc report from Chisinau]

[Text] Today, near Moscow, in a building belonging to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the seventh round of negotiations have begun on the conditions and terms of the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

General Anatol (Kruchina) is participating in the negotiations as observer on behalf of the Dniester region. The delegation of the Republic of Moldova, led by this country's ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Anatol Taranu, is made up of military experts and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the State Department for Privatization.

This morning's meeting was marked by the fact that the Dniester side did not arrive at the scheduled time. At the Russia delegation's insistence, it arrived some two hours later.

During the discussions, the Moldovan officials pleaded for the conclusion of the withdrawal of the 14th Army on 1 July 1994 and synchronizing this with the granting of a special legal status to the territories illegally occupied by the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic. The results of the first round of negotiations were hardly encouraging. At the end of the second meeting, which began in the afternoon, Mr. Anatol Taranu stated the following to the Moscow-based correspondent of the national radio station of the Republic of Moldova:

[Begin Taranu recording] In his speech, the chief of the Russian military delegation, Colonel General Vorobyev, for the first time announced a deadline of two to three years within which the Russians—from a technical point of view—could evacuate the 14th Army. Again, however, the condition was mentioned of a political solution to the problem of the Dniester region. It was necessary to draw the attention of the Russian side that the Russian delegation at the meetings [words indistinct] agreed on the unconditional withdrawal of the army. The Russian delegation, however, firmly maintained its position.

At the same time, the Moldovan delegation proposed a new initiative, namely to negotiate material compensation for the stationing of the Russian Army in Moldova. I must stress that this proposal took the representatives of the Russian delegation by surprise, and tomorrow—or part of it—will be dedicated to discussing this initiative by the Moldovan delegation.

The negotiations are taking place in a relatively constructive atmosphere. The representatives of the Dniester region, who intervened a few times, firmly denied the presence of Dniester military cadres in Moscow during the communist putsch. But the proof and evidence provided by our delegation once again demonstrated that democracy in Russia cannot be installed within the country without a democratic policy outside it.

We had to draw the attention of the Russian delegation in this respect and once again we mentioned that a pro-imperial policy promoted by Russia outside could cause undesired developments at home. These two things are closely linked and democratic Russia has to be consistent in the policy it is promoting toward the former Soviet republics, which today are independent and sovereign states. [end recording]

Chernomyrdin Comments on Relations With Belarus

LD1111195893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1742 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 11 ITAR-TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin today said "all questions relating to supplies of Russian energy resources to Belarus will be decided in the nearest future".

The statement was made to ITAR-TASS after Belarus, until recently one of the most ardent supporters of close ties with Russia, began to grow increasingly skeptical about prospects for a close-knit community.

Chernomyrdin told ITAR-TASS that "the resumption of mutually beneficial economic ties between Russia and Belarus will facilitate the achievement of economic and political stability".

The Government of Russia, which intends to further develop close interaction with Belarus, including through the creation of a single rouble zone and economic union, supports efforts being made by the Government of the Republic of Belarus to strengthen ties with Russia, Chernomyrdin said.

Earlier today, it was reported that the Belarusian national currency firmed up against the rouble, closing up by two points from the previous trading session on the Belarusian Interbank currency exchange.

Political Issues

Reaction to New Draft Constitution Noted

Lysenko Comments

MK1111103093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Lysenko, member of the Commission on Legislative Proposals under the Russian Federation president, under the "Opinion" rubric: "At a Fork in the Road. Referendum May Upset Balance of Power, But Referendum Is Needed"]

[Text] History has once again given us a choice: Either we follow, after 12 December, the road General de Gaulle proposed to France at the time of the Fifth Republic when the president's constitution, which passed at the referendum, brought the country out of the impasse, or we repeat our own history of the turn of the century with the sadly famous czar's Manifesto and three dissolved State Dumas.

What makes one speak about the danger of the second road?

It is mainly that both the elections and the referendum flow from the dramatic events in Moscow in September and October 1993 that cut short the legitimate road to reform in Russia. Today, not only the implacable nationalist-communist opposition, which does not hide its revanchist ambitions, but also parties and movements of centrist and partially democratic orientation have serious fears that the referendum on the constitution may upset the balance of powers and, as a consequence, cause the establishment of an authoritarian regime in our country. This is also helped by the fact that the draft of a new constitution is not the result of public consent arrived at or a political compromise but is rather the fruit of a "victory" by one part of society over the other, the embodiment of the president's will.

The work to finalize the new constitution draft done in recent months raises many questions: Can the draft fundamental law that is being put to the referendum be regarded as the result of work by the Constitutional Conference if there was not a single plenary meeting of the Conference after July 1993? To what extent will the "agreed" draft satisfy the regional elites in the republics and in a number of Russian Federation oblasts? Can it happen that the new constitution is not going to work in some components of the Federation? Finally, can it happen that fearing a second edition of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress, we may go to another extreme and form an obedient parliament under the president?

Supporting in principle the idea for a constitutional federation and equality for all components of a federative state, I also do not think it possible that these questions, which are vital for our peoples, can be solved by voting because there can be no majority or minority—there should be only a consensus, which can be achieved on the basis of a stage-by-stage and coordinated solution to all the questions.

As for the sections of the draft constitution devoted to the powers of federal authorities, I think the best option would be to settle for the compromise variant arrived at during the Constitutional Conference on 12 July. Russia needs a strong president in the same way it needs a strong professional parliament, an independent court of justice, and free mass media. A number of amendments made in the draft constitution (about appointing the premier, about the impeachment procedure without the Constitutional Court's participation), raise doubts about a real separation of powers in Russia being possible after 12 December.

All the cited arguments speak in favor of calling a new Federal Assembly rather than a referendum as a mechanism for the adoption of a new constitution.

There are also substantial arguments in favor of a referendum. They consist in the need for a speedy exit from the legal vacuum in which the country found itself after 21 September. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees that a new parliament is not going to repeat the sad experience of its predecessor by delaying the adoption of a new fundamental law for a long period. This indeed constitutes a shortcut to a repetition of the tragedy....

Thus we have to choose the lesser of the two evils. To my mind, this means a referendum. It is better today to pass at a referendum an imperfect draft constitution that has a number of drawbacks and is formed on a fundamentally new, progressive basis that offers an opportunity for its further improvement by the Federal Assembly, than to leave the country for an indefinite time without a constitution, and while Russia is not France, still....

Filatov Examines Provisions

PM1111144193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by S.A. Filatov: "Draft Is Published. What Next?"]

[Text] Never before in the history of our country has the state power put the decision of the fate of state and power into the hands of the people. It has controlled both according to rules elaborated by itself. Today the country's president, who already confirmed the validity of his mandate back in April, again appeals to the people and submits the rules of the future life of the country's citizens to their verdict, and the people are on 12 December to voice their attitude to these rules: Whether they agree to secure the shoots of a new free life, or prefer something else. I am sure that the majority of citizens will say "yes" to the new Constitution.

Why is a new Constitution necessary? We need a stable society, but this stability can be created only with the certainty which the Constitution provides. The lessons of the events of October once more forced the country's president to accelerate the process of preparation and adoption of the Constitution. There are very few people today who fail to realize that the question of the Constitution's adoption is paramount, that it is a qestion of the future of our state and its peaceful development without civil wars.

What are the draft's main provisions, and what will it give us?

1. The most fundamental element in the text is that it enshrines human and civil rights and freedoms.

For the first time it is enshrined that rights and freedoms are recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation according to universally recognized principles and norms of international law. The aforementioned rights and freedoms—and this should be noted especially—are not just statements of principle but, as Article 18 of the draft says, they are direct-acting and are guaranteed by the entire system of justice. This means that, in the event of the violation of any right written in the Constitution, a citizen can appeal to the courts, and the courts' paramount obligation when deciding the case is to apply the constitutional provisions. This means that the Constitution must become mandatory reading for legislative organs, for organs of executive power, and for local self-government, because constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms determine the activity of the aforementioned organs.

The Constitution establishes the rule that all are equal before the law and before the courts (Article 19). The state guarantees the equality of human and civil rights and freedoms irrespective of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property or official status, place of residence, attitude to religion, convictions, or membership of public associations. Under the Constitution our state is not a state for the state's sake, it is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions ensuring a person's dignified life and free development. This does not mean that the state thinks for everyone and does everything for everyone. On the contrary, it creates conditions with a view to guaranteeing freedom of development and life for every person, and all the rest depends on a person's capacities and ability to secure himself a dignified life.

Article 22 of the draft enshrines the right to personal inviolability. Arrest, taking into custody, and keeping in custody are permitted only by judicial decision. An individual cannot be detained for a period of more than 48 hours without a judicial decision.

Personal inviolability also takes the form of the ban on everyone from entering someone else's house or apartment without permission.

No one is entitled to enter a dwelling against the wishes of persons residing there, except in cases prescribed by law or by judicial decision (Article 25). The right to personal well-being also includes the right to determine and indicate one's nationality and the right to use one's native language and freely choose the language of communication, education, instruction, and creativity.

The draft's provision on the right of citizens to freely travel and choose their place of stay and residence, and also the right to freely travel abroad and return without impediment (Article 27) is probably acceptable to everyone.

Nor is anyone likely to object to the norms on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess any religion or not to profess any, to freely choose and disseminate religious and other convictions and to act in accordance with them (Article 28).

Certainty is also being introduced into the economic rights and freedoms of citizens. Everyone is given the right to engage freely in entrepreneurial activity. The question of private ownership has been fundamentally resolved. Article 35 says that the right of private ownership is protected by law.

The right of private ownership is also extended to land. Article 36 enshrines the provision that the owner of land and other natural resources is entitled freely to possess, utilize, and dispose of them.

The norms of Article 44 on the protection of intellectual property and on state guarantees of freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical, teaching, and other categories of creative activity will be important for creative workers.

In the conditions of a market economy the state protection of the person's social rights are of extreme importance. This is why the draft enshrines two principles—labor is free, and forced labor is prohibited.

The draft recognizes the right to individual and collective labor disputes, including the right to strike.

Under the draft Constitution, each person has the right to leisure.

The state declares through the Constitution that it takes the family, maternity, and childhood under its protection and guarantees to all persons social security in old age, in the event of sickness, disability, or the loss of breadwinner, and for the raising of children, nor does the draft forget fathers who are raising their children on their own. At the same time voluntary social insurance and the creation of additional forms of social security, as well as charity, will be encouraged.

The guaranteeing of citizens' right to housing is of paramount importance. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of housing as functionaries may see fit. Low-income citizens and other citizens indicated in the law will continue to receive housing from state or municipal housing stock free of charge or at affordable cost.

The draft enshrines a highly important human right—the right to health care. Medical assistance in state and municipal health care establishments is provided to all citizens for free.

All our children have the right to receive free preschool, secondary general, and secondary vocational education.

Moreover, basic general education is compulsory. Thereafter, each person can receive free higher education after, of course, having passed competitive entrance examinations (Article 43).

A citizen may appeal to the courts whenever any of his rights are infringed. Any decision and action (inaction) of organs of state power, organs of local self-government, public associations, and officials can be appealed in court. Moreover, the citizen is compensated by the state for damage caused by the unlawful action (inaction) of state organs and their officials. If all available means of legal protection inside the state have been exhausted, it is possible to appeal to interstate organs for the protection of human rights and freedoms in accordance with the Russian Federation's international treaties.

As we can see, human and civil rights and freedoms and guarantees of their exercise are extremely profoundly reflected in the draft constitution. And, as laid down in Article 55, laws abolishing or diminishing human and civil rights and freedoms must not be promulgated in the Russian Federation.

2. The entire Constitution is permeated by the idea of strengthening our federative state. It precisely defines the legal status of the components of the Russian Federation and their equality amongst themselves and in relations with the center.

It is important to note that the autonomy of the components is defined not only by the Constitution but also by the Federation Treaty, as well as their right to conclude other treaties on the delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers.

In general, it seems to me that one of the main foundations of federal relations is the fact that the Constitution enshrines the already prevailing practice of developing reciprocal agreements between components on all vital issues.

Since a series of provisions of the Federation Treaty have been organically incorporated in the draft, its status is so defined in the "Concluding and Transitional Provisions" that, if its provisions contravene the Constitution, the constitutional norm prevails. This equalizes the rights of the components of the Federation without disparaging or encroaching upon any of them. Without taking anything away from the republics, this offers an opportunity to "raise a little" the level of equality for krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs, virtually equalizing them. This is most graphically reflected in Article 72 on questions of the joint jurisdiction of the Federation and its components. The content of the article enshrines "to the utmost" the rights of the components, taking everything that the Federation Treaty previously ascribed to the republics alone. Nor does the draft contain norms on the possibility of endowing special status on individual components enabling them to conclude special treaties with the Federation, which would ultimately and inevitably lead to breaches of mutual relations within the Russian Federation and to the possibility of amending the Fundamental Law via a treaty. The Constitution contains no right for today's regions to secede from our state.

The problem of the Federation Treaty still remains. Its significance in our political life is constantly felt. In terms of content it is both dangerous and attractive at the same time. It was prepared in the offices of the White House piecemeal, as it were. When the krays and oblasts signed it they had no idea of the content of what the republics were signing, while the autonomous formations were denied the opportunity to find out what the first two were doing. It turned out that each component was satisfied with its "share" until it learned what its counterparts had gotten from the center. Once everything was known, those who got less started trying to reapportion the shares. The signing of such an agreement is by itself a factor which stabilizes the situation in the country but, on the other hand, it did lead to today's confrontation among the components. Therefore, as I see it, the solution of this problem chosen by the draft Constitution is the most correct one.

3. The most important issue for us was to constitutionally regulate the following relations: president—government—Federal Assembly. The linkage is based on the premise that the president of the Russian Federation is the head of state and guarantor of the Constitution, human and civil rights and freedoms, and the sovereignty, independence, and state integrity of the Russian Federation. With the consent of the State Duma, the president appoints the chairman of the government (if parliament rejects three nominations the president has the right to appoint the chairman independently, dissolve the Duma, and call fresh elections), adopts decisions on the dismissal of the Government, on the proposal of the chairman of the Government appoints and dismisses his deputies and federal ministers, and submits to the Federation Council nominees for appointment as judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Arbitration, and as general prosecutor. According to the procedure laid down in the Constitution he may be dismissed from office by the Federation Council on the basis of a charge of treason or some other grave crime filed by the State Duma.

The maximum age limit for a nominee to the presidency has been omitted as a sign of trust in and respect for the voters who are capable of making the correct choice for themselves in the light of all factors, including the ages of the contenders for the presidency. This has also been done in the light of other countries' constitutions. As a rule, they contain no such restriction.

Article 85 contains the right of the president to suspend the operation of enactments by organs of executive power, if such enactments contravene not only the Constitution but also other federal laws, pending a resolution of the matter by the appropriate court. This will promote the fuller and more precise application throughout the country's territory of the principle of constitutional legality and the strengthening of the unity of the system of executive power.

The Constitution creates a new legislative organ, the Federal Assembly, comprising two chambers—the Federation Council and the State Duma. The State Duma, which is an electable permanently functioning organ, elaborates and adopts laws while the Federation Council, consisting of representatives of the organs of representative and executive power of the components of the Russian Federation, approves those laws, but quite unexpectedly, we will have to elect the first Federation Council in December. A Federation Council which includes officials cannot be formed in practice today. The soviets have started disintegrating: Some have disbanded themselves, others have been left without a quorum and are incapable of work, yet others have been left without leaders who have resigned, while others still have frankly discredited themselves. The heads of administration in our country are partly elected, partly appointed. All these factors make it impossible to create an organ which would enjoy the sufficient confidence of society, even if not absolute confidence. This is why the president of the Russian Federation made the decision on the election of the Federation Council on 12 December as well as the decision that officials of the components of the Federation may also be members of the Federation Council. It will not work on laws article by article but will meet periodically and will examine what the State Duma has done from the viewpoint of federal interests as a whole.

Wheras the State Duma is reelected every four years, in other words the same set of people will work in it for four years, the Federation Council, once formed, has no legal limit on the duration of its powers, but its members—two representatives from each component of the Federation (probably the head of the administration and the chairman of the legislative organ), who belong to it as ex-officio members will, of course, be rotated automatically depending on their official position. The term of office of the Federation Council which is to be elected n December is two years.

The State Duma has the right to express no confidence in the Government.

The State Duma's basic task is to elaborate and adopt laws. This is the law-making machinery.

The State Duma has the right to express no confidence in the Government. But the president has the right either to accept that decision and dismiss the Government or else dissolve the Duma itself if it reiterates its unwillingness to work with that Government.

The Government offers its resignation only to a newly elected president.

These provisions on mutual relations have been included in the draft on the basis of the lessons of the October events. The constitutional linkage between president and Government is necessary for the stability of the country, for the stability and security of the state.

In view of the lessons of the October events, members of the Russian Government are permitted to be deputies of the State Duma.

4. The draft enshrines the status of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. We must preserve it as a democratic institution of constitutional justice and place it within a precisely defined constitutional framework. It is stipulated that cases concerning the compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of laws and other enactments will be decided by the court on the application of the president, the Federation Council, the State Duma, one-fifth of the members of each chamber, the Government, and the organs of legislative and executive power of the components of the Federation. The Constitutional Court interprets the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Enactments deemed to be unconstitutional will cease to be in force. These are two new provisions. The number of judges has been increased from 18 to 19.

5. And finally the concluding and transitional provisions of the Constitution. They include the following: The Constitution will come into force from the day of its publication, and December 12 will be considered the day of the adoption of the Constitution if the results of the vote are positive. The former Constitution will cease to be in force and all the laws will be applied to the extent to which they do not contravene the Constitution. The president will exercise his powers until the expiry of the term of office for which he was elected and the Council of Ministers will be called the Government of the Russian Federation. All the courts will continue to function as normal.

On the submission of the Public Chamber, a point was included which stipulated that both chambers of the first convocation are elected for a two-year term for the transitional period. In fact this will be a period of acclimatization for the new state structures, of elections of legislatures in the components of the Federation and of heads of administrations, and only then will the Federation Council be ready to accept its new permanent members.

I want to stress in particular how adequately the content of the draft meets society's needs. Many times we have suffered because decisions adopted by the former Congress and Supreme Soviet did not correspond to the opinion of the members of society or its consciousness. This was very evident in the results of the April referendum and the results of various public opinion polls. The participation in the Constitutional Conference of representatives of the most diverse sociopolitical parties and movements and trade unions from the components of the Federation, religious faiths, and organs of state power offers the hope and confidence that these people were able to express the true interests and aspirations of our people rather than of a ruling elite.

Rumyantsev on New Constitution

LD1111152493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1417 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—Russia's Social Democratic Centre head Oleg Rumyantsev believes the new constitution which will be put to vote in a December 12 nationwide referendum will not live long.

Speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Thursday, Rumyantsev said that because the constitution "is being adopted in unfair conditions, it will live for only a year or two."

"The constitution is doomed to be short-lived," he said, adding that its adoption aims at "legalising the establishment of an authoritarian regime" in Russia.

Rumyantsev, who is running for a seat in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's future parliament, from the centrist bloc Civic Union, said that he and his followers will be seeking to "improve the Civic Union's image." He believes that the Social Democratic Centre could "lend more dynamism and social importance" to the Civic Union.

Rumyantsev said that in the future parliament the Civic Union will form a "core of the moderate opposition." Its closest allies will be the Agrarian Party and the Democratic Party of Russia. The Vybor Rossii (Russia's Choice) bloc will be its "open political opponent."

Democratic Party Leader Critical

LD1111210593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2003 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Manvelov]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—"We strongly oppose the way the Russian Government works," Nikolay Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, said.

Speaking at a meeting with foreign diplomats in Moscow on Thursday [11 November], Travkin said that he would "call against approving" the draft Russian constitution at the upcoming referendum because it does not contain clear-cut principles of power delineation, local self-government and parliament activity.

His fellow party member Oleg Bogomolov said the future Russian parliament will not be legitimate because it is being elected when the old constitution is still in effect; it does not envision such a body. He warned that there is a big danger that authoritarianism could take the upper hand in Russia again.

The Democratic Party of Russia "has strong positions in 34 Russian regions," Travkin said. He said the party will not join any election blocs or other political organisations the majority of which "do not represent the interests of the people."

Draft Constitution's Main Provisions Examined

PM1011140993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Vasiliy Ustyuzhanin report under the general heading "Winter Crops Sprout in Constitutional Field": "In 1906 Nicholas II Had Slightly Less Power"]

[Text] The long-awaited draft Fundamental Law, over which so many swords have been crossed, emerged from the Kremlin 10 November as the president had promised. Russian citizens have been given a month to read and ponder it before voting on the draft Constitution in the 12 December referendum.

If the draft wins support, the term of the president's powers is automatically extended to 1996 since the suggested text says: "From the day the present Constitution comes into force, the president of the Russian Federation...exercises the powers laid down by the present Constitution until the expiry of the term for which he was elected." So the parliament may not be threatened with wrangling about the date of the next presidential election.

Clearly, the prepared draft is the focus of conceivable and inconceivable compromise. Federalists will find that the president has too many powers, unitarians will consider them inadequate. Communists will emphasize the vagueness of the social guarantees, while the liberals will on the contrary consider the very definition of Russia as a social state superfluous. The constitution, however, is primarily an act of national consensus. It cannot be secured without mutual concessions.

What points should be singled out in the proposed draft? Relations between the center and the regions. The draft stipulates that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory. If you recall that all the previous versions contained the idea of sovereign states forming the Russian Federation, this draft sorts everything out—the state with its prime sovereignty (of which, the draft says, the multinational people of Russia are the repository) is the guarantor of the sovereignty (economic, political, territorial) of all components of the Federation.

The draft also "disposes of" their status once and for all: "All components of the Russian Federation are equal with each other in interrelationships with federal organs of state power."

The Constitution gives the president of the Russian Federation extensive powers—he is the head of state (not of the executive power), but does at the same time have the right to chair government sessions, appoint the chairman of the Council of Ministers (with the consent of the State Duma), deputy chairmen of the government and ministers, shape the directions of domestic and foreign policy, declare a state of emergency, head the Security Council, and so on.

In 1906, when the Fundamental Laws were issued, the monarch assumed fewer rights. He was not, in particular, supreme commander in chief.

The president has the right to dissolve the parliament—that represents the greatest acquisition for B. Yeltsin personally and for his entourage. However, the president must remember that the State Duma cannot be dissolved within the first year and during the last six months of its activity. The State Duma is in turn empowered to dismiss the government and file charges, impeach the president (for treason, for instance), charges that have to be confirmed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Based on the findings of the latter the Federation Council can suspend the head of state within three months (no later!)

In the opinion of Robert Tsivilev, legal aide to the head of the president's administration, the proposed draft Constitution precludes a repeat of the deadlock October situation where the two branches of power were at one another's throats.

If everything turns out fine, on 12 December we will have a chance of changing another state holiday. Or, to be more correct, moving it—from 7 October (Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's Constitution Day) to 12 December (Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's Constitution Day). However, let us not plan ahead; let us wait until the December frosts.

'Quality' of Draft Constitution Questioned

PM1111100593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Yelena Ovcharenko article under the general heading "Winter Crops Sprout on Constitutional Field": "Russian Fundamental Law: Will It Make It Through the Week?"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin's categorical ending of the "parade of sovereignties," as well as the extremely aggressive manner of dealing with the "components of the Federation" that he reserved for the last few days before the new draft constitution was made public, prompt the thought that there is no comparing the Russian leader with George Washington. The latter, who was at one time the head of the convention working on the U.S. Constitution, sweated—because it was 30 degrees centigrade outside among other things—cheek by jowl with other deputies without putting pressure on them, and on an equal footing.

People have been waiting for the promised draft for three years, but the fact that it took Russia so long to write the latest Fundamental Law is causing doubts as to its quality. I am against blindly copying the United States, but I do somehow prefer the efficiency with which 55 Americans in 1787 worked on the 4,400 words of the Constitution. They argued and discussed the document for three and a half months, six days a week, from 1000 to 1500 hours, and in that period only once allowed themselves a 10-day break.

Our politicians' statements that the process of working out the country's constitutional system was dragged out due to the changing situation seem bankrupt. It was evidently held up quite deliberately in order to have the constitution as the backdrop to specific politicians' activity. In that case why were efforts wasted on another document: Our country has already had a string of Leninist-Stalinist-Brezhnevite "fundamental declarations"? Now there is another one on the horizon, one that shows every sign of being a temporary measure. If that is the case and, what is more, considering our rich history where it cost nothing to repeal the constitution or even take a direct potshot at it, are the authorities entitled to expect our people to finally respect this new constitution?

You can judge how objective the Kremlin's need for a constitution is from the way in which the Russian leadership's position has changed over the last year: Early in the year Boris Nikolayevich seemed to have forgotten to think about it. Ahead of the April referendum he spoke of the need to submit some of the postulates of the Fundamental Law to the referendum, but then thought better of it. While the intractable parliament was still in existence Boris Nikolayevich, reluctant to enrage the republics, oblasts, and other territories, did not say a word about his plans to shortly pull the plug on it.

Another point... "I support the rights of nations to self-determination, but with the exception of secession from Russia," our president said after the well-known calls to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow." I am not against fighting for Russian integrity. Yeltsin did not suddenly rush to finalize the draft of the new constitution when Russia—one can now say it—entered the authoritarian phase of democratic development. The ban on legal political activity for some of the opposition, the dissolution or limitation of the powers of local authorities, and the center's appointment of administration heads considerably distorted the system of "checks and balances," which had proved its worth in the West, in favor of the executive. The president decided to add to this—not straightaway, but "after a rethink"—the practice of ministers and administration heads combining their powers with those of deputies.

Since a week before the newspapers published the draft, "components of the Federation" were unable to grasp—and obtain intelligible explanations—whether the Federal [federalnyy] Treaty would be included in the constitution, this gave rise to the most profound pessimism. If it comes to that, Israel has survived for decades without a constitution, yet we had to urgently adopt one during a period of transition, and since we have already decided to take this step, there is no point in using the transitional period as an excuse, claiming that it is a unique Russian feature and, by way of supporting argument, adding the weakness of our society, the undeveloped party system, the lack of party discipline, and so on to the "willful decisions" of the past month.

I would venture to remind people who are in favor of temporizing that the oldest constitution in the world—the U.S. Constitution—was created under equally critical conditions: ineffective government, severe socioeconomic crisis, unemployment, disorganized diplomacy, lack of money to maintain the Army and Navy, the states' categorical refusal to pay taxes to the central treasury, and wrangling not only between North and South but also between states over borders and the integrity of their territory. When delegates to the convention wrote the constitution they acted on the premise that it is necessary to rise above the interests of political figures and individual territories. The question of impeaching the president, for instance, caused just as many disputes as the small states' desire for fair representation in the system of power.

Incidentally, you will not find the word "democracy" in the U.S. Constitution. Perhaps because its writers took the long view when writing it and were therefore ashamed to make premature declarations that might not come true.

Republic Sovereignty Issue Will Provoke Debate

PM1111154793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Presidential Council Member Alla Yaroshinskaya: "Answer to Question Regarding Form of Government Will Decide Country's Fate, Presidential Council Member Alla Yaroshinskaya Believes"]

[Text] For the first time a completely new constitution, whose provisions discard the postulates of Soviet power which developed over 70 years, has been put before the people.

I think that there are key questions and aspects which will undoubtedly provoke a great debate. I am referring to Article 5 of the draft concerning the principles of the Russian Federation's structure, in particular the deletion from the text of the draft constitution of the provision concerning "the sovereignty of republics which are part of the Russian Federation." It is well known that the Constitutional Conference's Public Chamber supported this idea, but there was no complete unanimity in the State Chamber. This aspect will, in my view, become the subject of a lively debate.

Second is the question of the form of government. Will Russia have presidential or presidential and parliamentary power, in other words a mixed type of power. A debate on this question is also inevitable.

The form in which these two articles are adopted will determine a great deal in Russia's future. We must adopt a constitution by which we must live. This means that Russia's fate is being decided.

Constitution Overcomes Regional Separatism

LD1111193493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1405 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] If a new constitution is adopted through a referendum, Russian society will be consolidated. The document provides for presidential powers that equal those in any democracy like France, for one. This was told to Interfax on Thursday [11 November] by Boris Zolotukhin, the Coordinator of the Constitutional Conference's State Chamber.

At a meeting with journalists on the same day, he noted that the draft of the fundamental law put for a referendum on December 12 eliminates two basic national development trends—separatism and the domination of the soviets (councils). He welcomed the removal from the draft of the point on sovereign independent states within the Russian Federation and the substitution of it by a clause on the equality of all Federation territories before the federal government.

If any territory disapproves of the new constitution, it will still be considered adopted and binding across Russia, Zolotukhin remarked and voiced confidence that more than 50

of the electorate would come to the polls on December 12 and the new constitution would be passed. Otherwise, he added, the Upper and Lower Houses of a new Russian Parliament would act in keeping with a decree on provisional federal authorities.

Draft Constitution Lauded as Optimal Version

PM1211110393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Commentary under the "Political Day" rubric by Academician Vladimir Kudryavtsev: "The Constitution Will Survive Us. Or Will We Survive It?"]

[Text] The published draft Constitution is a document for the transitional period. Even if it is approved at the referendum, constitutional debate will hardly end there, and this is not connected with shortcomings in the text. Quite the reverse—in my view, as a result of significant intellectual efforts, a document has come into being which does Russia credit. No, the reason actually lies in the momentum of political processes.

In my view, as a Constitution for the transitional period, this is the optimal draft. Its articles defining civil rights and freedoms are thoroughly elaborated. For the first time we are dealing with with a document which embodies international standards as regards human rights.

Less stable are the sections of the draft on the relations between the federal organs of power themselves and between the center and the regions. The exclusion of provisions on the sovereignty of federation components from the text of the Constitution seems to me correct.

Well, would much good come of such a definition, if in reality regional sovereignty has its own limits which do not go beyond the sovereignty of the state? It is quite possible to clarify the sphere of powers of the center and regions in a supplementary document, but right now, in the transitional period, when the need for clear and firm power at the center is obvious, I suggest that excessive regionalism—in practice frequently spilling over into isolationism—is harmful, even for the components themselves.

I do not think that the draft Constitution vests the president with any dictatorial powers. Neverthless, that is an argument from the ideological category.

The draft actually balances relations between the four entities in the power equation—parliament, the president, the government, and the judiciary.

Yeltsin's 'Unpredictable' Moves Analyzed

MK1211113593 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 4

[Vladimir Somov report in "Man of the Week" column: "Boris Yeltsin: Everyone Knows How Many Blows Have Befallen Me"]

[Text] Sociologists must be trying to find out whether the president has gained or lost points after his latest statement canceling the early June elections of the head of state. Politicians, including those abroad, appraise Yeltsin's decision differently. As for the average man, he has once again just shrugged his shoulders in perplexity, although he should long have been accustomed to the unpredictability of the president's actions.

Yet is Yeltsin's latest decision quite so unpredictable after all? I, for one, was sure that there would be no early elections after October 1993. The need for a compromise with the Supreme Soviet (after the abolition of the latter) has disappeared and it is too soon and useless to seek compromise with a new parliament yet. It is another matter that the president has come out with such a statement immediately after the mutiny was suppressed, and that would have been logical and justified. But for a whole month Yeltsin continued to issue assurances that the June elections would take place. True, he sometimes added that the final decision rests with the Federal Assembly.

In the end this will apparently be exactly so. After all, so far there has been no corresponding edict and it will hardly appear in the near future. But the breathtaking, sensational statement has been made, giving the people much food for thought.

What is surprising and amazing in this whole story is not the president's passion for risk taking or his ability to make decisions as he goes along (we have already become accustomed to that) but the unpredictable behavior by...his entourage. Just one or two hours before Yeltsin's statement presidential administration chief Sergey Filatov assured journalists that Boris Nikolayevich will not cancel the June elections. Another highly placed official—press secretary Kostikov—was also surprised by Yeltsin's decision. Imagine the situation. The president is conducting a friendly conversation over lunch with newspaper chief editors and announced cancellation of elections, and the press secretary has to make sure whether this statement needs to be made public or treated merely as verbalized thoughts. Therefore Kostikov, too, was not in the know.

Who, then, did the president consult if even his closest aides did not know about the decision? Maybe no one? Hardly likely. Yeltsin is said always to listen to his advisers. It must be that in this instance, too, someone advised him to come out with such a statement.

What happens in the corridors of power and how policy is "cooked" has always been a closely guarded secret as far as the Russian man in the street is concerned. One thing is clear: The team of presidential advisers is fairly diverse, and that also goes for their political views. It is not accidental that Yeltsin's closest associates have now affiliated with various election blocs.

Yet something else is also clear: A fierce struggle is going on within the presidential team over influence on the "boss." Sometimes this struggle spills onto the surface and then battles begin, like the recent "Poltoranin-Shumeyko" clash.

Sometimes even more curious things happen. When first reports appeared about Kazannik's possible appointment as general prosecutor, presidential aide Burtin came out with a statement to the effect that those were nothing more than groundless rumors. Indeed, Kazannik was invited to come from Omsk to Moscow, but for quite a different reason. ITAR-TASS filed that statement but slightly more than an hour later another report came out: Yeltsin has signed an edict on appointing Kazannik general prosecutor.

What is happening in the presidential apparatus if the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing? Is that not why contradictory edicts and orders are born? Is that not why the president signs various amendments to regulations on elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council? And finally, it this not why ill-considered, ill-advised, and overhasty statements are made? The latest one—about the cancellation of early presidential elections—could be referred to here. It might well have been delayed until the Federal Assembly began its work, undoubtedly agreeing with Yeltsin's case.

I am far from trying to portray the president as a man obeying somebody's will. The advisers are taking turns in pulling strings, and the "boss" does what they want him to. Fortunately, Yeltsin has his own head on his shoulders, but the apparatus is the apparatus, and the old truth that "the king is made by his retinue" has been true at all times, which we are constantly seeing even today.

At that meeting with the chief editors Yeltsin announced that he is not going to contest the 1996 elections, implying that he has lived through too many blows for one man. One cannot doubt the president's sincerity. But one still has to live till 1996. Moreover, who knows what exploits the retinue may yet call on its king to accomplish?

Yeltsin Sacks Sverdlovsk Oblast Head

LD1011172693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1540 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] We have just received a report from the Russian president's press center. Boris Yeltsin signed an edict today relieving Eduard Rossel of the post of head of administration of the Sverdlovsk Oblast. Valeriy Georgiyevich (Tushnikov) has been appointed acting head of the administration. Eduard Rossel has been relieved of his post for failing to carry out the presidential edicts and for considerably exceeding his powers.

Text of Edict

PM1011212993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Edict of the Russian Federation president "On Terminating the Activity of Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies," dated 9 November 1993 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text] In connection with the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet's repeated violation of the Russian Federation Constitution and of Russian Federation laws, expressed in the proclamation of Sverdlovsk Oblast as the Ural Republic and in the adoption of the Ural Republic Constitution—which means a unilateral change to the constitutional-legal status of Sverdlovsk Oblast and the oblast soviet's appropriation of the powers of a representative (legislative) organ of state power of a republic within the Russian Federation—I decree:

1. The decisions of Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of 1 July 1993 "On the Status of Sverdlovsk Oblast Within the Russian Federation" and of 27 October 1993 "On the Ural Republic Constitution" are to be considered as having no juridical force from the moment they were adopted.

2. The activity of Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet and the powers of the people's deputies of this soviet are to be terminated from the day this edict comes into force.

3. The Administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast is to:

place under its jurisdiction all organs, organizations, and establishments subordinate to Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet;

ensure that employment is found for apparatus staffers and service personnel (in accordance with their wishes) of the former Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet.

4. Elections to the representative organ of state power of Sverdlovsk Oblast are to be held in January-February 1994. The Administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast is to decide the date of the elections.

5. The head of Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration is to approve a statute on elections to the representative organ of state power of Sverdlovsk Oblast and a statute on the representative organ of state power of Sverdlovsk Oblast.

6. The leaders of enterprises, establishments, and organizations which previously employed people's deputies who were released to work full-time on Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet are to provide an opportunity for employment to be found in the previously held or analogous posts with corresponding labor remuneration. The organs of executive power in Sverdlovsk Oblast are to be given assistance in finding employment for people's deputies in cases where the enterprises, establishments, and organizations for which they worked have been liquidated and do not have legal successors.

7. This edict comes into force the moment it is signed.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation President
B. Yeltsin
[Dated] 9 November 1993
Moscow, the Kremlin
No. 1874

Yeltsin Aide Explains Disbanding Soviet

LD1111121793

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 0300 GMT on 11 Nov carries an interview with Nikolay Medvedev, chairman of the Commission for the Nationalities-Federation System and Interethnic Relations, by an unidentified reporter about Yeltsin's decision to disband the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet.

He argues that because its decision to form the Urals republic was made after Yeltsin's decree disbanding the soviet, the decision is invalid. "It was even written in the first clause of the decree that from 1 July, no decision by the oblast soviet is valid under the law," Medvedev says. The reporter says that in its turn, Sverdlovsk Oblast regards this decree as invalid since a referendum was held in Sverdlovsk Oblast in March at which people spoke in favor of a republic. Medvedev rejects this, pointing out that "the question of the oblast's status cannot even be put to a referendum, this right applies at a different level altogether." The oblast administration "exceeded its powers" and its "irresponsible actions" only serve to confirm that the president's decision to disband the oblast soviet "though extreme, was correct", he said. "The very structure of the soviet system simply opens the way for irresponsible moves and the actions taken by the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet demonstrate this. A group of people get together and adopt decisions, but what if they decide to build communism in Sverdlovsk oblast? They could do this. All states need some kind of order," he said, adding that other areas of Russia—St. Petersburg, Vologda—have similarly had the wrong approach to issues of status.

Kozyrev Addresses Government Presidium Session

LD1111152693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1335 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Excerpts] A session of the Russian Government Presidium was held on Old Square, Moscow, today. Our observer Valeriy Kiosa was present and here is his report on this event.

[Kiosa] [passage omitted] After the session I asked Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev to give his evaluation of the situation regarding immigration policy, the main directions of which were on the whole supported today, since this theme is closely connected to Russian foreign policy. This is what he said, summing up the session.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] It is true that some Russian-speaking immigrants, and not only the Russian-speaking population, are emigrating. This needs to be looked at; first of all we must examine the conflict zones, which is yet one more indicator that we cannot get away from using our peacekeeping forces in these conflicts. Every officer, serviceman, or soldier not sent as part of the peacekeeping forces will result in hundreds of refugees and they will all come to Russia. Therefore, unfortunately, we are obliged not to deviate from the peacekeeping policy.

Finally, the situation when they leave the former Soviet republics because there is no agreement there about dual citizenship—I want to say once again that all the republics over a year ago received our drafts, moreover internationally regulated drafts, not some kind of subjective diktats; they are all based on universally recognized international norms—and that applies to the draft agreements on dual citizenship, on legal protection, and also on immigration. I will not hide that today at the presidium session I expessed my firm position that we should link a readiness to give us a quick positive reply to our proposals with the whole complex of our economic and financial links with the republics concerned. This is not any kind of neo-imperialism which they are going on about now in the West—it is normal practice, because if we continue to give aid, offer credits, and so on to our republics, our neighbors, then of course we expect them to take into account the interests which for us are of a humanitarian, economic, and political nature. This economic linkage will be ever more firmly put into practice. This was the general mood, at least it was the prime minister's mood. [end recording]

Army Commander Recalls White House 4 Oct Events

LD1111233093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] We shall probably be returning more than once to the tragic events of 3-4 October, especially where this has to do with denying false rumors. There have been in particular reports that during these events the Russian defense minister issued an order for helicopter unguided missiles to be fired at the White House. Well, were there any combat helicopters in the air? Here with the answer is Colonel General Vitaliy Pavlov, commander of the Russian Land Forces' aviation.

[Begin Pavlov recording] Yes, there were combat helicopters in the air. I myself went up with a couple of Mi-8 helicopters. These Mi-8s were totally without any missile pods. They carried no pods, no missiles, nothing. The helicopters were empty. I took off from Tushino airfield, flew around Ostankino and other points in Moscow, and flew past the White House. It was indeed a terrible scene that I saw. As a military man I was shocked, not so much by the fact that the tanks were firing as by the fact that I could see the lack of concern on the part of certain people, a wave of people racing along the streets and crowds of civilians in the streets at every crossroads around the White House. This was happening while there was combat firing. What was incomprehensible to me was why thousands of people were in the immediate vicinity of the firing. The losses might have been much, much greater, even from ricocheting stones and so on. [end recording]

Colonel General Vitaliy Pavlov tells us for what purpose these unguided missiles are used.

[Begin Pavlov recording] The purpose of each type of projectile is even written down in all our instructions, and unguided missiles are not intended for striking at or even destroying such major buildings. If one fires a volley—and a volley from a combat helicopter is very powerful and it comprises about 160-190 missiles—it is dispersed over a large area. This is why the missiles are called unguided ones. Unguided missiles are intended to strike at personnel in an open area and at lightly armored targets. In principle, it would be useless using unguided missiles against a building. [end recording]

Internal Affairs Minister Yerin Interviewed

PM1111113593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin by Nikolay Modestov; place and date not given: "Democracy Must Be Reliably Defended"]

[Text] Over the first 10 months of this year 2,293,349 crimes were recorded in Russia. This was an increase of 38,668 crimes compared with last year. The rate of increase in legal violations has declined to 1.7 percent. What is this, a statistical paradox giving no grounds for optimism, or a real picture of the decline of the crime wave which has lashed us? Russian Internal Affairs Minister Army General Viktor Yerin began our talk by commenting on these figures.

[Yerin] The crime increase rates are declining with every passing month, which is at odds with the forecast we made for the period through 1995. How to explain this? First, in forecasting an increase in the number of law violations we then do everything possible to prevent this forecast from coming to pass, and I hope the "blame" for the discrepancy between the theorists' calculation and the actual result lies with the internal affairs organs workers and their labor and professionalism. But it is nonetheless other factors which lie at the basis of this phenomenon.

The reduction in the increase is mainly accounted for by the decline in crimes against property. There has been a reduction in the number of thefts. For the first time in many years we have an absolute reduction in the number of thefts of state and public property of 4.3 percent and a 2.4 percent reduction in thefts of citizens' private property. Considering that crimes against property make up about 70 percent of the total, even a slight change in that indicator influences the dynamics of criminal statistics.

A sense of ownership is emerging in citizens. Slowly and not as we would like, but the process has nonetheless begun. People are paying more attention to the protection of material assets. Citizens realize that living behind a cardboard door in our time is not the best option. Although, unfortunately, in connection with inflation processes there has been an increase in the cost of safeguarding apartments and there is a decline in the number of citizens' dwellings put under guard by the militia. But these are general economic problems... One more reason is the lower level of unemployment. Fortunately that indicator is lower than predicted by analysts, and I repeat again that crime is the product of social, economic, and political processes taking place in society. We cannot examine the results of the struggle against it in isolation from the transformations taking place in the state.

The increase in the most dangerous crimes continues. Premeditated murders increased 32.8 percent while serious bodily injuries have increased 31.1 percent and the number of rapes and muggings is still increasing. Thefts of weapons and ammunition are very alarming, they have increased over 30 percent. Large-scale and particularly large-scale thefts have increased 31.5 percent and the number of detected instances of bribery has increased over 33 percent.

The indicator characterizing the results of our work has improved a little. In 1992 on the basis of the results of the first 10 months the detection rate was 46.2 percent. This year 48.8 percent of the total number of crimes were solved.

[Modestov] Viktor Fedorovich, the description of the MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] workers' activity will be incomplete if you overlook the actions of the militia staffers during the October armed uprising. Your role in preventing an antistate coup was very highly assessed by the president...

[Yerin] I am sure that the assessment of a minister's actions presupposes not only a personal assessment of the leader. The minister always heads a specific system. I think that the minister, his deputies, the Moscow garrison, and not just the Moscow one, in these uniquely grave conditions managed not only to mobilize the system but also to ensure precise, professionally skilled work. That is why the armed rebellion was utterly defeated.

After these events we gathered together a group of very serious experts, scientists, professors, and practical workers including those who took no direct part in the dramatic events of early October. They were given the task of objectively and critically analyzing and assessing and focusing on what could have been done better and what impeded and reduced efficiency. There are very interesting calculations, there is something to work on, and some things will require additional financial and material investments, some things must be forbidden our services, but the first conclusion drawn by the commission's members is that there were no analogues in world practice.

[Modestov] What made the situation unique?

[Yerin] Never had the law enforcement system encountered a situation in which people of such high rank were law violators. And with the support of a specific group of deputies. You remember that after all for nearly two weeks there had been massive brainwashing of the personnel.

There are also legal aspects which made the situation unique. Not everything for dealing with this kind of real event has been entered in our legislative base. Essentially the internal affairs organs, in the experts' estimation, had, particularly at the final phase, to carry out combat operations. You can understand that the militia trains to fulfill quite different tasks—resisting an armed group, hooligans, or law violators—and here there was enforced resistance to a well armed and organized mass of people which on 3 October ensured fire cover for breaking through to the "White House" from the streets and then opened up the road to the city hall under fire cover.

[Modestov] Can the moment when MVD subunits turned the situation in the president's favor be called the culminating point?

[Yerin] Let us be clear. The internal affairs organs were not only working for the president. We work for Russia, for what is happening in RUssia. It was not only a case of the president personally. The personnel's aim was to fulfill their official and civil duty to defend the population and statehood. And it is very important that our staffers, understanding this and correctly assessing the public opinion which had taken shape, performed their tasks as required by duty and conscience.

After all, you understand what acts of provocation were perpetrated by those gathered in the "White House." They promised to issue titles, certificates, salaries, and promotions, but on 3 and 4 October these promises were accompanied by, forgive me, foul language. The former vice president together with his promises shouted that he would shoot all the leaders, that he knew them by name. Here one can assess in various ways the replies that the militia workers sometimes transmitted to him over the open airwaves. Perhaps their terms were not entirely diplomatic but on the other hand they were wholehearted and that also describes the personnel's mood.

[Modestov] Did you have fears the MVD might split?

[Yerin] No, I had no fears. Attempts to split the MVD emerged immediately after the so-called internal affairs minister was appointed, and it is no accident but natural that three ministers were appointed, all three for the "power" ministries. The most intensive attempts to split the internal affairs organs were undertaken by my former first deputy A. Dunayev.

[Modestov] Did you have complicated relations with him even before that?

[Yerin] Andrey Fedorovich Dunayev served in the internal affairs organs for I think over 35 years, had had a good career, had begun in the ranks and engaged in operational work. He reached the post of Russian Federation MVD minister. And this was not simply time-serving. There were also professional services here, you cannot discount that.

As for A. Dunayev's personality, he had serious flaws. He was quite arrogant, paid little heed to other people's opinion, it is very difficult for him to be the top man—he will not accept collective forms of management. In addition in recent years A. Dunayev had been engaged in creating material assets for himself and had begun to study dacha and apartment building... Perhaps he began to crack after being relieved of the post of minister, he went through a lot, you could feel that.

I understood that. We suggested various options to A. Dunayev, the possibility of working abroad with a substantial material benefit, but he refused. There were problems but I shall not start to say they were exceptional...

I was very pleased that all his attempts to talk with the internal affairs directorate chiefs and the leaders of educational establishments came to nothing. No one even promised him anything, and as agreed, everyone reported to the minister that there had been a particular telephone talk or else a "courier" ad come.

[Modestov] Did Dudayev himself telephone you?

[Yerin] He telephoned all my deputies and on 3 October telephoned me for the first time. This happened after the breakthrough to the "White House." The telephone call was rather strange and confirms yet again the inadequacy of the assessment of those in the "White House." He said that there was a very large crowd near the "White House" and he believed that it would be expedient for the internal affairs minister to meet with them. I said that in my assessment it was a case not of a large number of people but of an entirely specific crowd there for perfectly specific aims. The internal affairs minister at such a moment must engage in other things. If he considered himself also a minister of internal affairs that was his personal business. That was how our talk ended. A. Dunayev made no other attempts.

[Modestov] Do you believe that it was necessary to take tougher steps against the rioters and thugs? Perhaps you should have acted more resolutely?

[Yerin] It is not a case of lack of resolve. Here rather it is a case of the overall level of knowledge of the law by leaders and personnel. Social processes are changing, the nature of the opposition's behavior is changing. Nonetheless in this complex situation the internal affairs organs staffers acted in a tactically skilled manner, displayed restraint and resolve, and there was no confusion. To say that someone or other should be dismissed and punished is not appropriate now. Moreover, many staffers who displayed courage and heroism (unfortunately there were dead and wounded) have been put up for awards.

An analysis of the events has shown that we must alter a whole series of aspects. What do I have in mind? We must alter the mentality of the personnel who, as before, take the blow upon themselves and basically count on resisting with their own bodies. We must do the same work here as is done in the West, using the non-contact method. It requires different technical facilities but, most importantly, a change of mentality.

Why is this process proceeding so slowly? You remember the events of May Day and even earlier near Ostankino. You can look back even further and remember similar examples in Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi... It is not important who was at the sharp end of the attack there—the internal affairs organs or the armed forces. What happened next? In all cases there followed a "post-flight analysis" at the level of the mass media and the creation of a certain negative public opinion and everyone began to say how bad they are, what barbarians they are...

Actions during those days, especially 3 October, demanded the very prompt maneuvering of forces and facilities. After all the main mass of internal affairs organs staffers in order to prevent possible acts of provocation were unarmed, and when the development of the situation showed the situation was changing and that automatic weapons were being used against us and they were shooting to kill, it was decided to redeploy forces and facilities. We had to work swiftly to replace individual subunits and bring them forward to new spots.

[Modestov] Viktor Fedorovich, this subject will probably be of interest for a very long time yet, but life goes on and the militia's main tasks remain the same—the fight against crime. In this connection I should like you to comment on the following figures. Large subunits for fighting organized crime account for less than 1 percent of detected crimes. Does it not seem to you that the return here is incompatible with the potential at the disposal of this MVD subunit?

[Yerin] We have been forming subunits for fighting organized crime for only two years. A short period for such a process. The b backbone has been formed, the foundation has been created, in some parts rapid deployment detachments for these subunits have been created, but it is premature to speak of a very powerful subunit.

Of course, if you take the bare figures in the general crime wave what they produce is trivial, but do not forget, there is general crime and there is organized crime. Qualitative parameters differ very drastically. The thrust of the work by the criminal investigation, and this is also a very powerful subunit, with enormous professional experience, which I would call the militia guard, is work to prevent crime. For instance, an apartment theft or murder has been recorded—they must go out and seek the criminal. That is not the most productive work. It is objectively necessary.

Subunits for fighting organized crime are created to work on the basis of the individual, the criminal's personality profile. Work consists in not rushing after this crime wave, not reacting to each specific crime, but, having discovered and taken on a particularly dangerous community, revealing all its ties and intentions and documenting these facts in order on the basis of the assembled data to take this group, uncover a series of crimes already committed, and prevent possible crimes. The qualitative nature of these subunits must be different.

[Modestov] How do you assess the role of the Security Council in the present situation?

[Yerin] I believe that the Security Council is one of the most important organs of our state mechanism, and there is no doubt that its role must increase. At the same time I am not in favor of the Security Council dissipating its talents on minor issues. It should be an organ for elaborating global strategic decisions which ensure our state's security. And it should provide the president with draft decisions which are substantiated and profoundly and comprehensively studied.

The Security Council commissions can of course study more particular issues. It is pointless to create some special coordination organ, there have already been such unsuccessful attempts in our state, but in my view it is essential to create an organ which would elaborate a single legal policy for the state. It is paradoxical that we are saying, and confirming it with figures, that crime is growing, and we are discussing the struggle against corruption and detecting an increasing number of bribers, but if you take legal statistics you come up against something completely different. The courts are examining fewer cases in this category, are dropping cases, and giving sentences below the minimum stipulated by law!

When crime increases, changes qualitatively, and becomes bolder, becomes armed and more dangerous, actions should be correspondingly appropriate to the situation—more resolute and tougher.. We must dash this wave, dash it with all the means at the state's disposal. Perhaps after a while we should review sentences and release someone on parole and ahead of schedule if he behaves properly in prison. But society must feel that at all stages from the apprehension of a criminal, his investigation, and the decision on the method of detention right up to the court sentence the state acts in a single front, harmoniously, and toughly. And here in my view the Security Council should also have a say.

[Modestov] Viktor Fedorovich, our criminal code was adopted back in 1961, it is about the same age as the criminal procedure code. Obviously these documents are obsolete and do not correspond to the present day. In your view, how could they be reinforced?

[Yerin] If we are speaking of these fundamental and interconnected documents I would add to them a code for the execution of penalties, which pervade the entire official activity of the internal affairs organs in the struggle against crime [sentence as published]. It is hard for me to say why the Supreme Soviet was convinced of the need to adopt new codes. I believe that with correctly organized work we can perfectly well adopt them. But on the other hand I am glad that the Supreme Soviet has not done this work. There could have been a tragedy. I do not fear that word. Because all actions to improve the norms of criminal law have unfortunately been terribly divorced from the real situation.

In many things we are getting ahead of ourselves. I realize this is being done entirely sincerely.We are trying to capture the formal elements which attest to the development of democratic principles in society and to our approach to the ideals of a rule-of-law state. We are seizing them and introducing them and convince ourselves as to whether or not this works to the detriment of the struggle against crime. I can cite a specific example.

The entry of a lawyer into a case. Of itself an absolutely correct norm. When someone has been arrested his defense must be ensured as in any civilized state. It all goes very smoothly, but where to find a lawyer? In Moscow, within the Sadovoye Koltso, we can resolve this problem, but Russia is huge, with a population of 150 million. Take Magadan Oblast. A murder has been committed in a settlement, a suspect has been arrested, the investigator starts work with him, but... Under the law he cannot do so without a lawyer, but where to find one? Time passes, evidence is lost and a humane norm seems to start to be harmful.

We say the independence of the judge must be ensured. We cannot even allow him to be charged with being an unscrupulous or even, god forbid, a criminal person. That is why we can resolve the question quite calmly with regard to internal affairs organs workers and catch dozens of criminals in our ranks. We never conceal the fact, but why can the same work not be done with regard to unscrupulous judges?

Our changes in legislation adopted by the former Supreme Soviet did not accord with real life. After all, we exonerated deputies, judges, prosecutor's office workers. We proceeded from the premise that they were all honest, decent people, but life has shown us something rather different, to put it mildly... Take Anpilov—how much did we struggle with him, how many times did the soviet save him? Everyone must be equal before the law. There should be a single mechanism for bringing criminal charges against a citizen irrespective of his position and the post he holds. And the MVD has frequently made proposals on this score.

[Modestov] Will the militia's name be changed to police?

[Yerin] If you recall the draft law was adopted with a dual name—on the militia and in inverted commas on the police. That was in 1990 and at that time they had concluded that a law on the militia should be adopted. To be honest at the time I believed that was correct.

The reforming of power is under way in Russia and essentially we are moving away from the power of the soviets. There will be a fundamentally new mechanism of state administration built not on the omnipotence of the soviets but on more perfect forms of administration and in this connection staffers are beginning to discuss this issue. I believe that we will study and analyze the actual definition of militia and police and hold a poll among the personnel of various levels. We shall see what the results show and we must feel people's mood.

All our counterparts with a few exceptions have changed the name "militia" to "police." The Baltic republics, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia—everywhere the word "police" is used. This question is a valid one.

[Modestov] Well, whether you ministry is called the police or the militia, it will remain to stand guard over legality and law and order. And on behalf of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI readers I sincerely wish you successes in your hard work and wholeheartedly congratulate you on your professional holiday—militia day.

Edict on General Prosecutor's Office Published

PM1111101993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Edict No. 1685 of the Russian Federation President "On the Activity of the Prosecutor's Office in the Period of Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 20 October 1993]

[Text] With a view to increasing the efficiency of the activity of the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office organs to uphold the law and in accordance with the Russian Federation president's Edict No. 1400 of 21 September "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," I decree:

1. The unified centralized system of Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office organs is to be preserved, lower-ranking prosecutors being subordinate to higher-ranking prosecutors and the Russian Federation General Prosecutor.

Prosecutors are to carry out their activity in accordance with the parts of the Russian Federation Constitution and the Russian Federation Law "On the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office" which do not contradict the Russian Federation president's edict No. 1400 of 21 September 1993 "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" and this edict. Military prosecutors are in addition to follow the parts of the Statute on the Military Prosecutor's Office which do not contradict existing legislation and the Russian Federation president's edicts.

2. Until the Russian Federation Constitution has been adopted the Russian Federation General Prosecutor and the prosecutors subordinate to him are responsible for supervising the implementation of the Russian Federation president's edicts and coordinating law enforcement organs' crime-fighting activity.

3. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to make provisions for the necessary financing, supplies, and material and technical and other support for the Military Prosecutor's Office organs.

4. The Russian Federation General Prosecutor has three months to prepare, by agreement with the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, proposals on establishing preferential pension provisions for prosecutor's office staffers.

5. This edict comes into force the moment it is published.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 20 October 1993

Media Issues

Deputy Press Minister on Closing Papers

LD1011200193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1740 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] The Press Ministry intends to close 11 opposition newspapers and magazines of the pro-Fascist orientation with no court decision. The ministry also filed suits against another 4 newspapers, including DEN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, First Deputy Press and Information Minister David Tsabriya told Interfax today.

At the same time, he pointed out that the "opposition press in Russia has been and will be." In his opinion, when Viktor Linnik came to head PRAVDA's editorial board, the newspaper, though remaining undoubtedly oppositional, made a move towards the standards of a constructive opposition newspaper." "This is to our delight," Tsabriya pointed out.

He said it was not a problem to provide the whole country with comprehensive information concerning the coming elections, except for the Chechen republic where the elections will not be held. The existing legal acts on the mass media provide equal opportunities for every participant of the election campaign, Tsabriya said.

The official told a press conference today that his ministry intended to dramatically amend the law on the mass media. Among other amendments, the ministry proposed a simplified procedure for closing newspapers and electronic means of forwarding information and a net of fines to be imposed on the chief editor. At the same time, Tsabriya pointed out the amendments will not be extended over the law's main principles: the independence of the mass media and the prohibition of censorship.

Speaking on the relations between his ministry and the Federal Information Center, Tsabriya pointed out that the state's interests were met only under a situation when only one agency handles matters related to the press, or there is a clear division of powers between them. He did not rule out that the two bodies' leaders would hold negotiations in the near future to settle their differences.

Comments on State Subsidies

MK1111141993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Aleksey Kalmykov report: "David Tsabriya on Subsidies for Mass Media"]

[Text] Yesterday David Tsabriya, first deputy press and information minister, told journalists that as of now out of the 15,000 mass media organizations that exist in Russia, approximately 600 are directly subsidized by the state. This year the Finance Ministry has allocated approximately 20 million rubles in subsidies—half the sum requested by the Press and Information Ministry. According to Mr. Tsabriya, in the near future the newspaper KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE will publish a full list of publications that have received subsidies in 1993, specifying their circulation and the sum received. Furthermore, David Tsabriya spoke about pending amendments to the law "On the Press and Mass Media of the Russian Federation."

IZVESTIYA To Publish Three Times Weekly

PM1011161593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Editorial announcement: "New in Our Newspaper"]

[Text] In 1994 IZVESTIYA will publish a 16-page edition three times a week.

In Saturday's final edition your attention was probably drawn to "Everything About Television"—the trailer for a new supplement which will appear from next year.

But that is not all.

Even now, as many readers of our newspaper have remarked, IZVESTIYA has begun "running in" new special pages which we intend to offer you next year.

In many ways these thematic pages have been prompted thanks to the wishes of subscribers, who have been calling us recently on the special telephone line 299-80-16.

"Motor Show" will keep you up to date with the latest on the domestic and world automobile markets and tell you about the innovations of the State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration, foreign experience of the work of the traffic police, and virtually everything of interest connected with the concept of the automobile and the highway.

For the first time in the current issue we present the page "Travels and Adventures" (see page 13). We would like to know what you think of it, since we intend to regularly include it in future.

Lovers of sport and sports news will soon be able to satisfy their interest in IZVESTIYA thanks to the special "Sports Supplement".

Well, the editors have also heeded those who have been pressing us to publish official documents promulgated by institutions of state power: A special section for such documents will appear in the newspaper in the new year.

Readers have already grown accustomed to, and are asking us to continue publication of, the traditional pages "People", "Digest," "History and the Modern World,' and "Another View."

However, not everything that IZVESTIYA's editors intend to offer you in the new year is listed here. The main thing is that you subscribe to our newspaper in time.

IZVESTIYA Subscription Campaign Extended [subhead]

By agreement with local postal departments, subscriptions will be accepted in some places until 15 November, in others until 20 November, and in yet others until a later date. We remind you that the cover price of a six-month subscription to IZVESTIYA is only 1,800 rubles [R], or R300 for one month. The total cost depends on delivery charges.

More on Plans for IZVESTIYA

PM1211103193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Editorial office announcement: "IZVESTIYA-94"]

[Text] In the new year our newspaper, responding to readers' wishes, will increase its size and content by including the following sections or pullout supplements:

IZVESTIYA-TV—a pullout supplement for those who are not only viewers, but also want to know what is going on behind the screen, plus the television programs for the week with commentary.

IZVESTIYA-Sport—a pullout supplement for amateurs, professionals, and mere fans, discussing events in practically all kinds of sports.

IZVESTIYA-Official—A pullout supplement for major state documents.

We will continue to publish the "FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA" section for business people, which has only been going for a year, but has already acquired a reputation in the world of business.

Authorities Said Annoyed With Independent TV

MK1111133093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Viktoriya Belopolskaya report under "NTV Told To Change the Channel" rubric: "Igor Malashenko Risks Shoving Eduard Sagalayev"]

[Text] It turned out yesterday that the leadership of the Federal Information Center [FIC] has told NTV [Independent Television Channel] General Director Igor

Malashenko to terminate the contract with St. Petersburg TV on leasing air time and shift the company's broadcasts to [Moscow] Channel 6.

FIC Director Mikhail Poltoranin, known for his passionate behavior in the days of "black October," is now spreading confusion in the ranks not only of opponents of democracy but also its ardent supporters. Thus, for example, Eduard Sagalayev, TV-6 director, was dismayed when he learned that the FIC head intends to persuade the Petersburg-Channel 5 company to cancel the contract on leasing air time, concluded with NTV on 6 September, and to move NTV to Channel 6, which is under Sagalayev's control, about which he informed Igor Malashenko as a comrade in trouble.

This idea is not at all attractive either for NTV or for Channel 6. First of all, TV-6 co-founder Ted Turner insists that the enterprise pay its way, which means that any time, not only prime time, is literally as precious as gold to Channel 6. Second, if this happens, NTV will be left with practically no viewers. Broadcasting via St. Petersburg was not really effective in that the St. Petersburg channel audience is merely 75 million viewers, but this figure now appears huge compared to the TV-6 audience which, for technical reasons, is extremely small.

NTV's good intentions to open the way to unbiased reporting and independent analysis of events are well known, but apparently owing to these intentions, NTV's life is complicated and it proceeds in constant expectation of being taken off the air, a technical failure, or a flare-up of rival discontent on the part of Petersburg-Channel 5. The danger of the contract with NTV being terminated by the St. Petersburg company was felt yesterday and is being felt today. The results were not slow in coming. Mr. Poltoranin generated a new idea which kills two independent "birds" with one stone—NTV and Channel 6. Apparently the existence of TV that cannot be administered bothers the authorities.

These plans are touchingly idealistic: The Petersburg-Channel 5 company will have to pay a penalty for cancellation of the contract and Ted Turner may be able to take some retaliatory measures.

Television Technicians Protest Ostankino's Monopoly

MK1111135093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 77, 11 Nov 93 (signed to press 10 Nov) p 1

[SEGODNYA-signed report: "'Ostankino' Tries To Become a Monopoly"]

[Text] It has transpired that chiefs of the "Ostankino" Television and Radio Company have drawn up a draft presidential edict on including the Television Technical Center [TTC] in the company structure. A letter sent by TTC staffers to Boris Yeltsin emphasizes that at present three state-owned Moscow-based television companies and independents—NTV, TV-6, and 2x2—have been using the center's technical facilities, and that the solution proposed by "Ostankino" chiefs would result in creating an artificial monopoly that will have more effective leverage for exerting pressure on other television companies, including even their forcible removal from the air.

RABOTNITSA Journalists Condemn Chief Editor's Actions

PM1011165393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

["Open Letter From Journalists of RABOTNITSA to Chief Editor Z.P. Krylova" signed by Ludmila Gavryushenko, Natalya Arishina, Larisa Bogdanova, Nadezhda Osminina, Mariya Musina, Nina Fedorova, and Nadezhda Nesterova; under the "Scandal" rubric]

[Text] Your colleagues appeal to you—former members of the editorial collegium, journalists, who, strictly speaking, make this magazine, helping readers to find their bearings in the difficult circumstances of life and to acquire confidence in their own resources and in tomorrow.

Thinking of the future of the new magazine—which, incidentally, in 1994 will be 80 years old—we suggested that you float it on the market, endowing every member of the labor collective with ownership rights. For some reason you were not keen on the idea. Evidently, you have forgotten that the founding collective is proprietor of the magazine, and not you. But as soon as we expressed no confidence in you, you withdrew four editors of leading sections from the editorial college.

Obviously, you had no option left but to destroy in whatever way possible the journalistic collective which had been witness to your abuses of power.

Acting alone you dispose of the money from subscribers, investing it in commercial structures. To the accompaniment of fine words about the difficult financial situation, you acquire cars and garages used by no one knows who—but certainly not the journalists. All on your own you approve the table of organization—and an ever greater place in it is being taken up by noncreative employees who serve you personally. Large sums are allocated every month from the editorial budget for your upkeep and to provide you with a personal dacha, chauffeurs, doctors, and lawyers. And meanwhile, the journalistic collective has neither proper working conditions, nor the rubles to resolve social questions. You do not think about the subscribers either, arbitrarily reducing print runs and depriving them of issues that they have already paid for.

This is only a small part of what we know; after all, your activity, as you stress, is a commercial secret.

Constantly talking to the collective about the magazine's difficult financial position, you at the same time publish free advertising on its pages. We might have been able to understand this, if such philanthropy were shown to firms whose activity is aimed at aiding low-income families, invalids, and children. But you patronize firms dealing in antiques.

Wishing to be neither accomplices in nor dumb witnesses to your actions, we asked you questions about your financial and economic activity. You answered us with repressions: cuts, dismissals, reprimands, and lower wages.

We wish to remind you that the "cold war" did not begin yesterday, but back in 1991, when you, personally, without the participation of the labor collective—the founder of the editorial office—changed the charter and reregistered the magazine, appropriating the right to run it. Unfortunately, we recently found this out too. But you expect that this secret will remain a secret after we, in your opinion, "have voluntarily left the editorial team." How much longer have we got left, in your estimation? One reprimand for 10 minutes' tardiness? That was how you fired one journalist. We hope that you remember that on 10 November you are supposed to appear in court, where the case of the illegality of your order is to be heard.

Surely, Zoya Petrovna, you understand that such methods of fighting with "human material," which you mastered to perfection when you were a member of the CPSU Central Committee, will no longer wash? You accused us of "seeking to destroy a national asset"—the magazine RABOTNITSA. There can be no more absurd a claim. Destroy what we created and continue to create through our own toil? No, Zoya Petrovna, we will not allow this venerable publication for women, millions of whose readers know our names. And we wish to keep these names honorable.

[Signed] Ludmila Gavryushenko, Natalya Arishina, Larisa Bogdanova, Nadezhda Osminina, Mariya Musina, Nina Fedorova, and Nadezhda Nesterova.

From the Editorial Office

In recent times conflicts between chief editors, their intimates, and creative collectives have been flaring up or quietly smoldering in one editorial office after another. But the underlying cause is not personalities, but an objective cause—economics.

The fact is that most of the mass media are not enterprises in some form of ownership. The exception are those newspapers whose publication has been suspended at sundry times by sundry powers. In order to resume production, editorial offices have had to hastily register either as a limited partnership, or as a joint-stock company. Sometimes one has been recast as the other, but the major task was done—the editorial offices became an enterprise with legally based relations between employers and employees or between shareholders, and with the other consequences ensuing from this.

The majority of mass media outlets, however, have become juridical persons on the basis of the Law on the Press, in which the political section is sufficiently clear, and the economic side is poorly elaborated. It is this vagueness which has engendered another postcommunist phenomenon: The chief editor (and the plant director besides) has become the de facto owner of the newspaper or magazine. And the absence of controls over their activity and their lack of accountability have in some places led to a boorish style of leadership and the flourishing of petty tyranny, financial abuses, and other breaches of ethics and legality.

And until the economic question is resolved, juridical and moral conflicts like the one which has erupted in RABOTNITSA will, unfortunately, multiply. And this does not make the already difficult life of editorial collectives any easier.

Election Issues

Premier Said To Curtail Deputies' Rights

MK1011142093 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 46, 10-16 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p 1

[Report by Andrey Pavlovich under the "Elections" rubric: "Chernomyrdin's Secret Contribution"]

[Text] It has become known to this newspaper from reliable sources in the government that Viktor Chernomyrdin made his own contribution late last week to the guarantees of the electoral campaign's legitimacy. The premier signed a confidential directive denying his deputies who are campaigning for election, for the duration of the campaign, the right to sign financial documents distributing credits, quotas, licenses, etc., so that these concealed but extremely effective means of buying votes are not used in the election race.

We should recall here that four deputy premiers—Yegor Gaydar, Sergey Shakhray, Aleksandr Shokhin, and Boris Fedorov—have declared their intention to run for deputy seats on party tickets.

Shakhray Says Federal Assembly Should Call Elections

LD1111143293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] In the opinion of Russia's Unity and Concord Party, it should be up to the new Federal Assembly to finally decide whether to hold early presidential elections or not. That was how the party leader, Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, answered a question about his party's attitude to President Yeltsin's intention to reconsider his earlier decision to hold early presidential elections in 1994 and vote to choose a new head of state in 1996.

As the term of the Federal Assembly's powers is limited by two years, it would be logical to hold simultaneous presidential and parliamentary voting in 1996, Shakhray noted. In his words, his party is ready to support such a position in a new parliament.

The party leadership argues that, in legal terms, Yeltsin has the right to reconsider his own decision and cancel early presidential elections. "At the same time, a decision of such magnitude is important not only formally, in terms of law, but also politically," Shakhray remarked. For this reason, the Russian president's statement on elections cannot be viewed unequivocally."

The party believes that predictability and consistency must be the major ingredients of state policy, Shakhray said.

To Seek Chairmanship of State Duma

MK1211092593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 1

[Indira Dunayeva report under the general headline: "Pre-Election Passions Running High. Administration Heads Want to Joint the Federation Council. Sergey Shakhray Creates Democratic Coalition in the Duma"]

[Text] It has already become quite clear that leaders of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] election association will get into the new parliament.

Yet Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray, who tops the PRES slate, also has his own maximum program: to head the State Duma in the new parliament. He is already trying to play the role of speaker by establishing links not only with all democratic but also centrist organizations. Thus, the PRES Political Council has decided to support in elections to the Federation Council former Mossovet Chairman Nikolay Gonchar, one of the leaders of Civic Union's Moscow division, who has recently been calling for the creation of an economic union on CIS territory.

Addressing a news conference yesterday, Sergey Shakhray said that consultations are under way on election campaign collaboration in territorial constituencies, primarily with Russia's Choice. Apparently Shakhray regards this bloc's representatives as the foundation for creating a democratic coalition in parliament. "If the PRES manages to create this coalition, I shall be seeking the post of chairman of the State Duma," Shakhray stated. In his opinion, "it is time to stop reproaching Russia's Choice for being a pro-presidential bloc, since Boris Yeltsin is supported by all democratic blocs." Judging by these statements, should Shakhray head the Duma, we would have a speaker who enjoys an equal and nonconfrontational relationship with the Russian president.

Sergey Shakhray believes that the majority of problems in the Russian state arise because there is no "mechanism to express the economic interests of the Russian heartland at the federal level." By way of a recipe for salvaging Russia, the PRES proposes observance of economic federalism. Its essence was explained at the news conference by another leader of the bloc, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin. According to him, economic federalism is primarily a rational distribution of tax revenues to the budget: "The Center should take exactly as much as is needed to implement its functions." Furthermore, economic federalism envisions the existence of a single economic space in Russia, as well as support for the "depressed" regions through a mechanism of forming a regional development fund and a subvention fund.

According to the PRES leaders, the government's work with the regions should be so organized that the regions are represented in the Russian Government itself, assuming responsibility for the decisions on federal-wide economic policy.

Baburin Comments on Leaving President Without Control

LD1111175793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1640 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—One of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's major political foes, Sergey Baburin, said on Thursday that in the present situation it would be insane to leave the president without even the slightest control of the legislative branch.

Speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Thursday, Baburin, one of the leaders of the Russian All-People's Union which has been denied registration for the December 12 elections, stressed that his union did not consider the elections as a goal in itself. He admitted that at first the union wanted to boycott the elections, but then decided against it, reasoning that "that's exactly what they (Yeltsin's camp) wanted us to do, to withdraw from the struggle." "The worst variant would be if our boycott would result in a failure to elect the parliament: to leave the president now even without the slightest control from the bodies of legislative power would be insane," Baburin said.

The union was denied registration for the upcoming elections to the State Duma, the lower house in Russia's new parliament, on the grounds of violation of the signature-collecting procedure. The union collected 105,000 signatures, but 30,000 and 16,000 of them were collected in Moscow and the Moscow region respectively. However, under election law, a political party may not collect more than 15,000 signatures in any one region. Additionally, the union collected signatures in Estonia and Moldova without the participation of the consulates of these states in Russia. This is inadmissible. As a result, after all extractions, the figure shrinks to 90,000, which is 10,000 short of the required number, Ryabov explained.

However, the union is determined to continue campaigning to fight the elections by individuals from constituencies on a first-past-the-post basis. Baburin said he would run as a candidate from the Omsk constituency.

Lukyanov Seeks Registration as State Duma Candidate

LD1111131193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Anatoliy Lukyanov, a defendant in the state of emergency committee case and formerly the USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman, stands a chance to become a State Duma member.

As his daughter Yelena Lukyanov has told Interfax, the Smolensk constituency (Central Russia) "has been collecting signatures in his support for a long time." The signed list has been delivered to the local electoral commission to get the ex-Soviet Parliament's Speaker registered as a candidate to the State Duma. Yelena Lukyanov expects the completion of registration formalities by November 15.

Besides, her father figures in the list of the Russian Communist Party, recorded at the Central Electoral Commission. So, a member of the State of Emergency Committee may get a certificate of a candidate to the State Duma as early as this week.

Yavlinskiy Grants Interview on Elections

LD1111224793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 11 Nov 93

["Exclusive" report]

[Text] One of the electoral blocs, whose chances for election to the State Duma are considered quite high by experts, is the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc (initially called "Russia and Freedom"). Its leaders expect 10 to 15, possibly even 30 percent of the vote. Interfax [IF] correspondent Natalya Kapyshina talks with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, a co-founder of the bloc and a noted economist, who recently announced his intention to run for president of the Russian Federation in 1994.

Yavlinsky: Our electoral association is, in fact, a democratic opposition to the current government. Although we share some of their goals such as freedom, democracy, private enterprise, and competition, we detest the forms and methods by which political reforms have been conducted in the last two years. Our bloc feels that such methods give reason for doubts about the proclaimed goals and ideals. Most of all this concerns the continuous whipping up of political hysteria. Rather than reformist, many actions by the current administration have been revolutionary, with all the ensuing consequences. A line that has been emerging, regardless of anyone's wish, leads to neither democracy nor to a market economy, substituting the first with some surrogate of a totalitarian type and replacing the second with a further state monopoly, whose interests are a far cry from those of the private economy.

IF: Many cabinet ministers intend to combine their ministerial posts with parliamentary duties. What do you think of this?

Yavlinskiy: It is common knowledge that an authoritarian regime like the one in Russia today always holds elections in order to fortify itself. Hence, the government's bloc "Russia's Choice" appeared, which finds itself in special circumstances. No wonder all the cabinet members will try to get into parliament, and all governors will be seated in its Upper House.

In the USSR, there was a principle which compulsorily combined three posts: member of the Communist Party Central Committee, member of the government, and deputy of the Supreme Soviet. A similar situation is evolving now: membership in the government's party, in the cabinet, and in parliament is essential.

But with all the doubts, one has to admit that elections to a new parliament are the only opportunity for laying down the foundations of law and legitimacy. It is impossible to run Russia by force, as has been the case through the centuries. A workable parliament and a democratic government are indispensable for Russia.

IF: What is your view on simultaneous parliamentary elections and the referendum on a constitution scheduled for December 12?

Yavlinskiy: The idea seems odd to me. Why should the working group of the Constitutional Conference, sitting in a Kremlin hall, know better than a democratically elected parliament what kind of a constitution is best in this land? If this Conference is considered to be a better judge, then all this should not be disguised by some democratic procedures. Rather, a simple admission should be made that Boris Yeltsin has granted a constitution to the people of Russia.

IF: What is your opinion about the wording of the fundamental law being drafted at the Constitutional Conference?

Yavlinskiy: Some of its points arouse much anxiety. I personally am worried by the main question that the government has left unanswered for such a long time—the federation problem. The idea to make the Federation Constituent Members equal gives rise for concern. Is it really possible to mechanically proclaim all 89 constituent members regions? What will this lead to, say, in Tatarstan? Do we solve a problem or do we lay a mine under it? Against the background of what's going on in the center, one can feel that the pace of separatism has become somewhat slower, indeed. But does this mean that it is high time to constitutionally legitimize the federation members' equality. I doubt it. I favor a constitutional rather than a contractual federation. But the road to it is very long.

Russia has a future only if its territories merge into a federation on their own. Otherwise, we will find ourselves at a dead end and will have to return to this problem in a year's time. It is inconceivable to use the methods by which the last Supreme Soviet was dissolved for setting up a federation in Russia, although I agree that the Federation Treaty should be removed from the draft constitution. The treaty is nothing new in terms of law since it leaves the key issues unanswered. Nor is there any discussion on that in society today. And that's the main trouble for Russia now. All questions should be tied to elections in the territories and the clarification of their status. What do 89 Federation territories stand for? All of them were formed in their time for military and political goals. So, it has to be decided whether they are military districts, a party organization, or something else. However, there is an altogether different situation in the country today.

The trouble is that if in the past it was proper to regard the possibility of regions from the angle of economic, industrial, and geographic potentials, and the natural resources of a single economic complex, now from the position of a liberal economy, the regions have quite different interests of their own. It is necessary to find something to keep them together by reconciling their fundamental economic and geo-political interests. Territories should be offered appropriate models to prove their real effect. And then, talks could be carried out with far bigger regions than the 89 federation constituent members.

IF: Do you think the Federal Assembly should deal with that?

Yavlinskiy: I think there is the president for that. That is the task for a major figure, for whom preventing the country from disintegration is a key issue of historic dimensions.

As for a new constitution, it seems to me that everything should be done stage by stage. First, hold elections and set up a parliament. Then, the president will submit his draft constitution, parliament will examine its wording, and will pledge to put it up within 3 months for a national referendum. This means that parliament must perform its constituent function. If the draft is approved at the plebiscite, then after putting the final touches to it the constitution can be endorsed. Then local and presidential elections should be held, to be followed by new parliamentary elections. Such a plan is only logical.

What we are offered now is a strange parliament to be elected without a constitution, like a time bomb.

IF: What do you think about the recent land privatization decree?

Yavlinskiy: My impression is that the executive branch was strongly against its adoption, otherwise that process would not have lasted for over 2 years. Indeed, it is an intricate question, concerning the vital interests of a great many people. My opinion is that in solving it, it is necessary to take into account the fact that Russia is such a huge country, that attitudes toward land ownership on its territory should be an electoral issue and change from region to region. In principle, all restrictions on the possession of land should be lifted, but regional peculiarities be left intact. For instance, it is one thing to sell land in Dagestan (North Caucasus, IF) to people from Siberia, and another to sell land in Siberia to Dagestan's citizens. It is for the local authorities to settle the problem most rationally and peacefully.

IF: Should Russia repeat the Baltic countries' experience, and return property to those who owned it before the 1917 revolution or to their ancestors?

Yavlinskiy: Well here, too, everything depends on concrete conditions. I believe that the right of owners to this property in principle must be recognized. However, this by no means suggests that each heir must physically regain such property. I suggest that by recognizing the inheritance right, the government must compensate the owners of property with money or some other equivalent.

IF: How would you briefly assess the current situation in Russia's economy and the policy being pursued by the finance ministry to curb inflation and reduce the budget deficit?

Yavlinskiy: I wish this policy would be tougher. The government has been making certain attempts to stabilize inflation, but I do not see tough measures to hold back credit emission, which is nearly as crippling as it was in the spring. The difference is just a few points.

The trouble is that there is virtually no one in the government today to deal with economics, nor will there be anyone until political issues have been resolved. I wish the government would prove strong enough to at least keep the country from hyper-inflation by keeping inflation at least to 40 percent. Anything more can hardly be expected from the cabinet, since all its ministers are busy with the election campaign. If you recall, they declared: do not disturb us for several months, and we will stabilize the situation. But as soon as they were left alone, they all occupied themselves with the elections. Taking part in the election campaign are 16 cabinet members, aligning themselves with different blocs. What kind of a coherent team is this?

Zatulin on Breaking With Yavlinskiy

MK1011150093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 46, 14 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p B1

[Own correspondent's report: ""Entrepreneurs for a New Russia Strengthen Alliance With Shakhray's Party"]

[Text] Konstantin Zatulin, leader of the "Entrepreneurs for a New Russia," has explained his reasons for breaking with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy in favor of Sergey Shakhray's party.

He said in particular that the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc" could be called "a bloc named for 'I' [Ya—a reference to Yavlinskiy, also meaning "I"]," and that Yavlinskiy himself "was not intent on working in parliament, but was trying his hand in preparing for the upcoming presidential elections." After prolonged, fruitless talks with him the entrepreneurs's association decided to form a bloc with the PRES as an equal partner.

The chairman of the "Entrepreneurs for a New Russia" all-Russian association is running for the Duma in the Tuapse district of Krasnodar Kray and on the ticket of the Party for Russian Unity and Accord, with which "Entrepreneurs for a New Russia" formed an alliance for the election campaign. Konstantin Zatulin is number three on its list after Sergey Shakhray and Aleksandr Shokhin.

Zatulin said that he supported "the state's paternalism with regard to industry," and as for federal policy he favored "the regions' right to have their own opinions on choosing their path of development," which brings him closer to PRES leader Sergey Shakhray.

Ryabov Discusses Election Preparations With CSCE

LD1211130493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1058 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow November 12 TASS—Some 500 foreign experts will soon come to Moscow to start official monitoring of the preparation and holding of nationwide elections to the Federal Assembly and of the referendum on a new constitution of the Russian Federation. The observers are expected to come from Europe, Asia and former USSR republics. Some of them will represent the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and other international organisatons, Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Nikolay Ryabov said today at a meeting with the delegation of observers from the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, headed by Chairman of the Assembly Ilkka Suominen.

According to Ryabov, the electoral campaign, for which very little time was given, has successfully passed the first stage: 13 electoral associations have been registered, which will be entered on ballot papers at the elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly. According to Ryabov, the registered electoral blocs cover about the whole of the political spectrum, from pro-government and centrist blocs to those which are in tough opposition to the president's course.

The granting of equal propaganda opportunities in mass media organs to all the electoral blocs and the candidates, registered on an individual basis, is one of the main tasks of the Central Electoral Commission for the coming weeks, Ryabov continued. He warned state bodies against direct participation in propaganda in favour of this or that bloc.

Ilkka Suominen, chairman of the parliamentary assembly, expressed gratitude to representatives of the Russian Central Electoral Commission for the information and said that he and his colleagues were counting on close cooperation with Russian electoral commissions. He stressed that he had not noticed "any serious defects" in the regulations on elections. According to Ilkka Suominen, during their stay in Russia foreign observers will be interested as well in the procedure for the forthcoming presidential elections.

Borovoy Against Parliamentary Election Restriction

LD1011151093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1241 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow November 10 TASS—Russian noted businessman Konstantin Borovoy, whose election bloc "August" failed to collect the necessary 100,000 signatures to qualify for elections, said he would run for parliament anyway.

Borovoy told a press conference on Wednesday [10 November] that after the Central Election Commission had admitted that there had been cases of faked signatures he decided to continue the elections race and run for the State Duma in a one-seat constituency.

Borovoy also urged the president to cancel the demand to collect 100,000 signatures in order to run for elections. He said it is necessary to allow all registered election blocs to run for parliament.

Experts View Election Forces Lineup

MK1011144093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Nov 93 pp 1,2

[Unattributed "in-house" expert's report for the president's administration from the "Document" column: "The Opposition Will Have a Majority in the State Duma"]

[Text] The following is an internal expert document analyzing the lineup of political forces in the run-up to the elections, prepared for the presidential administration.

Overnight from 6 to 7 November, of the 35 voters associations that registered their candidate and that have been raising 100,000 signatures, 21 have remained. The results of the "subscription" campaign (the list of those who were knocked out of the election race and those who continued to contest seats in the new parliament) allows the following conclusions:

1. The level of political activity among the population remains fairly low. The requisite number of signatures has been raised primarily by those associations (blocs and parties) which:

a) have preserved their former links and traditional supporters and which have an organizational and political experience of work among the masses (like, for instance, the communists) and which have also managed to acquire a favorable image among the population—the Democratic Party of Russia, the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement, and New Russia;

b) have relied on the support of local structures in the Center and in the provinces (the pro-government Russia's Choice bloc and the PRES [Party for Russian Unity and Accord] party of the regional nomenklatura);

c) had a sufficient base in the shape of economic structures of the new, market-related, or the traditional, state-distribution type (the Consolidation Party with its entrepreneurial potential, or Civic Union relying on the enterprise director corps and its rural counterpart—the Russian Agrarian Party);

d) are corporate associations of the traditional type (Russia's Women, the Dignity and Mercy veterans and invalids association, the Future of Russia-New Names youth association).

The extremely limited time frame for the registration stage of the election campaign has not brought any substantial dividends to the pro-government forces because it has left them one to one with extremely powerful opponents. Serious work to involve the inert part of the electorate (the "uncommitted") into the political process has proven impossible. As a result, uncertainty and lack of confidence as to the outcome of the elections have only increased.

2. An analysis of the dominant social mood allows the assumption that the overall number of voters who may go to the polls will be approximately 60 percent. Moreover, up to 5 percent of the turnout may only go through the motions of voting while in fact abstaining from any choice (in other words, they will either cross out the entire list or take the ballot papers away with them).

3. After 6 November the following lineup of forces is emerging, which may hold until the election day:

Russia's Choice—the largest group, destined, however, for a lone confrontation with the future opposition (both moderate and intransigent). The weakening of its positions is inevitable owing to the aggravation of internal disagreements and the emergence of contradictions in its relations with the president.

A probable share of votes in December—20 to 24 percent (K. Borovoy's demarche will hardly have any practical implications for Russia's Choice). This amount may somewhat increase with the votes cast for the associations that have failed to clear the 5-percent barrier (up to 23 to 27 percent). In the Duma this group may consolidate up to 30 to 33 percent around itself owing to the inevitable division within the corporate groups.

Moderate opposition forces (PRES, the New Russia, "Vangard," and "Yabloko" blocs and the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement and possibly Civic Union, the Russian Democratic Party and the Consolidation Party). Disagreements with the ruling bloc are not so much of an ideological as predominantly situational character. Speculative demarches by a particular group trying to play the card of creating a "new coalition" are likely, which will be taking on not only a centrist but also a left of center character through teaming up with the Russian Agrarian Party. This coalition may also strengthen by achieving a rapprochement with the constitutional democrats who are appealing to patriotic feelings.

In its entirety, this grouping may count on a share of votes comparable with Russia's Choice and probably even higher (26 to 32 percent), increasing as a result of the votes given to outsiders (28 to 34 percent). The overall number of seats controlled by these forces may reach 33 to 36 percent.

The intransigent opposition forces (the Russian Federation Communist Party, the Russian All-Nation Union), on their own, may ensure for themselves a fairly modest representation—5 to 6 percent. Their main effort will be directed at teaming up (importantly, not even during the elections themselves but in the process of forming parliamentary factions) with the supporters of the national-patriotic idea, and also at attracting into their camp deputies from corporate associations (agrarians, women, veterans, and so forth). As a result, their overall proportion in the State Duma may increase to 15 to 20 percent. In the future the representation of these forces may expand owing to the inevitable erosion of the center.

The nonpoliticized forces affiliated with corporate associations may poll between 12 and 15 percent of votes (not counting the APR [possibly the Russian Agrarian Party]). The very first months in the work of the new legislative body will be marked by an accelerated redistribution of deputies from corporate groups based on political platforms.

4. The present forecast of the lineup of forces in the future State Duma takes into account only half the mandates which will be distributed according to party lists. There is no reason to think that a basically different situation will develop in single-seat constituencies (although it could be possible to anticipate an even more pessimistic assessment of the probable outcome of the elections for the ruling group).

Nonetheless, a substantial part of "independent" deputies from single-seat constituencies will apparently rally around a personified ruling authority, including the president or the head of government.

5. Separate treatment should be given to the composition, role, and place of the new legislative body bearing in mind the fact that the Federal Council within it will be particularly attractive. Many representatives of regional elites are linking their ambitions with it. The powers of this body and its special status within the state power system may contribute to the subsequent development of such a novel phenomenon in this country and confrontation of the chambers.

6. The prospects for the largest faction in the future parliament (Russia's Choice) will somewhat improve owing to a possible exacerbation of political struggle over a consistent implementation of reforms which will be objectively prodding potential allies, as represented by the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement, PRES, and part of the Russian Democratic Party and others, to form a reform coalition ensuring Russia's Choice the requisite majority in parliament.

7. The government bloc should realize the need to work out and implement a corresponding coalition strategy. In the tactical respect this will call in the very near term for intensifying the information and propaganda influence on the electorate with the aim of explaining the character and extent of the threat arising from the intransigent opposition. Each voter should have a perception of a real danger and an understanding of his personal responsibility for the country's fate and the irreversibility of the ongoing changes.

Likewise it is essential to understand that within the time before the elections the opponents will not provide any other opportunity to prove the validity of apprehensions on their account. This is shown by the celebration of the 76th anniversary of the October revolution.

8. Special attention needs to be given to the relations between the president and the future parliament (its ruling majority). Apart from the most radical and quite constitutional option for the dissolution of a legislative body that has rejected all reasonable compromise, there is a separate problem of organizing interaction between the president and this body.

It would be the most prudent not to accentuate his proximity to Russia's Choice but to try to gain benefit from his position as a nonpartisan arbiter whose support is sought by particular forces. Especially since the political demands and the personal claims put forward by Russia's Choice would hardly consolidate this association's authority in the president's eyes.

In practical terms this means the need to establish constructive cooperation on his part with the center or even to create his own counterbalance, association with which will be sought by other parliamentary factions in the form of a nonpartisan movement (its concept was presented by V. Kostikov in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 5 November).

The main reserve for this is the second half of the Duma, which is also confronted with the task of self-identification, as well as some corporate associates and the unique nonpartisan movement "Preobrazheniye," whose program corresponds the most fully to the concept of the "presidential party."

Election Committee Reports on Nomination of Candidates

LD1111143893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] According to the Central Election Committee, as many as 1149 candidates have been nominated for the State Duma by single- mandate constituencies as of November 11. Of these, 30 were registered by virtue of their collecting the required number of signatures. Deputies from one-mandate constituencies will receive 225 of the 450 seats in the State Duma.

Among those registered is Vice-Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha (Orenburg electoral district in the South Urals). Zaveryukha has also been nominated as a candidate to the State Duma by the Agrarian Party.

Out of 89 two-mandate constituencies under the Federation Council, a total of 85 have nominated 514 candidates. Some 30 of them have been registered in the Central Election Commission.

Moscow, Chita, the Chechen Republic have not nominated a single candidate to parliament's upper chamber.

The deadline for submitting lists to the Central Election Commission in support of candidates from one- or two-mandate constituencies expires at midnight, November 14.

Technicalities Prevent Party Registrations

LD1111130893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Interfax has been informed that the Central Election Commission did not uncover instances of falsifying lists with signatures presented by 8 parties and coalitions that were barred from being registered. Among the most typical offenses were the transfer of some documents by fax, the absence of the signature of the collector on some sheets and over 15,000 signatures collected in one region.

The official verdict on the non-registration of lists presented by 8 parties and coalitions will be made public today, November 11, at 15:00 at an open meeting of the Central Election Commission in the conference hall, 12th Floor, 19 Novy Arbat St.

Ryabov Comments

LD1111153593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1448 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—Russia's Central Electoral Commission announced on Thursday the reasons for denying eight political parties and blocs registration which would allow them to begin campaigning for December 12 parliamentary elections.

The Party of Consolidation, the National Republican Party of Russia, the Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of People's Freedom), the political movement Transformation and the Russian Christian Democratic Party failed to collect the needed number of signatures required to fight the elections as a party.

The party New Russia and the Association of Independent Professionals have withdrawn their lists of signatures from the Central Electoral Commission. New Russia has also called on its supporters to vote for representatives of democratic forces, while the Association of Independent Professionals said it would support the Vybor Rossii (Russia's Choice) bloc.

The Russian All People's Union has collected 105,000 signatures, but 30,000 and 16,000 of them were collected in Moscow and the Moscow region respectively. However, under election law, a political party may not collect more than 15,000 signatures in any one region. Additionally, the union collected signatures in Estonia and Moldavia without the participation of the consulates of these states in Russia. This is inadmissible. As a result, after all extractions, the figure shrinks to 90,000, which is 10,000 short of the required number, Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov said.

Commission To Show Documents

LD1111161293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1514 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov—The chairman of the central electoral commission said today that it is prepared "to allow foreign observers to study the documents on the basis of which it refused to register candidates from certain parties and blocs."

Replying to a comment that the decision not to register certain associations "is political discrimination against the opposition forces," Nikolay Ryabov said that in case of a disagreement any party can appeal to the Supreme Court against the Central Electoral Commission's decision. "This most democratic way of sorting out problems is stipulated in Article 43 of the Resolution on elections," he said.

Shakhray Rejects Forgery Accusations

LD1111215493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, attributed to Borovoy's "over-emotional personality" his remarks that the signatures of all blocs other than Russia's Choice had been forged.

Shakhray told Interfax that he could not say "whether an experienced and popular politician such as Borovoy could manage to collect 100,000 signatures in his support or if he is playing a game and poses as a victim for tactical reasons." Shakhray did not rule out the possibility that Borovoy's remarks were "designed to improve the positions of Russia's Choice and discredit the main competitor, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord."

Shakhray was not sure whom Borovoy had in mind when he spoke of "false income declarations filled out by certain politicians."

"If he meant me," said Shakhray (as of today the only statesman to make his income public —IF), "I invite him to check my finances and assets." He added that Borovoy could visit his home "to count how many bicycles my family owns."

Media Coverage Tribunal Sets Out Election Procedures

PM1011111193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Text of "Regulations Governing the Information Arbitration Tribunal," ratified at the 3 November 1993 session of the Information Arbitration Tribunal]

[Text] The regulations determine the procedure for the examination in the Information Arbitration Tribunal of disputes arising in connection with nonobservance in the mass media by editors, journalists, anchormen, candidates, electoral associations, and electoral commissions of the requirements laid down by legislation for the coverage of the election campaign.

Article 1. The Information Arbitration Tribunal (hereafter the Tribunal) accepts disputes for examination:

A. if an agreement exists between the parties to refer the case to the Information Arbitration Tribunal, provided that this is contained in a document signed by the parties or concluded by the parties by means of an exchange of letters or communications by teletype, telegraph, or using other means of communication to record this agreement;

B. in other cases provided for by the Statute on Information Guarantees for Election Agitation and by the present Regulations.

Article 2. The Tribunal may, within the limits of its jurisdiction, consider cases on its own initiative.

Article 3. The sessions of the Tribunal (except the first session and working sessions) are open. Admission to the courtroom cannot be restricted unless this is required by the need to ensure normal proceedings.

The court's ruling is announced publicly.

Article 4. The parties have an equal right to study the materials of the case or to make written excerpts from them, to take copies, to make challenges, to present evidence, to participate in the analysis of proofs, to move petitions, and to give oral and written explanations.

Article 5. The Tribunal seeks to settle disputes through bringing about agreements between the parties and the voluntary execution by the parties of these agreements.

The parties have the right at any stage of the hearing to conclude an agreement on the subject of the dispute, which is then confirmed by ruling of the Tribunal. If it is impossible to achieve such an agreement, the dispute is resolved by the Tribunal itself.

Article 6. The proceedings are conducted in Russian.

Article 7. A member of the Tribunal cannot participate in the hearing of a case if he is personally interested, directly or indirectly, in its outcome.

Article 8. When appealing to the Tribunal it is necessary to present:

an application or complaint, which should contain: the name of the person appealing to the Tribunal; the circumstances on which the claimant bases his demands; proofs confirming the circumstances expounded; the claimant's demands, a list of enclosed documents and materials, including audio- and videorecordings, press reports, or any materials supposedly containing violations of the legislation on the performance of election agitation using the mass media;

the agreement to refer the case to the Tribunal, if such an agreement has been reached.

The chairman of the Tribunal gives instructions to members of the Tribunal on statements and complaints received by the Tribunal. A Tribunal member decides the question of the acceptance of the application or complaint for examination by the Tribunal.

Article 9. Applications or complaints can be refused acceptance in cases:

of the claimant's failure to fulfill the requirements of Article 8;

if examination the case does not come under the Tribunal's jurisdiction;

if a dispute between the same parties, on the same subject, and on the same grounds is already before the Tribunal, or the Tribunal has already ruled on dispute in question.

Article 10. In the event that the Tribunal elects to consider a case on its own initiative, a ruling to this effect is delivered at a session of the Tribunal.

Article 11. After a case has been accepted for examination by the Tribunal, the judge performing the preliminary preparation of the case can question the parties or require from them explanations on the essence of the demands presented and objections declared according to the procedure set out in Article 29 of the Statute on Information Guarantees of Election Agitation; he is to require from state organs, mass media editors, or other organizations information necessary for the resolution of the case. If necessary, he is to appoint a panel of experts.

Article 12. The actions indicated in Article 11 are performed by the judge, as a rule, within three days following the acceptance of the application or complaint.

Article 13. After the completion of the indicated actions, on representations from the judge performing the preliminary preparation for the examination of the application or complaint, the chairman of the Tribunal sets a date for the courtroom hearing, or sends it for examination by the relevant Council for the Mass Media.

Article 14. The courtroom is presided over by the chairman of the Tribunal or, on his instructions, by one of the members of the Tribunal.

Article 15. Statements or complaints accepted by the Tribunal are examined, as a rule, within a period of not more than seven days. In case of necessity the Tribunal is entitled to prolong proceedings by no more than five days.

Article 16. In the event that a party who has been informed in the proper manner of the court hearings has not presented the necessary proofs, the Tribunal resolves the case on the basis of the materials which it does have.

Article 17. After the elucidation of all circumstances bearing on the case, the Tribunal retires to a consultation room in order to reach its ruling. The hearings conclude with the delivery of the ruling.

Article 18. The court's ruling is delivered in written form and consists of:

the title of the ruling, indicating the Tribunal examining the case, its composition, the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the date of the delivery of the ruling;

the legal grounds for the decision reached, indicating the norms of substantive law and the reasons on which the conclusion for the approval or rejection of the complaint or application are based;

the judicial findings, indicating the Tribunal's ruling on the case.

Article 19. The court's ruling is implemented by the parties voluntarily within a three-day period, and the parties inform the Tribunal that this has been done. In the event of failure to implement the Tribunal's ruling, the Tribunal is to take measures stipulated by the Statute on Information Guarantees of Election Agitation.

Article 20. The Tribunal, on its own initiative or at the request of an interested party, is to discuss the question of giving recommendations or explanations in line with Article 30 of the Statute on Information Guarantees of Election Agitation. Interested parties have the right to address the Tribunal on questions of giving recommendations or explanations.

Article 21. In accordance with Article 30 of the Statute on Information Guarantees of Election Agitation the Tribunal gives expert conclusions. The Tribunal can hear specialists on questions arising in the course of preparation of an expert conclusion.

Article 22. The Tribunal can examine one or several cases in one judicial session.

Article 23. The Tribunal is obliged to deliver a ruling after hearing the parties' explanations. If a party declines to appear in court to give explanations, the ruling can be delivered in his absence. The refusal of parties to appear in court is indicated in the ruling.

If the party is absent for a reason deemed valid by the Tribunal, it can postpone examination of the case.

Article 24. If during the examination of a dispute circumstances are established pointing to the presence of signs of a corpus delicti, the Tribunal informs the organs of the Public Prosecutor's Office to this effect and suspends the examination of the case.

Article 25. The Tribunal's ruling on questions under its jurisdiction is final.

Judge Sees Television Staff's Campaign as Unfair

MK1011122093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 46, 14 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p A8

[Report on interview with Aleksey Simonov, a judge on the Information Arbitration Court, by Yuriy Bogomolov; place and date not given; under the "Mass Media" rubric: "First Case"]

[Text] An election race on television has not officially started yet, but the Information Arbitration Court, set up by presidential edict, has begun considering its first case.

Aleksey Simonov, a judge on the arbitration court, told your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent that the case in question would be considered on the court's own initiative.

"The crux of the matter is as follows," Aleksey Simonov explained. "In 'Ostankino' alone there are eight people—journalists and chiefs—who are running on various parties' tickets. Including Mr. Bragin, 'Ostankino' chief, who represents "Russia's Choice." The lawfulness of combining these jobs will be actually one of the first matters into which we will inquire. There is no need to prove that a candidate (and his party) will from the outset have a clear edge over opponents if he holds so responsible a post in the administrative hierarchy of the greatest state-owned television company. (For how this edge can be exploited to advantage, see the results of a content analysis in the report called "A Subservient Screen Is More Dangerous Than the Enemy," published in this MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI issue—Yu. B.).

[Bogomolov] The situation is ambiguous indeed. Not only from a legal point of view, but also from that of ethics...

[Simonov] To the extent that another candidate from 'Ostankino' and "Russia's Choice"—Kirill Ignatyev, Bragin's deputy—has made an official statement on suspending his work on the company's board of directors and voluntarily refraining from working out its programming policies. I am not sure that this is a way out. But it is at least evident that the interested person feels somewhat embarrassed over his dual role.

[Bogomolov] All provisions of the edict on the basis of which one could object to a television staffer's running for the Duma apply to journalists. Mr. Bragin, however, does not work in the company as a journalist.

[Simonov] But it is his signature that is affixed to documents determining that this particular program, not another, will be aired.

[Bogomolov] Let's imagine that the arbitration court deemed this incident to be an infringement of information fairness. What then?

[Simonov] Then it will be up to the Central Electoral Commission to decide how and in what form the balance of equal air time can be restored for candidates and parties.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI File

The Information Arbitration Court was set up by the Russian Federation President's edict of 29 October 1993 for the purpose of resolving disputes between the mass media and candidates, parties, and electoral commissions, primarily with regard to violations of the law regulating the election campaign.

To all appearances, the court will have to consider incidents where a candidate thinks that the television company gave him less time on the air than his rival had. Or that it set the price of "television advertising" too high. Or that it let its journalist who is running for parliament "misuse his office." According to a provision established by the edict, a journalist running for the State Duma, Council of the Federation, or being a candidate's authorized representative "must suspend his participation in the preparation of programs in his capacity as a journalist."

Members of the Arbitration Court are to be appointed by the president. The court, which is made up of nine people, is headed by Professor Anatoliy Vengerov, department chief at the Moscow State Law Academy.

Editor Nevzorov Seeks Seat in New Legislature

MK1011104093 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 46, 10-16 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p 2

[Report by Yuriy Svetov under the "One of 'Ours'" rubric: "One Out of '600' Instead of Three From 'Vzglyad'"]

[Text] The Northwest bureau of the newspaper ROSSIYA has received information on the electoral intentions of Aleksandr Nevzorov of the "NTK-600" [Independent Television Channel] editorial office which is continuing to operate.

We have been told that he will be trying to make it into the Federal Assembly in two ways. First of all on the Constitutional Democratic Party—the Party of National Freedom ticket where he ranks third after Mikhail Astafyev and Igor Shafarevich. In addition to that he is going to run in Central Electoral District No. 210, which brings together the residents of five central rayons of St. Petersburg. Nevzorov has no doubts about his victory. There is the inspiring example of the last elections: Vzglyad [Moscow TV talk show] hosts and B. Kurkova of the "Fifth Wheel" [St. Petersburg TV program].

The future of the "600 Seconds" TV program largely depends on the stand of the State Television and Radio Company "Petersburg-Fifth Channel" directed by Kurkova. The demand by the creative artists' community to close down "Seconds" for good drew varied reactions from St. Petersburg residents.

NTK personnel are convinced that the program will live on, although they found it hard to name the specific date it will go on the air again. It is likely to expand to half an hour and appear on Thursdays or Fridays. On tape.

Let us see if Nevzorov's TV popularity is sufficient for him to be elected deputy. More important: Is this an asset in a lawmaker's job? In the final analysis, everyone wants a professional parliament rather than "600 Seconds" live on the stage of the Federal Assembly.

Shumeyko on Media Access During Elections

MK1011113093 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 46, 10-16 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p 3

[Interview with Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko by Natalya Koposova; place and date not given; from the "Power" column: "At Present I Am More Concerned With Ideological Matters"]

[Text] Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko is first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and press and information minister of the Russian Federation Government. He worked in the Supreme Soviet's committee on economic reforms and property; since 1992 he has been first deputy premier of the Russian Federation Government and coordinator of the tripartite commission on regulating socio-labor relations (trade unions-government-entrepreneurs).

[Koposova] Working in the government, you have had to deal with various matters: economics, culture, education. Which would you prefer if you could choose?

[Shumeyko] Today I am more concerned with ideological matters. This in spite of the fact that I am, as some people point out, a candidate of technology.

[Koposova] In other words, you are not a provisional person here.

[Shumeyko] Apparently so. This is more interesting to me and it allows me to use my entire previous experience.

[Koposova] Yet far from all are capable of mastering a new sphere without damaging it. How much longer will nonprofessionals remain at the head of important sectors, in particular the mass media?

[Shumeyko] Professionalism is certainly an important question, but let us take the Press and Information Ministry as an example. Which of the specialists should be minister if he has to oversee various branches: the press, the radio, TV, book publishing, and the printing industry. Which of the specialists should be a minister: a journalist, a technician, a book expert? In my opinion, an attempt should be made to create a management system wherein the largest possible number of specialists should administer this sphere, overseen by an experienced organizer/coordinator.

[Koposova] And which specialist should, in your opinion, direct a state TV and radio company?

[Shumeyko] Today the state has three TV companies: Ostankino, and the Russian and St. Petersburg companies—Channel 5. The birth of a program and its delivery to viewers are totally different things. The first should be dealt with by a specialist in TV journalism, the second by a specialist in TV communications.

When the Federal Information Center was being set up, it was supposed that it would take on the task of accumulating ideology to disseminate it to the masses. Yet everything was merged: both the artistic and the technical parts. And nothing good came of it. It is necessary to clarify the situation here.

No doubt, while the state is evolving, there should be an information and analytical subdivision under the head of state—a very serious one, which takes care of ideology, accumulates it, and decides on how to spread it. The ministry for its part should incorporate subdivisions that would address this task on the technical plane. Then we will manage to place a specialist at each level who would be well familiar with this question.

[Koposova] Incidentally, specialists know that no matter how the Election Law and the corresponding edicts might be regulating the election campaign, there are still possibilities for manipulation. What, after all, is to be done with free elections in a situation when a state TV and radio company is headed by an advocate of one of the political blocs?

[Shumeyko] Elections must be free in that the citizens express their will. As for the electronic media, the Central Electoral Commission, under current regulations, is capable of influencing these matters. Moreover, with this level of freedom a large role is played by public forces—this has never been the case in the past. The representative of any bloc may become a member of the Central Electoral Commission. And they are obligated to admit him and hold sessions only in his presence. The Central Electoral Commission sets up an oversight council.

Of course, in spite of all this monitoring, a smart commentator can destroy a candidate with literally two words in the course of his presentation, but this has nothing to do with freedom of elections: It is impossible to force a person to think differently. Freedom is always a relative concept. When they talk about freedom of elections, what is implied is free expression of will by the citizens, and they see all this on the screen and they make their conclusions. They are not so stupid.

[Koposova] How will the election campaign affect broadcasting? Will the schedule be disrupted again?

[Shumeyko] No. Article 28 of the Regulations on Elections of Deputies to the State Duma in 1993 says that three weeks before the elections, everyone will be given one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening.

[Koposova] Will state TV companies be operating under a special regime?

[Shumeyko] Yes. I suppose that many blocs will say that they are not giving proper coverage; this is not a question of freedom but of journalist craftsmanship.

[Koposova] Not so long ago you said that after your experience with the prosecutor's office you had to revise your relations with some people who were formerly close to you. Who stayed loyal to you in that situation? Whom do you still consider to be your friends?

[Shumeyko] The secretariat supported me, and this is indicative. Usually when the boss "stumbles," his subordinates turn away from him, but no one turned away from me. This is not simply a secretariat but friends and fellow thinkers who know and trust me. Today this confidence has been reaffirmed not only by the former prosecutor but also the new one, who told me that the decision to initiate a criminal case has been rescinded because there was no such need. As for certain ministers and vice premiers, some forgot my phone number and some could not get through; as soon as they learned about the prosecutor's decision, they immediately remembered and got through all right....

[Koposova] The political ambitions of which politicians, in your opinion, correspond to their real capabilities today?

[Shumeyko] I would not use the word "ambition." As for capabilities, now there is no figure equal to the president, no matter who might be contemplating that post. The same goes for the head of government, who is now not number two, but number one and a half. It goes for all government members without exception. If we talk about those "politicians" who are not holding any state post at present, then, for example, Yavlinskiy has done practically nothing. When he was leaving the government, I asked him: "Why, Grigoriy Alekseyevich? Are you leaving just because your '500 Days' program has not been adopted? The reform could be implemented without the program." At that time he aptly replied that he was tired of being the only one responsible for it; it was as though in the Kerenskiy government Lenin were placed in charge of the October revolution. Indeed, the time is ripe but there is no revolution.

[Koposova] Much is being said about a split in the government. What do you think about this?

[Shumeyko] There is no split in the government. That there are different points of view within it is perfectly normal. Anyway, the government must not be unanimous. The Politburo was unanimous. Characteristically, the more bright personalities there are in the government, the greater the diversity of opinions. The main thing is not an absence of disagreements. The main thing is to be able to listen to a different point of view. I feel well in the cabinet of ministers. In a word, I go to work as if it were a vacation.

Court To Examine Election TV Coverage

LD1011210893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1508 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow November 10 TASS—"One of the first 'cases', which the Arbitration Court of Information plans to examine, is the question of whether Chairman of the "Ostankino" TV and Broadcasting Company Vyacheslav Bragin, his assistant Kirill Ignatyev, and anchorman Leonid Radziyevskiy, who are taking part in the current elections, should relinquish their official posts for the period of the election race," ITAR-TASS was told by one of the arbitrators, Aleksey Simonov, chairman of the Glasnost Protection Foundation.

He said that the court, set up to guarantee the fairness of the canvassing campaign, was prompted to examine this case by some publications that had lately appeared in the press. And although, on the one hand, the act on informational guarantees during the canvassing campaign envisages the suspension of work on TV and radio programmes only for journalists, who are running for the elections or discharging the functions of a candidate's representative, it is difficult to disagree with the argument that top officials of the TV and broadcasting company are in a position to influence the shaping of programmes. Simonov said that this question would be discussed during one of the session of the Arbitration Court following thorough investigation.

Another important topic that may be examined by the court, the arbitrator believes, could be that of paid political advertisements. It is not ruled out that, on the court's recommendation, this "new genre" will also be used in printed publications. The court has to determine its basic approaches to the practical uses of paid advertisements. The question of their price will be raised only if corresponding complaints are received by the court.

At the same time, Simonov believes that there were quite many "indirect advertisements" in the mass media, which could also give food for court hearings.

"The first open meeting of the Arbitration Court, housed in building No.19 on Novyy Arbat Prospect," Simonov said, "Is expected to be held on Friday."

Cost of Airtime for Political Broadcasts Announced

LD1111185493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1236 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, here is some information from the directors of Russia's Radio. In accordance with the presidential decree of 29 October 1993 and the provision on information guarantees for election campaigning, and also with the internal regulations of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company, the following charges for airtime for election campaigning are being set for the period of the 1993 election campaign.

Paid broadcast time is granted to registered candidates and electoral associations on weekdays from 1510 to 1600 and from 1610 to 1700 Moscow Time 11-19 November inclusive, on the basis of a contract concluded with the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company.

The cost of one minute of broadcast time for election campaigning in rubles [R], less value added tax is: R166,791 for relaying radio material provided by a candidate or electoral association; R168,719 for broadcasting live and in the Russia's Radio studio; R185,024 for preparing material involving a mobile studio going out to a place specified by the candidate or electoral association.

The cost of airtime for relaying political broadcasts in rubles, less value added tax is, depending on the time of day, the cost of one second, I repeat, one second, is between R3,593 and R14,370. All inquiries on buying airtime for electoral campaigning on Russia's Radio should be addressed to: Moscow, 5th Yamskogo Polya St., No.19/21, Room 211. Telephone 250 05 96.

St. Petersburg TV Deputy Chief on Access to Air Time

MK1011145093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 46, 14 Nov 93 (signed to press 9 Nov) p C11

[Interview with Viktor Pravdyuk, first deputy chairman of the "St. Petersburg-Fifth Channel" state television and radio company, by Viktoriya Voloshina; place and date not given: "Pinning Hopes on St. Petersburg's Good Breeding"]

[Text] The term "election campaign" elicits something like a nervous allergy at St. Petersburg television. "This is a plague for us," Viktor Pravdyuk, first deputy chairman of the "St. Petersburg- Fifth Channel" state television and radio company, told your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent.

[Pravdyuk] According to the law, all candidates have the right to equal shares of air time, and we will strictly abide by it.

[Voloshina] Will the programs come on the air live?

[Pravdyuk] To all appearances, yes.

[Voloshina] Are you not afraid that expressions not fit for a parliament will fill the air in the heat of a debate?

[Pravdyuk] It seems to me that the Moscow events have to some extent discouraged politicians from using strong expressions or engaging in personal attacks. In addition, there is still hope placed on St. Petersburg's good breeding.

[Voloshina] "City fathers"—Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, Oblast Administration Chief Aleksandr Belyakov, St. Petersburg Council Chairman Belyayev—can be seen on St. Petersburg television fairly often. At the same time, all of them are running for deputy seats. Doesn't this violate the principle of equality?

[Pravdyuk] Between us, I do not understand why the electoral commission has not given thought to this matter, but we do not have the right to deny air time to, say, the St. Petersburg Council chairman or the city mayor when they address economic matters. The only thing we ask them is to leave all election programs and slogans outside these premises.

[Voloshina] Who will see to it that equality is ensured on television?

[Pravdyuk] I assure you, there will be no shortage of volunteers. Recently, an anchorman called candidate Bezukhov, Bezrukov—an enormous scandal erupted afterward.

[Voloshina] It was Nevzorov who was at his best with such tricks—confusing names as if by accident. As a matter of fact, is it possible that the mouthpiece of the intransigent opposition will be revived in the midst of an election campaign?

[Pravdyuk] He is preparing a program tentatively called "North," but the telecast will come on the air not earlier than 14 December. Before that date Nevzorov may emerge on television as a candidate to the Duma, if he is registered.

[Voloshina] How about candidates' paid television addresses?

[Pravdyuk] Petr Filippov (from the Association of Independent Professionals) paid for three minutes of air time. One minute on our St. Petersburg channel costs 300,000 rubles. On other Russian channels they pay 500,000 for a one-minute political advertisement.

Party of Russian Unity, Accord Against Joining Blocs

LD1111214693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1745 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] The Party of Russian Unity and Accord will not join any pre-election blocs, Russia's Vice Premier and party's leader Sergey Shakhray declared at a press conference on Thursday in Moscow. In his words, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord is "the only party which participates in the elections not on a class-social principle but on the uniting idea of federalism and self-determination."

According to Shakhray, a coalition of the parliamentary majority in the State Duma will be created on the basis of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. He declared that the party would urge the government to raise the issue on confidence in it before the new parliament. At the same time the Party of Russian Unity and Accord supports Viktor Chernomyrdin's Cabinet.

Only those ministers who receive the support of the parliamentary majority must remain in the government, believes Shakhray.

He reaffirmed that he would run for the post of the chairman of the State Duma.

Shakhray believes that "from the political point of view the president's statement on his unwillingness to participate in the June 1994 re-elections is sooner weaker than stronger." "Predictability and continuity are of great value in politics," he said. Today's elections are "15% more democratic than the elections of the Soviet Union and Russian parliament in 1989 and 1990" which were held according to the CPSU instructions, said Shakhray.

Another participant of the press conference, Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, announced that attempts of the Russia's Choice bloc to paint the political spectrum in black and white is "to the benefit of communists and patriots."

"Russia's Choice should thoroughly think over whether its leaders would not become communists' accomplices as a result of such tactics in the pre-election struggle," said Shokhin.

Democratic Party Rules Out Aligning With Communists

LD1111211493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] In the future Russian parliament the Democratic Party does not intend to align with Communists (Zyuganov), Liberal-Democrats (Zhirinovsky), the Movement for Democratic Reforms (Popov and Sobchak), Russia's Choice (Gaydar) or the party of Sergey Shakhray. A coalition is possible with some of the rest. This statement was made in Moscow at a Thursday [11 November] meeting with embassy representatives by the leader of the Democratic Party Nikolay Travkin. He was confident that his party is strong enough to clear the barrier of 5% of votes.

Travkin spoke against holding parliamentary elections together with a referendum on the constitution.

Answering a question from diplomats, Travkin said his party relies on people realizing the necessity of building a civic society and believing that the price of the reforms of Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar is too high for the country.

According to Travkin, his party intentionally does not set up election blocs.

He said his party also supports reforms, but disagrees with the government policy of liberal radicalism and the sequence of steps taken in the name of reform.

Opposition Parties May Be Sidelined for Irregularities

MK1011121093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 4

[Report by Olga Garbuzova: "Parties on Elections. Opposition Alliance May Be Denied Permission To Contest Elections"]

[Text] Sergey Baburin, leader of the "Russian All-People's Union" electoral bloc, said at a press conference yesterday that he regarded the actions of the authorities as aimed at preventing his alliance from contesting the parliamentary elections as a provocation. Mr. Baburin also said that during the election campaign the "Russian All-People's Union" set up its branches in 15 regions of Russia.

The press conference focused, for the most part, on an incident that occurred at the union's head office. After a visit by armed OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] officers, who said they were allegedly looking for Aleksandr Barkashov, lists containing 20,000 signatures gathered in Russian regions were declared missing.

The patriots made up the losses by collecting the missing signatures in Moscow. By doing so, however, they exceeded the established quota for raising signatures in one single region. This is why the "Russian All-People's Union" is unlikely to contest the December elections.

According to INTERFAX, the "Russian All-People's Union" and another four electoral associations—the National-Republican Party, the Consolidation Party, the Constitutional-Democratic Party, and the "New Russia" bloc—may be denied registration of their lists of candidates because of irregularities found in the associations' signature lists. It is worth noting that, according to pollsters, among the associations Sergey Baburin's "Russian All- People's Union" is most popular with the voters—a total of 4 percent of those polled plan to vote for it.

If the INTERFAX report proves correct, it is the Russian Federation Communist Party, headed by Gennadiy Zyuganov, that stands to benefit most from the goings-on. It will effectively turn out to be the sole serious opposition electoral association. Hence, actual struggle in the elections is likely be waged between Gennadiy Zyuganov's and Yegor Gaydar's blocs.

As it slashes the number of electoral associations allowed to take part in the December elections, the Central Electoral Commission has taken great pains to make sure that the elections are held in all Federation components. Yesterday, the Central Electoral Commission called on Chechnya's leaders "to be reasonable and to take organizational steps, until the election campaign is over, to prepare for elections for the Federal Assembly."

Voting Arrangements for Russians Abroad Outlined

PM1111133593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 1

[Feliks Babitskiy report: "How the 100,000 Russians Abroad Will Vote"]

[Text] Every year there is an increasing number of our fellow citizens abroad. They go there to live permanently, to work, or on a long tourist trip, but they do not lose their Russian citizenship. How will they be able to exercise their constitutional right to participate in the elections? Here is what the Foreign Ministry Electoral Commission told our correspondent about this.

Precinct electoral commissions are being organized at embassies, consulates general, consulates, and other establishments on foreign countries' territory by Russian Federation ambassadors, who are obtaining the necessary consent from the authorities in the countries concerned. Foreign electoral precincts are included in the 77th Moscow City Dual-Seat Electoral Precinct and three single-seat electoral districts—the 191st Babushkinskiy, 195th Medvedkovskiy, and 198th Preobrazhenskiy Electoral Districts—with an even distribution from each country. According to estimates around 100,000 Russian citizens abroad will take part in the 12 December voting.

It is part of the commission's job to send election materials to precinct commissions and to receive results data and documents from abroad, summarize them, and hand them over to the appropriate Moscow district electoral commissions. The commission is currently collating the data being received from establishments abroad concerning the electoral commissions which are being set up, distributing election materials, and providing prompt assistance to establishments abroad in resolving practical organizational questions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is also counting on help from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and other ministries and departments which have their own foreign missions, as well as on the Russian Transport Ministry's assistance in the prompt delivery of election materials.

The Defense Ministry and the Border Troops command are responsible for organizing the voting in Russian military units abroad.

Ministries Ordered To Join in Monitoring Election Spending

PM1111161993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

["Directive of the Russian Federation President on the Formation of the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission Control and Auditing Service"]

[Text] 1. The Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission Control and Auditing Service is to be formed for the purpose of monitoring the proper utilization of resources allocated out of the Russian Federation republic budget to finance the elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council and monitoring sources of income and the procedure for spending the resources of the electoral associations and the candidates standing for the Federation Council and the State Duma.

2. The Russian Finance Ministry, the Russian State Tax Service, the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Russian Security Ministry are for a period of six months to assign three specialists each for work in the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission Control and Auditing Service and to afford that service assistance in carrying out its set functions.

3. The Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission is to ratify the statute on the Control and Auditing Service and the composition of its personnel within 10 days.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin
[Dated] 6 November 1993
Directive No. 718

Procurator's Office To Supervise Elections, Referendum

LD1111182393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1549 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Olesya Nosova]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—Aleksey Kazannik, procurator-general of the Russian Federation has instructed to form a special working group to exercise procurator's control over implementation of the legislation on elections of the deputies of the state duma and on holding a nation-wide referendum on draft constitution.

According to the Centre of Information and Public Relations under the procurator-general's office, the group will be commissioned to react immediately upon all infringements of the law during preparations and holding the elections and the referendum.

Procurator's offices in Russia's republics, territories and regions have also formed analogous groups.

Procurator General Sets Up Observer Bodies

LD1211052193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] Russian Federation Procurator General Aleksey Kazannik has set up a special working group to make sure the laws on elections to the Federal Assembly and on the referendum on the draft constitution are observed, INTERFAX was told at the Russian procurator general's information and public relations center. The working group is called upon to react immediately to any cases where the laws are not abided by in the run up to elections and the referendum on 12 December. These groups have also been set up at procuracies in Russia's republics, krays, and oblasts.

Details of Electoral Commission's News Conference

LD1211124693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today, the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] members talked about the results of the first stage of the electoral campaign and answered questions from journalists. As is known, of 35 electoral associations on the federal lists, 13 have survived. The next stage is registration in single deputy constituencies, which is to be completed by 14 November. Four days later, after the information is processed, the final list of candidates will become clear, both for the federal list and for the single deputy constituencies. If in two deputy constituencies there are not at least three candidates and there are no alternative choices, then the registration period will be extended.

CEC members stressed that, as yet, they have no grounds to talk about falsification of signature lists submitted by parties in support of their registration. Also, there have been no protests from electoral associations that did not collect the necessary 100,000 signatures, with the exception of the Russian All-People's Union [Shakhray's Party]. However, the investigation of the case of the lists that supposedly disappeared threatens to drag on for months. There is obviously insufficient time before 12 December [election day], and so, on the other hand, if violations during the collection of signatures were committed by any bloc that successfully passed the first stage, then their deputies can, as a result, be deprived of their mandates. In the meantime, each of these 13 associations has the right to state aid for the electoral campaign for which 170 billion rubles is being allocated, plus 83 billion rubles for holding the referendum.

In Sverdlovsk Oblast the elections to local representative bodies have been postponed until February by presidential decree. [video shows news conference in progress]

Money Discussed

LD1211101393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] Every electoral association still in the battle for votes for the Russian Federal Assembly will receive R [rubles] 20 million, members of the Central Electoral Commission [CEC] announced today at a news conference. It was also reported that every candidate will be paid a salary of R450,000 and a further R400,000 for transport expenses. CEC Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Ivanchenko reported that 1,200 candidates for the State Duma and 520 candidates for the Federation Council had been registered by today.

Ryabov on Foreign Aid

LD1111214093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1842 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—Russia's Central Electoral Commission said on Thursday that some foreign countries offered assistance to hold parliamentary elections in Russia.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS on Thursday, Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov said, however, that "we have received nothing yet."

He said the Europarliament has adopted a decision to provide assistance to Russian elections. Similar decisions are now being considered by the governments of other Western countries, including the United States and Japan.

The commission and the Russian Foreign Ministry have sent a letter to President Boris Yeltsin asking him to set up a special team to handle and distribute foreign aid. He said the aid will include primarily communications hardware, copying machines and other equipment.

"Under no circumstances should the means be used for propaganda or for (support of) any concrete election association or candidate," Ryabov said.

'Viewpoint' Article Surveys Public on Elections

LD1111195693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1557 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation, Viewpoint's sociological service, and the INTERFAX News Agency]

[Text] THE PRESIDENT HAS DECREED PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR DECEMBER 12. DO YOU THINK THAT THEY SHOULD OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ELECTIONS TO THE LOCAL POWER BODIES? On October 9, this question was answered by 1,137 adults from different regions of Russia. A total of 44% of respondents answered the question positively and 29% said "no." About the same (27%) were undecided.

Today the country lives in conditions of completely new political realities, when the councils of people's deputies are leaving the political arena. While the dissolution of the old Russian Parliament is a fait accompli, the future of the local councils had not yet been determined at the time when this public opinion poll was held. In addition, since the tragedy of October 3 and 4, too little time has passed for the population at large to understand its reasons and possible consequences. That is why the statistical information available reflects the attitude not to the elections to new bodies of power, but, rather, to the old power and those political forces which either support it or reject it.

Interfax has repeatedly noted that the typical feature of our time is that Russians orient themselves not so much to the essence of this or that political idea, as to the names of the politicians the idea is associated with. During the fierce confrontation between the president and the parliament, three groups emerged according to their attitude to the conflict in the high echelons of power. The first and the most numerous one involves supporters of Yeltsin and his reforms (44%, plus or minus 6%). The second group includes Yeltsin's opponents (25%, plus or minus 5%) and the third group involves those who do not care (25%, plus or minus 5%). Since the poll's figures almost completely coincide with those above, it would hardly be a mistake to suppose that it is precisely these groups in the Russian population which are meant in this case.

Those who are for new elections (44%) make up the largest group. Young people are the most intolerant to the old power (49% from among respondents aged 16 to 24). Analysts explain this by the fact that the young are less connected with the outgoing political system than their parents and grandparents, who were always taught by the Soviet power structure that they were obliged to it for everything. Of those supporting new elections, 44% have a higher education, 46% have a secondary education, and 40% have incomplete secondary education. Most of the respondents are the unemployed (61%), the military and policemen (52%), and entrepreneurs (48%). Far fewer supporters are comprised of leaders of state enterprises (37%) and workers (39%).

As to the opponents of early elections to local bodies of power (29%), sociologists believe that hardly all of them can be that satisfied with the activities of their deputies. Rather, they reject the presidential policies altogether. The young make up the fewest of this group (22%). Middle-aged people make up the largest number (32%). Leading this group are people with a higher education

(34%), followed by 29% with secondary and 26% with incomplete secondary education. This is understandable, taking into account their professional status: leaders of state-owned enterprises (43%) are in the lead, followed by entrepreneurs (38%), and skilled specialists (30%). Among the smallest groups are the unemployed (4%), pensioners (25%), and students (26%).

These people little resemble the old people with red flags, the people Russians are used to seeing on the evening news. They do not stage public meetings or organize disturbances in the streets. These people are aware that their future is in jeopardy, which, as political scientists believe, was sustained by the system of councils. Since the current local councils are the last strongholds of Soviet power to be destroyed by the upcoming elections, the share of presidential opponents within the framework of the given public opinion poll has reached its maximum.

Following the bloody October developments in Moscow, observers believe, each side wants to stand its ground to the end. Given that the future of Russia is at stake, there is no doubt that both sides, seeing this future in completely different ways, are mobilizing all forces for victory. The important thing is that the clashes be summed up by elections, and by no other means.

TO APPROVE THE CONSTITUTION OR NOT?

The new Russian constitution has been worked on since 1990. Earlier attempts to solve the problem with the help of the congress of people's deputies was always met with resistance from the majority of deputies. The Constitutional Assembly that opened in June 1993 was unable to coordinate and approve the text of a new document. Today, too, it is difficult to say whether the new constitution will be adopted this year or in the indefinite future, although the text of the draft has been published.

What do voters think about the problem?

WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE IDEA OF ADOPTING A NEW RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION AT THE REFERENDUM SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS? A total of 1,060 respondents answered this question on October 16, 1993.

A total of 42% of respondents gave a positive answer, 24% said "no," and 34% were non-committed.

In the previous issue of this bulletin, experts analyzed the people's attitude to the idea of adopting a new constitution this year. The bulletin said that the share of supporters for the constitution's early adoption decreased before the October 3-4 events by 12% as compared to May 1993 and stood at 43%. Interestingly, in the mid-October poll, practically the same share of respondents (42%) favored the adoption of a new constitution in the December referendum. Thus, the October developments in Russia have so far not changed the correlation of supporters and opponents regarding the closure of the constitutional process before the end of the year.

This, above all, refers to specialists with higher education, who are divided into two almost equal groups (43% are in favor of adopting a new constitution at the December referendum and 39% are against), students (37% for and 21% against), and pensioners (35% for and 27% against). On the contrary, most entrepreneurs (63%), and military officers and law enforcement personnel (53%) support the approval of a new constitution at the December referendum. Thus, in the public arena, as in politics, the debate continues around this question, and the country, as before, remains without a full-fledged constitution.

SHOULD THERE BE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS?

The question of simultaneous or separate parliamentary and presidential elections was perhaps the most critical political crisis in late September-early October 1993. According to the results of the poll held October 2 ("Specter" No. 42), about one-third of those polled (32%) favored simultaneous early presidential and parliamentary elections, and about one-fourth (23%) backed Boris Yeltsin, who proposed holding first parliamentary and then presidential elections. Sociologists believe that at that time, simultaneous elections of both branches of power were considered to be the most neutral option for a compromise between the conflicting political forces that placed both parties in an equal position. Today, the question on the date for presidential elections is no longer a political bargaining chip between power branches. However, it continues to cause differences, not only in society as a whole, but also within the presidential team. Yeltsin's recent decision to remain in his post until 1996, say analysts, may only add fuel to the fire.

A total of 1,137 respondents who participated in the opinion poll held on October 9 were asked the following question: ACCORDING TO PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, ELECTIONS TO RUSSIA'S NEW PARLIAMENT HAVE BEEN SET FOR DECEMBER 12. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY?

The overwhelming majority of respondents (45%) gave a positive answer, 36% answered negatively, and 19% found it difficult to answer this question.

Comparing the data received on October 2 and 9 shows that the number of supporters for simultaneous elections substantially increased, from 32% to 45%. However, analysts believe that these numbers reflect rather difficult dynamics in public opinion: under the changed political situation, the previous question has acquired a completely different meaning from what it had earlier.

It seems that those who strive to see a new political figure in Yeltsin's place and those who view early elections as a guarantee to prolonging his authority can support the idea of simultaneous elections. At the same time, among opponents of simultaneous elections (36%) there can be both Yeltsin supporters, who think that there is no need to hold elections, and those who believe that holding off on re-elections until a later period will increase the probability of the appearance of a strong political alternative to the current president.

An analysis of the answers to this question proposed to various groups of respondents indirectly confirms the above. One can see a substantial difference of opinions primarily depending on the living standard of the respondents (monthly per capita income) and on their profession.

The share of those who support simultaneous elections of the president and parliament (57%) is the greatest in the group of people with the lowest incomes (not more than 5,000 rubles). Apparently, experts believe, representatives of this group are against the president, and early elections for them mean an opportunity to change the government's socioeconomic course. However, only 31% of all respondents with incomes totalling 5,000-7,000 rubles support simultaneous elections.

The number of simultaneous election supporters grows with the increase of income and reaches 53% in the group with incomes ranging from 35,000-50,000 rubles. One can make a supposition that this dynamic reflects the predominance of the pro-Yeltsin mood in the groups with medium and high incomes, which create the foundation for the formation of the Russian middle class. In the group with the highest incomes (more than 50,000 rubles), the share of those in favor of simultaneous elections drops to 43% and is actually equal to the number of opponents to this idea (44%). Perhaps this reflects the variety of political orientations among the Russian elite, who are in the process of development. It cannot be ruled out that in this group of respondents there is a high number of Yeltsin followers who consider any early elections to be unnecessary.

It is more difficult to explain differences in the answers of various socio-professional groups. Some 55% of pupils and students, 52% of specialists with higher education, 52% of servicemen and employees of law enforcement bodies, 50% of employees without higher education, 45% of pensioners, 43% of heads of state enterprises, 42% of businessmen, 41% of workers, 37% of housewives and non-working people, and 30% of the unemployed are in favor of simultaneous elections of the president and parliament.

It can be noted that social groups which have received the smallest number of privileges from the socioeconomic policy associated with the name of the president stand at the beginning and at the end of this list. Sociologists believe that there is apparently a great number of those among the first two groups who wish to get rid of Yeltsin as soon as possible, although one cannot but keep in mind that, as before, a considerable portion of the intelligentsia and students support the course of reform regardless of their own vulnerability during its implementation. It seems that here we face a situation when opposing political positions are reflected in a single approach to a concrete problem. As far as non-working people and the unemployed are concerned, there are both many opponents of simultaneous elections and those who have failed to determine their attitude towards this question.

Consequently, as before, the problem of early presidential elections finds quite varying attitudes in Russian society. The level of well-being occupies the leading role among socioeconomic factors affecting public opinion on this problem. Analysts believe that this factor will probably occupy first place during formation of public opinion on several other issues.

International Affairs

Official Urges Dismantling Nuclear Arms in Russia

LD1011180493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1712 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[Text] November 10 TASS—Head of Ukrainian Atomic Energy Agency Mikhail Urmanets said nuclear warheads must be dismantled in Russia. In an interview to a newspaper MOLOD UKRAINIY he proposed that the Ukrainian nuclear missiles should be transfered to Russia under condition that the atomic fuel resulted from their processing returns to Ukainian nuclear power stations.

"The uranium from the missiles to be dismantled under the START-1 treaty will be enough (to run our nuclear power stations) for decades", he said adding that it would be much cheaper to buy this fuel back from Russia. Now Ukraine dispatch its uranium ore to Russia for producing nuclear fuel.

Urmanets said all four urainian nuclear power plants' work is stable and they "make good money". But their reservoirs for nuclear waste are already overfilled while the Russian plants in the Urals and Siberia which usually took the waste now charge enormous price in hard currency to take it for processing.

Parliament Postpones Ratifying Nuclear Treaties

LD1011183293 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] In Ukraine the parliament has again postponed ratification of the international treaty on nuclear disarmament and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This was to be discussed this month. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was notified about that by the leaders of the republic. However, it became clear after the agenda of the parliament session was approved that the leaders and the president of the republic, Leonid Kravchuk, have once again been unable to come to terms on that key issue. Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko repeated, nevertheless, that Ukraine intends to become a nuclear-free state and needs foreign aid to carry out the nuclear disarmament program.

Further on Parliament Debate

MK1011115093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report under the "Ukraine" rubric: "Deputies Are Not Inclined To Discuss Nuclear Disarmament Matters. Election Law Is on the Agenda"]

[Excerpts] On 9 November 1993 the Eighth Session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council resumed its plenary meetings in Kiev. [passage omitted]

Despite assurances given by Ukrainian officials to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that the ratification of nuclear disarmament documents would be discussed by parliament without fail in November, no consideration of START I or the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been scheduled for this month. Maybe the Ukrainian leaders were deliberately deceiving Christopher, and through him the entire U.S. Administration; or maybe internal differences among Ukrainian Government authorities have worsened once again, and President Leonid Kravchuk and the parliament chiefs were unable yet again to agree on their approach to what amounts to Ukraine's key problem. The latter theory was confirmed by, among other things, a statement by Vladislav Datsyuk, Ukraine's new general prosecutor, who was appointed to this post in violation of the current Constitution. When asked about his own legitimacy, Datsyuk said that "the Supreme Council may pass any decision, this is actually why it is called Supreme." Opposition deputies immediately deemed this statement to be proof of "bolstering the nomenklatura autocracy based on violation of the constitution and the law." Neither the general prosecutor himself not the parliament speaker have responded to the allegations. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry Invites Clinton To Visit

LD1111141893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0824 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—On 10 November, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko received William Miller, U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry press center told a UNIAN correspondent that they discussed the agreement signed during the visit by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. "There is only one legal document regulating relations between Ukraine and the United States. This is the charter signed during Leonid Kravchuk's visit to the United States in May of last year. Ukraine suggested that Bill Clinton visit our state for further interstate negotiations. The Foreign Ministry press center reported that this issue is now being considered by the U.S. President.

Chornovil Praises Yeltsin's Land Edict

AU1011144693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Russia Is Again Ahead of Us?"]

[Text] According to RUKH-PRESS, the chairman of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement], gave a high assessment of Boris Yeltsin's edict on private ownership of land in Russia. "It is a real market revolution in Russia's agrarian sector," he said. "Russia has again made a daring step forward in implementing reforms, whereas Ukraine, as before, remains far behind." In Vyacheslav Chornovil's opinion, unless democratic forces win in spring elections and unless reforms in Ukraine start, it will soon not only become backward, but also the most backward country in Eastern Europe.

Talks on Black Sea Fleet 'Mere Formality'

WS1111153593 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 4 Nov 93 p 13

[Report by Volodymyr Prystupa: "All Black Sea Fleet Servicemen Ready To Vote in Orekhovo-Zuyevo"]

[Text] It seems that both Moscow and Sevastopol have decided who owns the Black Sea Fleet. One gets the impression that the discussions held by Ukrainian and Russian Government commissions have become a mere formality.

The fleet's ideological service takes no rest at all. Almost all officers suspected of pro-Ukrainian sentiments have been dismissed. Moscow military chiefs have realized that he who pays the piper, names the tune. For a year now, Russian servicemen have been paid in rubles with subsequent conversion of wages into karbovanetses. Due to the exchange rate that is constantly increasing, servicemen's wages are substantially increased on a monthly basis.

Not long ago, the process of granting Russian privatization vouchers began in the fleet. According to information from the Black Sea Fleet Financial Department, all servicemen are entitled to vouchers, regardless of their citizenship, including sailors on active duty and families of officers and ensigns.

Russia is taking these measures with evident hopes of high economic and political dividends. Moscow has adopted a decision regarding participation by fleet personnel in the Russian legislative elections. Reliable sources have reported that on 21 October, the Central Electoral Commission decreed that Black Sea Fleet personnel will vote in Orekhovo Zuyevo electoral district No. 112. These documents have not reached Sevastopol as of yet. Thus, there is no way of knowing whether only Russian citizens or all servicemen will be permitted to vote. If the second option is true, the Russian-Ukrainian intergovernment commission will have nothing more to discuss.

Military Presence in Georgia Criticized

AU1011162493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 5

[Commentary by Valentyn Labunskyy, HOLOS UKRAYINY military columnist]

[Text] Sad information from the Black Sea Fleet has been reaching us these days. Subunits of the Black Sea Fleet Marines, among whom there also are Ukrainian citizens, landed on the shore of sovereign Georgia. The Black Sea Fleet warships that had sailed there in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Georgia were immediately fired on by the troops faithful to ex-President Gamsakhurdia. The ships returned fire.

As officially stated, the ships arrived in Georgia in order to guard transport communication lines, primarily railroads, automobile highways and the sea ports of Poti and Batumi. The mission is, undoubtedly, noble, but was the task given by the U.S. Government to the U.S. soldiers in Somalia less noble? In order to rescue that country's population from starvation, the U.S. commandos arrived in Africa in order to escort trucks carrying foodstuffs. It is common knowledge how this noble action ended: The Americans were drawn into the internal Somali conflict, and somebody's sons, husbands, or brothers paid with their own lives for the "noble decisions" adopted by Capitol Hill politicians.

Are we repeating other people's mistakes? It is increasingly often maintained in Georgia that the main reason for the escalation of the civil war there is the Russian troops' interference into the country's internal affairs. It is believed in Tbilisi that they recently helped the Abkhazian military formations to defeat the regular units of the Georgian Armed Forces. The interference into the new turn of the internal Georgian conflict, this time between the government troops and Zviadists, by servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens will lead to an internationalization of the war. It would be naive to expect that the Black Sea Fleet marines will be able to quench the fire. History has proven that civil wars tend to expand further if a third force intervenes into the conflict among fellow citizens, no matter how noble the slogans with which it covers up the intervention may be. There will not be more peace in Georgia as a result of the presence of the Black Sea assault force there, but there will be more tears, this time of our mothers.

During the conflict in the Dniester Region, Ukraine showed real wisdom when it refrained from rendering armed assistance to any of the sides. It appears that, today, our leaders lack such wisdom. However, not everything is lost yet. It is not yet late to recall the Ukrainian citizens serving in the Black Sea Fleet from the conflict zone and declare firmly and explicitly: "Ukraine is ready to give Georgia any assistance except military."

National Affairs

Supreme Council Begins Session 10 Nov

Approves Bill on Elections

LD1011134593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1115 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Gordeyev]

[Text] Kiev November 10 TASS—A bill on elections was approved in first reading by a session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine today.

The bill is due to come up for second reading next week, but it is already clear now that the new elections in Ukraine will be held on the basis of the traditional majority system.

A majority of people's deputies in the Ukrainian parliament prefer this system, while representatives of the parties and movements which are losing their hold on the voters continue to insist on a mixed system.

Among the forces that fear losses in the forthcoming elections are the two Rukh (Way) movements, the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine and some others, mostly nationalistic in character, whose rating dropped sharply in most regions of the republic recently.

Bans Illegal Paramilitary Groups

LD1111174393 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1545 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Kiev [no date as received]—At the morning plenary session of the Supreme Council today, 294 deputies voted for additions to Article 187-6 of the Criminal Code in accordance with which the formation of illegal militarized formations or groups, or participation in their activities is punishable by deprivation of freedom for 2-8 years. It is envisioned that leadership of such formations, financing them, supplying them with weapons, ammunition, explosive substances, or military equipment is punishable by deprivation of freedom for 3-10 years. The participation of illegal militarized formations or groups in attacks on state and public enterprises, establishments, organizations, or on individual citizens is punishable by deprivation of freedom for 7-15 years. In the event that these actions lead to the death of people or other serious consequences, the offender will be deprived of freedom for 10-15 years. All parts of this Article envision the possible confiscation of property and the last [part] the obligatory confiscation of property.

The criminal code of Ukraine has also been supplemented by Article 63-1 on "mercenary activity", Article 187-7 "the participation in armed conflicts of other states", and Article 187-8 "the illegal activity of public associations". The Ukrainian code on administrative infringements has been supplemented by Article 186-5 (violation of legislation on public associations"). Some amendments and additions were also made to existing legislation.

UNA-UNSO Deputy Commander Dmytro Korchynskyy, commenting today on the adopted amendments and additions to the criminal code by the Supreme Council, said he expects arrests among members of his organization which in turn could lead to destabilization and lawlessness but it would not stop the social and political processes. "We need total victory and not revenge," Dmytro Korchynskyy said. [passage omitted]

Kravchuk Addresses Supreme Council 11 Nov

LD1111144693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] President Kravchuk has declared that neither the government nor the Supreme Soviet in its present composition can lead the country out of the crisis. Presenting a national development program for 1993-1994 in parliament on Thursday [11 November], he made it clear that the measures offered by the cabinet could only revitalize the economy and pave the way for reform.

Drawn up by the cabinet, formally led by the president, the program suggests empowering the head of state to issue and amend economic and other laws.

To halt price growth, the government proposes regulating the level of businesses' profitability and planning the budget quarterly on the basis of production plans and price indexing.

The plan also provides for changing the price regulation procedure for further liberalization and for setting "price ceilings" for some commodities.

According to the counterinflation program, after the pace of inflation slows down, prices and wages should be frozen, and a national currency - hryvna - should be introduced. The government estimates inflation in Ukraine in September-October this year at 55- 60 percent.

The cabinet has already drafted a national budget for 1994 to be submitted to Parliament on Thursday.

In the draft, revenues total 173.7 Tn karbovantsy, expenditures - 203.2 Tn., and the deficit amounts to 9.9 percent of GDP or 14.6 percent of the expenditures. The deficit is to reach 18.4 percent of GDP, or 31.7 percent of the planned expenditures.

The basic source of budget revenues (23.3 percent) will be payment for the transit of gas, oil and ammonia across Ukrainian territory. Foreign trade revenues are expected to grow 10 fold compared with the current year. In the meantime, next year the republic will have to repay $986 Mn of its foreign debt.

In economic development next year, attention will be focussed on the accelerated advancement of the agro-industrial complex, on the extraction and refinement of fuel, on efforts to protect the environment, restructure the economy, build homes and other projects, return deported nationalities to Ukraine and design and produce munitions.

The government's main task is to overcome hyperinflation, stop production decline, keep living standards from further falling, and stabilize finances.

Industrial production growth in 1994 is planned at 5.3 percent, agricultural production growth at 7.1 percent, national income is to shrink 1.2 percent and labor efficiency is forecast to go down by 6.5 percent.

With a requirement for 32 Mn tons of oil and 102 Bn cubic meters of gas, Ukraine intends to secure the extraction of 4 Mn tons of oil and 17 Bn cubic meters of gas.

Grain output is planned at 45 Mn tons (41 Mn tons this year). The monthly income of a state-sector employee will average 564,000 karbovantsy.

Although national industries require $24.4 Bn, only about $1 Bn is expected to be available.

Calls For Switching Focus of Reform

LD1111194593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1619 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin"]

[Text] President Leonid Kravchuk in a speech to parliament on Thursday [11 November] called for switching the focus of reforms over to the manufacturing sector. He also called on political parties for unity and constructive criticism of the government.

The problem of energy supply to Ukraine must be taken on at the level of factories and whatever necessary measures adopted to create a foreign exchange market to this end, Kravchuk said.

The president said that although it would be wrong to remove all subsidies at the moment, these must be reduced. And he called for austerity measures and replacing government financing by commercial credits.

Kravchuk spoke of the need to provide incentives for domestic producers and to lift all government restrictions on imports and exports. In his words, the new plan provides for the current fixed rate of the karbovanets to be replaced by a floating one.

On the economic front, 1994 will see the privatization of small and medium size businesses with most of the larger enterprises being turned into corporations early next year as envisaged by an appropriate presidential decree. Kravchuk also spoke of wanting to issue a decree on investment funds which will lead to the emergence of brokers needed for implementing the privatization scheme.

On the two earlier decrees: on privatizing unfinished construction projects and state commodity bonds, Kravchuk said both of them were aimed at furthering economic reforms. Clearly, there can be no economic recovery without additional investment, he said. The president said that if implemented, the commodity bonds' decree will help stabilize the national currency, safeguard foreign investment and carry out a range of highly-effective projects.

IF Note: The commodity bonds' decree adopted early this month provides for the issuing of $10 Bn [billion] bonds set against state property as collateral. However, a number of deputies accused Kravchuk of selling out the country to foreigners.

Kravchuk denied that his other decree on unfinished construction projects was in breach of the country's land legislation which bans land acquisition by foreign buyers. He said the ban applies only to farmland. However, he said additional resources can be raised if unfinished construction sites plus land are brought under the privatization scheme.

IF Note: The presidential decrees have now been placed on the agenda of a parliamentary debate. A number of deputies with both nationalist or democratic leanings are calling for their veto.

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Defense Ministry Denies Plans To Cut Forces

AU1111060393 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'Canards' Are Flying Again"]

[Text] The newspaper IZVESTIYA of 3 November 1993, referring to the UNIAN agency, carried information to the effect that Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy had allegedly signed an order in accordance with which Ukraine's Armed Forces will be reduced by 150,000 men and their numerical strength will become 380,000 men. It is also alleged that, by the end of 1995, the Ukrainian Army will be reduced to 250,000 men and that only four out of the eight general military divisions deployed will remain.

The Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense is authorized to state that the information disseminated by IZVESTIYA does not correspond to reality. Ukraine's minister of defense did not sign any order with such content. The numerical force of the Armed Forces has been specified by Ukraine's Supreme Council and will consist of 450,000 men.

It is sad that a Ukrainian agency upon which newspapers rely for verified and balanced information has become a source for this "canard."

Paramilitary Group Formed To Protect Ukrainians

LD1111110693 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1720 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev 10 Nov—The association "State Independence of Ukraine" [DSU] has begun to form "Varta DSU" [DSU guard] detachments to enable Ukrainians to protect themselves against the gang formations of the RDK [Republican Movement of Crimea], the National Salvation Front, and other Russian organizations in Ukraine. "We have not yet won the Ukraine for which Ivan Bohun, Symon Petlyura, Yevhen Konovalets, Stepan Bandera, [names of Ukrainian independence fighters] and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian heroes—cossacks, haydamaky [Ukrainian insurgents of the 1760's], sharpshooters, UPA fighters and division members [Ukrainian division in the German army]—offered their lives. We do not have the right to interrupt the glorious military traditions, the tradition of revenge against the enemy. The enemy has governed on our land for too long!", the DSU leaflet reads.

Sect Leader Threatens Suicide; Members Dispersed

PM1011115193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Svetlana Dorosh of "UNIAN specially for IZVESTIYA": "Members of White Brotherhood Have Declared a Hunger Strike"]

[Text] Kiev—According to Ukrainian Internal Affairs Ministry reports, as of the morning of 9 November 655 people had been arrested on suspicion of involvement with the Great White Brotherhood.

The militia is dispatching the "brethren" to their places of residence after establishing their identity. It can be stated right now that most of them are inhabitants of Donetsk, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and Lugansk Oblasts. Many of those hospitalized have declared a hunger strike.

In the opinion of Vasiliy Makarchuk, senior detective in the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Ministry Criminal Investigation Department (who, incidentally, met with Marina Tsvyhun and Yuriy Kryvonohov several times in 1991), the situation is now complicated by the fact that the brotherhood has gone underground, and the militia in effect, mostly manages to arrest only the fanatical youth rather than the more influential representatives of the White Brotherhood.

In Kiev, however, a new rumor is being discussed: Mariya Devi Khristos is to burn herself to death on 10 November.

Police Clash With Sect Members

AU1011170493 Paris AFP in English 1649 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, Nov 10 (AFP)—Five Ukrainian special forces policemen were injured in front of the Saint Sophia cathedral here on Wednesday [10 November] during clashes with members of the radical "White Brotherhood" sect.

More than 60 people were arrested by police after the violence, which capped a 10-day standoff between the security forces and the White Brotherhood, a sect which encourages mass suicide.

Nearly 700 sect members have been arrested by the police during the past 10 days. The White Brotherhood claims to have tens of thousands of members.

The leader of this protestant sect, Maria Tsvigun—who calls herself "Maria-Devi Christos" or the "Seventh Messiah"—announced that she would crucify herself in front of the Saint Sophia cathedral on Thursday.

According to the Ukrainian interior ministry's press service, 144,000 followers, who call themselves "angels," may set themselves on fire in central Kiev on the same day in order to reach heaven before the apocalypse, which the sect believes will occur on November 24.

'Messiah,' Husband Arrested

AU1111112193 Paris AFP in English 1029 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, Nov 11 (AFP)—Police arrested the two leaders of a radical sect who have urged followers to commit suicide to reach heaven before the apocalypse, which they predict for November 24, the Ukraine Defense Ministry said Thursday [11 November].

The couple, Maria Tsvigun—who calls herself "Maria-Devi Christos" or the "Seventh Messiah" and heads the White Brotherhood protestant sect—was detained with her husband Yuri Krivanogov after a nationwide crackdown over the last 10 days in which nearly 800 sect members have been detained.

Police said the two were found inside Saint Sophia cathedral here Wednesday [10 November] after riot police burst into the ancient church following a 10-day standoff with sect members, touching off clashes that saw more than 60 people arrested.

Maria Tsvigun was identified Thursday morning by her first husband, to whom he cried "Vade retro Satanas" (Latin for "Get thee behind me, Satan"), the Interior Ministry press chief Ivan Lavchenko told AFP.

Many of those detained in the recent roundup have come from Russia, notably St. Petersburg. The White Brotherhood claims to have tens of thousands of members.

According to the Interior Ministry's press service, 144,000 followers, who call themselves "angels," may set themselves on fire in central Kiev in a collective suicide before what they see as the end of the world in two weeks' time.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Meets With Uzbek President Karimov

LD1011150693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1316 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Amangeldy Akhmetalimov]

[Text] Almaty November 10 TASS—Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who arrived for a brief working visit here today, had a long eye-to-eye talk with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Then their official delegations held talks on a wide range of problems of mutual concern. They culminated in the signing of an agreement on trade and economic cooperation for 1994, an agreement on mutual commitments and mutual support in connection with the emission of national money in the two republics, an agreement on the organisation of settlements between the two national banks. They also signed a protocol on the implementation of the earlier concluded agreement on measures to deepen economic integration in the period from 1994 to 2000. Nazarbayev and Karimov signed a joint statement, saying:

"The heads of state of the Republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan held talks on November 10 on several problems linked with the further development of integrational relations and pursuance of a concerted economic policy. They discussed ways and methods to effect mutual investments and set up joint enterprises and highly technological production facilities, to promote entrepreneurship. The agenda included the problem of the upcoming withdrawal from circulation in both states of banknotes emitted by the USSR and Russian banks in the period from 1961 to 1992.

"The sides have arrived at the conclusion that the terms on which the Government of the Russian Federation was ready to merge the monetary systems was unacceptable to them both, and that they placed the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan in an economically disadvantageous position.

"Confirming their adherence to the earlier achieved inter-state and inter-governmental agreements on the coordination of measures in the sphere of CIS monetary and credit policy, Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev deem it necessary to state the following: The Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan have reached agreement on the simultaneous emission of national moneys. They have coordinated some basic decisions on the mutual strengthening of the monetary systems in the two states.

"Corresponding instructions have been issued to the governments of the two countries, and to the central bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the national bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan to immediately study and sign bilateral agreements on mutual commitments and mutual support in connection with the emission of national moneys, on non-commercial payments, on inter-bank settlements, on practical measures to promote the regime of free trade and customs regulations, to achieve the mutual convertibility of their currencies and money conversion transactions.

"Moreover, they were instructed to devote particular attention to the crea tion of a ramified network of money exchange stations so that the population of the two countries could freely exchange the moneys of the two states. We believe that the coordination of all the actions of our two states at this important junction meets the economic and political interests of the peoples of our two countries, corresponds to their traditional spirit of fraternal relations.

"Taking into account the high degree of the interdependence of production and technological complexes, as well as the expediency of economic relations, we hereby reaffirm our resolution to step up the creation of effective mechanisms to promote integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States, to set up an economic union and also to establish customs and payments unions."

Republics To Introduce Currencies Simultaneously

LD1111123193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Vladimir Ardayev: "Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Will Introduce Currency Simultaneously"]

[Text] Almaty—A meeting of the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan presidents was held 10 November in Almaty. Islam Karimov arrived in the neighboring Republic at the invitation of Nursultan Nazarbayev. The official reason for the meeting was to check the progress of interstate treaties and agreements between the two countries.

The main subject of the two presidents' conversation, however, was a discussion of the situation that has cropped up in the ruble zone. As N. Nazarbayev noted, it is time to replace the slogan "a treaty is more precious than money" with the slogan "money is more precious than money." Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, he said, punctiliously fulfilled all their commitments for the CIS and the common economic area, but what happened, happened. First, the union of European states was formed, from which all Central Asian republics were excluded, and then the Kazakhstan Government delegation was obliged to leave the talks on the unification of monetary systems. Now Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which remain in the zone of operation of the old ruble, have been obliged to announce the introduction of their own national currencies, which they intend to do simultaneously.

Agreements have also been signed on mutual commitments and mutual support in connection with the introduction of national bank notes in the two Republics and on trade and economic cooperation for 1994, as has an intergovernment protocol on a program for the rapprochement of the Central Asian states' economies through the year 2000. In accordance with this protocol, as early as 1994, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are reducing the importation of goods and produce from outside by almost $400 million. The states' export potential is being increased by the same amount.

I. Karimov dwelled on the fact that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are resorting to different mechanisms for the introduction of national currencies. Whereas Kazakhstan intends to exchange old Russian and Soviet rubles for the new monetary unit—the tenge—Uzbekistan has chosen a gradual path and initially will introduce temporary coupons equal in worth to the Russian ruble which will circulate in parallel with the present currency. And only later will it introduce its own monetary unit—the som.

The Uzbekistan president also noted that the introduction of their own national currencies by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cannot be assessed as a natural process serving the further integration of the CIS states as some representatives of the Russian Government and the Russian press are presenting it. In actual fact, he said, the strong-arm expulsion of the Central Asian states from the ruble zone is the directly opposite process, which harms their peoples' historic ties with Russia.

N. Nazarbayev particularly stressed that Kazakhstan is approaching the introduction of a national currency in a calm atmosphere, under the full control of the president and government. The interests of Kazakhstan's working population will not be infringed during the exchange of money.

The presidents declined to answer a question about the specific schedule for introducing the currencies. As for the appearance of the new money, then I. Karimov joked: "They have one shortcoming—they do not bear Niyazov's portrait. Actually, our portraits will not be on the new money either." I. Karimov said that historical monuments will be depicted on the som. Portraits of eminent Kazakh enlighteners will probably be depicted on the tenge.

Further on New Currencies

LD1011222293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Report by Dukesh Baymbetov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are discussing the simultaneous introduction of national currencies. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that leaving the ruble zone would not affect the prospects of the republic's political, economic, and cultural relations with Russia. However, Kazakhstan has left the ruble zone and that's a fact, he said.

[Baymbetov] Being forced out of the ruble zone, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have decided to join efforts in their monetary and credits policy. This has become a dominant question at the meeting of the two presidents, who have agreed to introduce national currencies simultaneously in the interest of both republics.

An agreement on mutual liabilities and on the organization of mutual payments by the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan has been signed.

Practical steps toward the free trade regime, customs regulation, working toward the mutual convertibility of currencies and currency conversion have been discussed.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are intending to reduce to a great extent the import of goods from other countries, except for essentials.

The sides have confirmed their decision to intensify the creation of working integration procedures within the framework of the CIS and of the Economic Union, and to speed up the creation of a customs and payments alliance.

[Begin recording] [Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan] The provision of goods, ensuring hard currency payments, and mutual payments between enterprises are the most serious issues, which are already a problem. They may become even more complicated in the future, I think.

[Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan] This is a healthy process, and the Economic Union allows for it. There is nothing to be afraid of. This may bring us even closer together within the framework of the economic union. [end recording]

Nazarbayev Minimizes Impact of Ruble Pullout

PM1011131193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Nov 93 pp 1-2

["Exclusive" interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Yevgeniy Dotsuk in Almaty; date not given: "Nursultan Nazarbayev: Can Everything Be Measured in Rubles?"]

[Text] Nursultan Nazarbayev and his government are probably not having the most pleasant of times since the breakdown of the Kazakhstani-Russian talks on the single ruble zone. His parliamentary opponents advocating a currency of their own are today reproaching Nazarbayev for being short-sighted.

Yesterday KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA succeeded in getting Nursultan Nazarbayev to answer a few questions.

[Dotsuk] Do you think that what has happened to the ruble zone to be your own fault?

[Nazarbayev] Judging by the current situation, perhaps we should have introduced a national currency "yesterday." But our attempts to create a single ruble zone were dictated primarily by strategic considerations—the quest for the optimum means of overcoming the economic crisis, and political commitments. A normal negotiating process was under way, after all. There is hardly a better option now than for Commonwealth countries to pool their efforts, including their efforts to stabilize the money supply.

We never disputed the possibility of introducing a national currency. It was a question of dates, the need to clarify each side's position, and the implementation of summit-level interstate accords already secured.

[Dotsuk] Did the upshot of the talks with Russia on the ruble area come as a surprise to you? Was the Kazakhstani Government prepared for that turn of events?

[Nazarbayev] At a certain stage it became clear that the Russian side's conditions were unacceptable to us. Had we accepted them, even tougher conditions would have followed.

We certainly worked out the various options. Russia is of course entitled to decide its financial policy on the basis of its own political and other considerations, including transitory considerations. As for whether we are ready to quit the ruble zone or not. That turn of events has been envisaged and some moves have been made in that direction. The normative acts have to be studied today. I would like to assure you that we will try to reduce all the problems associated with the enforced switch to a new currency as much as possible.

[Dotsuk] You are now accused of being stumped as a result of following Russia's lead in economic policy.

[Nazarbayev] If you rely on facts rather than emotions, the conclusion turns out to be different. I have repeatedly spoken about the extent to which our countries' economies are interconnected. You cannot fail to take these factors into consideration when implementing reforms, whether political or economic. For our part we have conscientiously tried to preserve normal partnership ties, and we kept on hoping that, despite the actions of certain Russian forces, we would secure acceptable solutions. Judge for yourself. There was the treaty on the sides' coordinating their actions in the field of economic transformations, finance and credit policy, and tax and customs policy. There were the bilateral and multilateral agreements on the creation of the ruble zone and a banking and customs union, as well as sectoral formations based on direct ties. All this is by no means a matter of following Russia's lead but of coordinating actions and, I stress once again, of implementing accords and pledges. I am now convinced that it would benefit everyone to abide by them.

I will not get into a confrontation. I am convinced that eventualy everything will sort out. Russia was probably acting in its own financial interests in severing these ties. Can everything be measured in terms of the ruble? What about purely human ties and the age-old good-neighborliness, which, I am certain, will never be destroyed?

[Dotsuk] Are you sorry that your efforts to strengthen the CIS have not been successful?

[Nazarbayev] Efforts to close the gap between peoples and states are never wasted. My position is unchanged on this. Kazakhstan's leaving the ruble zone is already a fait accompli, but it will not under any circumstances concede that prospects for political, economic, and cultural relations between our states are poor. We have not, after all, lost the chance of establishing in the future the kind of relations that exist among the EC states, for instance.

Views Monetary Reform, Ties With Russia

LD1111053293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0345 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Today's republican newspapers in Kazakhstan carry a joint statement by Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan presidents, on a simultaneous introduction of national currencies. President Nazarbayev gave an interview to Mayak Panorama on this subject.

[Begin recording] [Nazarbayev] This is a normal process brought about by an economic union. Nothing terrible has taken place. Perhaps, we are getting wiser. The course of events shows that, perhaps, this will bring us even closer together within the framework of economic union and speed up the creation of an interstate bank, a payment union, the customs union that was envisaged, and coordinating bodies. The economies should be brought closer to each other on this basis.

The Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan have signed an agreement on assisting each other during the introduction of a national currency. Now a large group of representatives of the National Bank and the Russian Finance Ministry is coming to give us the help for which we asked. As regards our population, we have made arrangements for exchanging this money for rubles. We will do this together with Russia. My decree pursues the following goal: Those people who dispose of large sums of dishonestly earned money, including old-style rubles, will simply have to name their sources of income and exchange them. The other 98 percent of the people of Kazakhstan will not be affected at all.

As regards relations with Russia, about which questions are being asked today, Russia is our neighbor forever, and we would like to be good and friendly strategic neighbors in every respect. Russia is now going through difficult times. There is both political and economic crisis there. We would sincerely like democracy and a policy of reforms to win in Russia on 12 December and true democrats, who really love Russia and the Russian multi-ethnic people, come to power. We would like to be always together with this Russia and strengthen our friendship and relations. We wish Russia the same things that we wish for ourselves: prosperity for the people, strong democracy, and advanced reforms. [end recording]

Nursultan Nazarbayev's interview for our Panorama was prepared by our correspondent, Viktor Glukhovtsev.

INTERFAX is already reporting on neighboring countries' reaction to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announcing the introduction of national currencies. For instance, the chairman of the Kyrgyzstan National Bank has said that only after national currencies have been introduced, normal trade and economic relations and a real economic alliance may become feasible. He noted that Kyrgyzstan also is experiencing difficulties. However, the shortage of Russian rubles in the Kyrgyz market has been considerably reduced of late. By difficulties, the chairman of the Kyrgyz National Bank seems to refer to the continuing fall of the Kyrgyz currency, som, in relation to the dollar and the ruble.

Results of Currency Reform Measures Examined

PM1111093193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Vladimir Ardayev: "Almaty Implementing Currency Reform. Panic in Republic"]

[Text] Almaty—The president and Government of Kazakhstan have taken a series of measures aimed at stabilizing currency circulation in the Republic. They are primarily aimed at confiscating and withdrawing from circulation "old" Soviet and Russian money, whose volume has exceeded all imaginable limits in Kazakhstan.

Following the National Bank's directive that all dubious cash deposits should be credited to special accounts in order to verify their source, the president has issued an even "harsher" edict. In line with this edict, bank branches, irrespective of their form of ownership, are instructed that cash from individuals and legal entities in bills issued between 1961 and 1992 should be accepted and deposited in bank accounts that have been opened solely for this purpose without the right to withdraw it until additional instructions have been received from the National Bank. First Vice Premier Daulet Sembayev explained in a television interview that the money may be held in the special accounts for up to six months until special commissions have verified that it has been earned from legal transactions and was not brought in from other states by illegal means.

This paragraph of the edict does not extend to the activities of economic subjects receiving cash for selling goods and services which are prime necessities. The Cabinet of Ministers has confirmed the list of these goods and services by special decree.

The limit for bringing "old" cash into the Republic from CIS countries, which have switched to their own national currency or have announced they they are introducing it, has also been reduced from 500,000 rubles [R] to R100,000. All money over and above that sum is subject to confiscation.

The measures clearly bear the hallmark of confiscation, and this cannot but incur the population's displeasure, particularly that part of the edict which says that all funds paid into deposits and bank accounts in "old" cash since 1 October and not utilized by 5 November should also be credited to special accounts without the right of withdrawal. This came at a time when there was simply no other money in circulation in Kazakhstan. So that any money received as wages or, say, as the result of selling a dacha or an automobile, and subsequently deposited in a savings account in the period indicated, becomes "frozen."

The presidential edict was signed Friday evening and published in the local papers Saturday morning. But as early as Friday morning many Almaty stores owned by private companies and individuals had stopped accepting cash; their goods are at best being sold through non-cash transactions or for convertible currency.

You get the impression that the "old" Soviet and Russian ruble, with which Kazakhstan is inundated, is in its last wild death throes. In spite of the fact that the presidential edict orders the stepping up of non-cash money circulation, non-cash payments in Kazakhstan have in actual fact come to standstill. The majority of Almaty banks are only honoring payments in respect of their clients' taxes. The leader of one commercial bank said that the confiscation of cash by depositing it in special accounts without the right of withdrawal has created a clot in the money circulation system. Moreover, the National Bank has suspended credits to a number of commercial banks and many of them have gotten into debt.

The exchange rate of the dollar on the "black" market has leapt to R10,000. Prices have suddenly "exploded." Today a pack of imported cigarettes costs R7,000-10,000 in a private kiosk in Almaty, and a kilogram of pork in a state store costs as much. The first signs of dissatisfaction from the population have appeared—for example, on the night of 8-9 November newspapers (including IZVESTIYA) were not printed at the Republic's newspaper and journal publishing house "Deuir" because the printers refused to go to work, demanding higher wages and social guarantees.

According to some reports, the consular department of the Russian Embassy in Kazakhstan has been besieged by representatives of the Russian-speaking population demanding to be granted Russian citizenship.

It looks as if the situation is beginning to get out of control.

Ruble Trade Suspended as New Currency Readied

PM1111114793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by Dmitriy Gutenev under the rubric "Call From the Correspondents' Center": "Advent of the Tenge Awaited"]

[Text] In Aktyubinsk trade for 1961-1992 rubles has been paralyzed for third day running. The same is happening in other cities in the Republic of Kazakhstan. President N. Nazarbayev's edict "On Urgent Measures To Stabilize the Monetary System" has come into force. Under this edict, all cash in denominations carrying Lenin's portrait paid into banking establishments by physical and juridical persons from 1 October and not used by 5 November are to be registered in accounts specially opened for the purpose and may not be withdrawn until additional instructions are received from the bank. The sources of this money and and the legality of its procuement will be checked by special commissions being set up in the oblasts, cities, and rayons. The next step is the introduction of a national currency. Packages containing the new national bank notes—the tenge—are being delivered to the banks.

Nazarbayev Interviewed on Relations With PRC

LD1011194293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1525 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by unidentified correspondent; placed and date not given; from the "Mir Interstate TV and Radio Company" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Video caption: Chinese People's Republic, October, year not given] [Video shows Nazarbayev and entourage descending aircraft steps and being welcomed by Chinese officials, shaking hands with unidentified Chinese official outside building and talking to correspondent in office]

[Correspondent] At that time you brought with you very interesting plans, including, I recall, a plan for a trans-Asian railroad. Also at that time it seemed that this plan was a global one, as we were talking about fundamental changes in cooperation on border issues. Two years have passed. What have you managed to accomplish, and what have you failed to do, and why?

[Nazarbayev] You know, it was precisely during this visit that basic documents endorsing respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, and mutually advantageous cooperation between our states were signed, and those problems that seemed global at that time were discussed. In 1992 Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko visited, and 15 documents were signed, and another eight documents were signed with Xinjiang-Uygur Province which lay the foundations for relations of economic cooperation. I have to tell you that during these two years the Chinese People's Republic has become Kazakhstan's number one partner in economic cooperation and takes up 22.4 percent of our foreign trade turnover—some 500 million dollars. That is a huge sum for two years, I can tell you.

We have now discussed here, as a logical continuation, the declaration that was signed on the basis for friendly relations between our two states which, we stressed, has the power of contract, since the document is an open-ended one. If neither of the sides attempts to withdraw from it, it emphasizes all the main issues of mutual relations between the two neighboring friendly states. Relations with China, as a close neighbor, are very important to us.

Yes, my great wish to reach the Chinese hinterland and the Pacific by rail has virtually been realized. During the past year, 15,000 trains have passed through. That is about 2 million tonnes of freight—and this is starting from scratch. A total of 670,000 passengers travelled in both directions. The flow of goods is growing. The Chinese side now has no less an interest than Kazakhstan, because if one travels from Kazakhstan to the Far East in the traditional way, that is 7,500 km, while, with the new way, it is 3,500 km. You can see for yourself how big the difference is.

Apart from the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the flow of freight through Kazakhstan from Central Asia and Russia and the return from China to the West holds out the promise of immense mutual benefit. The project is already operating, in effect. But there is a problem with building a second set of tracks from the center of China to Urumchi. You know that very strenuous building work is going on: Already 150 km have been laid. We will have the double-track line in two years, and Kazakhstan may emerge as the shortest way to the Pacific and to the shores of Japan and Korea. Next year the line will link Iran with Meshkhed in Turkmenistan—130km—and then the line passes through Iran, Turkey, and the Bosphorus to Europe. So, it is a vast project.

Apart from that, we considered, and met with mutual understanding on, the problems of the use of two rivers that link the states—the Chernyy Irtysh and the Ili—that are not used at all. An agreement has now been reached to build a highway from Kazakhstan, from Almaty, via Kyrgyzstan, the Karakorum highway, Islamabad, and Delhi to Karachi. Part of it passes through Chinese territory, and China appears quite interested in it. [video shows red carpet laid out, Nazarbayev inspecting Chinese troops, discussions between two sides]

I must also mention the project for building a Central Asian gas pipeline across the territory of Kazakhstan via the People's Republic of China.

Nuclear weapons tests... [pauses] You will be aware that Kazakhstan was the first state to close down one of the world's two largest proving grounds in Semipalatinsk. We are consistently adhering to a policy of disarmament—nuclear disarmament. We have become part of the START I Treaty, and we will be part of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, I wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin, and he answered just before my departure. In the first place, we received a complete guarantee that the Chinese People's Republic has no territorial claims on Kazakhstan—this is very important; secondly, China guarantees not to use its nuclear weapons against Kazakhstan. Chairman Jiang Zemin told me this precisely in the form of a guarantee.

In addition, it is very important that we reached agreement on setting up a joint group of experts that would be working on the problem at both Lop Nor and Semipalatinsk, so that we can be sure that there is no radiation background, especially as the wind patterns are so beneficial to Kazakhstan. The group of experts should be working on this and our people here must be aware of this. Now, over a distance of 1,500 km of a common border, two sectors out of 11 have not yet peacefully resolved. Out of the nine sectors where concord has been reached, we have agreed on the legal wording and the demarcation of the borders and will sign these documents in 1994. Two sectors remain on which we are working—these are the region of the Druzhba Friendship Station and one other region—it may be, I think that there is the possibility of agreement being reached on them, but if not, then we can put them to one side and settle the problem of the borders and close this issue there and then, so to speak.

The next question is the creation of a free economic zone directly on the border between China and Kazakhstan in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast where, with the participation of Hong Kong companies, a zone is being set up which will be a point for distributing new technology on Kazakhstan territory.

[Correspondent] How realistic is this zone? Is it as realistic as the map that you brought with you?

[Nazarbayev] I think it is realistic, inasmuch as it would be 150 hectares—75 from the Kazakh side in the Khorgos region and 75 on the Chinese side. I do not see any obstacles here. I put this question yesterday and received support.

Tajikistan

U.S. Official Meets Rakhmanov, Foreign Minister

LD1111133393 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Imamali Rakhmanov, the head of state and chairman of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan, this morning received Mrs. Robin Raphel, assistant U.S. secretary of state for South Asian affairs, who arrived in Dushanbe yesterday. She later met with Foreign Minister Rashid Olimov.

During the course of the meeting, Rakhmanov familiarized the guest of honor with the present social and political situation in the Republic and spoke about the work carried out by the legitimate government to stabilize the situation following the 16th session [of 17 November 1992] of the Tajik Supreme Council. Rakhmanov emphasized the leadership's commitment to dialogue and to find a solution for all the issues affecting South Asian countries, as well as the world community, through political means. Similarly, the issue of sending peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth countries to Tajikistan in accordance with the Moscow agreement of the CIS heads of state was discussed at the meeting.

A meeting between Mrs. Raphel and Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, will take place shortly. Mrs. Raphel will leave Dushanbe for Moscow tomorrow.

'Masked Gunmen' Seize Arms From CIS Unit

LD1111062693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0601 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By the KHOVAR NEWS AGENCY]

[Text] Dushanbe, November 11 (TASS)—Some 40 masked gunmen burst into a unit of the CIS Air Defence situated near Dushanbe in broad daylight on Tuesday, the Command of the Air Defence disclosed today.

They seized six submachine guns and set a barrack on fire. Several soldiers were beaten up during the attack, according to the command.

It gave no other details, saying only that the attackers are being searched for.

Further on Attack

LD1111193193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1405 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] On November 9, at 14:30 (local time), 60-70 gunmen attacked the Russian anti-aircraft military unit situated in the Rokhati Village, 20-30 km from Dushanbe, Interfax was told by a spokesman for the Tajik Foreign Ministry.

The attackers hit 12 soldiers, two ensigns and locked them in the barrack. They took six Kalashnikovs, 800 cartridges, 20 grenades and set the barrack on fire. The servicemen jumped out of windows and are safe and sound.

Legal proceedings have been instituted into the crime.

Two Russian Guards Killed on Afghan Border

LD1111131893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1248 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 11 Nov—Two officers serving with the Russian border guards on a section of the Tajik-Afghan border patrolled by the Pyanj border guards detachment were killed on Wednesday, ITAR-TASS learned today at the Russian border guards' headquarters in Dushanbe. The border guards were blown up by a mine while on duty.

The leader of Tajikistan, Imamali Rakhmanov, has expressed condolences to the families of the dead men.

Foreign Ministry Hands Over Afghan General

LD1211061693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0515 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 12 Nov—An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told by the press service of the headquarters of Russian border troops in Tajikistan that late last night representatives of the Tajik Foreign Ministry handed over Afghan Colonel General Begim to Afghan military authorities. He was among the group of servicemen who, carrying a white flag, had crossed the Pyandzh River on the border early in November, surrendered to Russian border guards, and asked Tajik authorities for asylum.

According to Colonel Vladimir Maslivets, head of the press center of the headquarters of Russian border troops, the exchange took place near the Uzbek border town of Termes, after the Afghan consul in Dushanbe had been notified. The Tajikistan leadership did this act of goodwill, Maslivets stressed, in order to resolve the issue of what to do about Afghan servicemen still remaining in Tajikistan.

Russian Unit Repels 'Trespassers' Attack

LD1111144193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian Border Troops' press center reports that following an exchange of fire with the Russian border guards, the trespassers retreated to Afghan territory. None of the border guards was killed. The rebels' losses have not been established.

Rebels Continue Provocations on Afghan Border

LD1211120593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1057 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 12 TASS—Armed units of the Tajik opposition, entrenched in the border provinces of Afghanistan, are continuing their efforts to destabilise the situation on the Tajik-Afgan border. Officials of the Tajik Foreign Ministry's information department told ITAR-TASS today with reference to competent sources that some border areas of Tajikistan, guarded by the third, fourth, and eleventh posts of the Pyanj frontier-guards detachment, were shelled on Thursday evening from Afghan territory. As many as fifteen shells were fired from heavy recoilless guns at the 12th border post on the same day. Russian borderguards had to suppress the fire. There were no casualties among Russian servicemen and local inhabitants.

Tajik military sources believe that the socio-political situation in the border Shuroabad District, the south-eastern part of the republic, is being stabilised by remnants of a Tajik opposition gang, which was able to break through the border from Afghanistan more than a month ago. As earlier reported, the gang was dispersed by Russian borderguards and Tajik Government troops in the course of a joint operation. However, some opposition fighters were able to flee into the mountains and are now launching raids from there and attacking Russian border posts from the rear.

Armenia

Afghans, Pakistanis Said Among Azerbaijani Forces

NC1011194493 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Although there have been no wide-scale clashes on the NKR front lines, the situation in that region continues to be unstable. Azerbaijan's military units fire on the NKR's defense positions with various types of arms almost daily. Their objective is to force the NKR defense units to respond in kind. However, the Armenian military units have not been deceived by Azerbaijan's provocations. They have carefully heeded their headquarters' instructions and unilaterally refrained from firing back. [passage omitted]

The NKR National Security Administration has disclosed that the NKR has indisputable evidence that confirms the presence of Afghan and Pakistani fighters among the ranks of the Azerbaijan National Army. Their headquarters is in Ganja. In fact, they use the former headquarters of a Russian division in that city. The fighters are in Azerbaijani artillery units. They are of Pashtun and (Garni) origin.

A large quantity of documents, photographs, letters, and newspapers were discovered after the clashes in Fizulinskiy and Dzhebrailskiy rayons on 22 and 23 October. The newspapers were published in Karachi and Peshawar. NKR's National Defense Administration is prepared to show the documents to the journalists and the mass media organs.

Azerbaijan has been using mercenaries in its undeclared war against Nagrono-Karabakh for a long time. The number of mercenaries that republic employs is gradually increasing. However, past experience confirms that it is impossible to suppress a people who have risen to struggle for their national independence. [passage omitted]

Supporting Azerbaijan's leaders and nationalist circles in the criminal war, particularly helping them with personnel and military equipment and vehicles, is an unforgivable crime. The struggle waged by the Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] people to live as an independent entity is worthy of respect. [passage omitted]

Iran Reportedly Sends Troops to Northern Border

NC1111170593 Yerevan SNARK in English 1145 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 11 (SNARK)—According to the Irani mass-media reports, the Irani authorities sent two divisions to the northern borders to defend the Gyz Galasy Weir.

The "RESALAT" Irani newspaper informs [that] one army division and a division of the Islamic Revolution defenders were distributed in the region of the Khudaferin bridge, just opposite the Armenian detachments [which] captured the Zangelanskiy and other Azerbaijani regions as a result of the late October offensive. The military detachments' redistribution was done just after the declaration done by the Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani during his late October visit to Baku—Iran will not let military actions escalation at his northern borders. Hashemi-Rafsanjani demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

Parliament Official Welcomes Russian Efforts

LD1211123693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1116 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] The Karabakh forces cannot pull out to earlier positions before effective guarantees for the security of those frontiers, Seyran Bagdasaryan, Armenian Supreme Soviet's Nagorno-Karabakh Commission Chairman told Interfax.

The advance of Karabakh forces to the Iranian border after October 21 was, he says, necessary because Azerbaijani troops shelled heavily the southern border areas of the NKR [Nagorno- Karabakh Republic]. "Karabakh used the natural right to defend itself," Bagdasaryan emphasized.

He attributed Russia's demands, that the Karabakh forces pull out immediately, to Moscow's concern over possible intervention of other countries into the conflict.

Speaking of Russian Ambassador at Large Vladimir Kazimirov's visit to the region, which began on Friday, the Armenian MP said that Yerevan had always welcomed Russian efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict. He is convinced that Russia will take effective steps in that direction.

Meanwhile, officials of the Karabakh Foreign Ministry told Interfax that their chief, Arkady Gukasyan, is to arrive in Yerevan on November 12 for consultations with the Armenian Foreign Ministry. The possibility of a meeting with President Levon Ter-Petrosyan cannot be ruled out.

Parliament Head Talks With Azerbaijani Counterpart

NC1011162493 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1125 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Yerevan, 10 Nov (ARMENPRES)—Babken Ararktsyan, chairman of the Armenian Parliament, held a telephone conversation with his newly elected Azerbaijani counterpart Rasul Guliyev during the evening of 9 November. He congratulated Guliyev on being elected to that important post. The chairmen of the two parliaments stressed the importance of regular and direct bilateral contacts to clarify positions on various problems and to search for political ways to settle these problems. They also discussed a number of regional issues.

Azerbaijan

Defense Ministry Reports on Armenian Movements

NC1011152893 Baku TURAN in English 1046 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Baku (November 10) TURAN—Yesterday after massive artillery preparation, subdivisions of Armenian Army launched large-scale advance in the direction of Beylagan Region of Azerbaijan. The attack is held near Hudaferin bridge that is on the border with Iran. As Press-Centre of Defense Ministry of the Republic reports, there are heavy firings on that part of territory at present.

Today Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan distributed a statement which runs, tension has been growing in the zone of Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict for the last few days. It is connected with strengthening of military activity of Armenian Armed Forces at different parts of the front. The document runs, Armenian Armed Forces transfer additional military units and military equipment to the borders of Kazakhskiy, Tauzskiy and Kedabekskiy Regions of Azerbaijan. In particular, they have transported artillery systems Uragan, which fires volleys and have great destructive power.

Along with this, they have created spring-boards for large-scale advances in Terter and Gulistan directions in the north of Karabakh.

The statement of Defense Ministry runs, firings are held on the border with neighboring Iranian state and this war can overgrow to a large-scale war including another states of the region.

Bridge Seized on Iranian Border

NC1111175293 Baku TURAN in English 1253 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Baku November 11 (TURAN)—Khudaferin bridge from Azerbaijan to Iran (province of Eastern Azerbaijan) situated near Kumlak village of Dzhebrailskiy region is seized by Armenian forces. Having numerical superiority, in the course of two-day firings (November 9-10), units of Armenian army pressed Azeri frontier forces back and seized the bridge and the village. So, Armenian party once more violated its own agreement on cease-fire.

After occupation of Zangelanskiy region, part of Azeri forces concentrated at the bridge to evacuate peaceful citizens (about 39,000 people) through the only road to Iran. Having seized Khudaferin bridge, Armenian forces closed the corridor for civilians to go out.

After tank firing of Armenian forces, one of the spans of Khudaferin bridge, which is architectural monument of early Middle Ages (VII century), was seriously damaged. In this connection Azerbaijan Ministry of Culture intends to address to UNESCO as the bridge connecting northern and southern sides of Araks River is registered into this international organization and it is one of most ancient and historically valuable building at occupied by Armenia Azerbaijan territory.

Parliament Discusses Appointments, Situation

NC1011154093 Baku TURAN in English 1046 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Baku (November 10) TURAN—Yesterday's closed sitting of Milli Mejlis finished late at night without adopting any serious decision, an available source at the Supreme Soviet told TURAN agency.

The deputies discussed the question on the election of the Supreme Court and on the submission of President G. Aliyev Khanlar Gadzhiyev was approved the supreme judge.

By the decree of Milli Mejlis, the Chairman of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan Shain Rustamov was removed from his post.

On the submission of the Procurator General [Ali Omerov], Eldar Gasanov, Isakhan Veliyev and Khanlar Veliyev were elected his deputies.

On the proposal of the procurator general the Military Procurator Rovshan Aliyev was removed and Nizami Takhmazov took the office.

The deputies approved Ali Insanov, appointed the minister of public health care two months ago, to the post.

Then the discussion of the military-political situation in the country started. As the available source in the Supreme Soviet told TURAN news agency the opposition deputies severely criticized the leadership of the Republic for the serious failures in foreign and internal policy.

At the same time the opposition itself was severely criticized by the leaders of the Supreme Soviet.

As a result of the stormy debates the deputies decided to send a number of Milli Mejlis members to the refugee camps to examine their living conditions. At the next sitting of Milli Mejlis the deputies will have to present a report and to work out a plan on rendering the refugees the first aid.

As an opposition deputies speaking on condition of anonymity told TURAN agency by this decision the authorities try to show their activeness to the population. He also said, that there won't be any provocation actions against the oppositional deputies during the meetings with the refugees.

As TURAN agency found out the authorities of the country intend to strengthen a discipline in Army through taking more serious measures against rule breakers.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Discusses Situation in Senaki

LD1011214693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1610 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Speech by head of state Eduard Shevardnadze in Senaki on 9 November—recorded]

[Excerpts] As you know the situation is most complex. The resources of the country are limited, but, nevertheless, we all have to work together and take care that these wounds are healed as soon as possible.

Talking about the causes of all that has happened will not do much good to us. We have to direct our attention toward present and future tasks. The activities of each of us should be as concrete as possible, and only in this way will we be able to restore what has been damaged and improve conditions of life and work. [passage omitted]

We cannot allow bandits, murderers, and those, who, as the health minister has said here, can be regarded as their patients, to come to power. And when a blind part of the population follows, applauds too, and trusts such people, this is a misfortune. I myself, together with you, have suffered from this misfortune. I know its value.

This disease, this plague, has made us lose Abkhazia. This plague is a principal cause of death of hundreds and thousands of people, a cause of destruction of innumerable villages and towns, and so on. I speak of this plague because I think this disease must not recur in Georgia. And this really is a disease. [passage omitted]

I do not mean that we have to launch acts of vengeance. If someone is a fanatic, if he has a faith in a god he himself created, let him have this faith, but he must leave us alone. Let him work as others do. The Georgian authorities will not endure his aggravating other people, disturbing the situation. [passage omitted]

The police chief has just said that only 20 policemen reported for duty. Someone could have run away in fear or had other reasons. But those who act as deserters now, they are not our citizens. [passage omitted]

If you can do something for your country during these days, in these circumstances, and you are not together with your people and your country, you are a traitor. [passage omitted]

I am still against vengeance. But bandits, murderers, robbers, and provocateurs must be punished; terrorists must be punished. There is no other way. We can pardon mistakes but not crime and evil. [passage omitted]

We have appointed Davit Gulua as a commandant, and a commandant is entrusted with extraordinary powers and extraordinary duties at such times. He is here now. He last worked as the interior minister of Abkhazia. He has not put his gun away for a minute. He fought until the last moment. I cannot name anyone who endured so much with regard to our Abkhazian pain. This is no accident. We have to support one another and work here for some time, and eventually everyone will return to his place—in Abkhazia, Sukhumi, Gali, to Abkhazia in general. This is the target of our life. Not a distant target but a near one. Therefore, until Batoni [Georgian form of polite address] Dato [pet name for Davit] is needed there, he will work here together with you.

I have taken a decision that the principal seat of the Committee for Emergency Situations will be Zugdidi. I request you, citizens of Senaki, to regard it with understanding. Everything seems to be approaching completion. We seem to be beginning a new life. But we have reports that some more plans are being drawn up. They are still thinking about new moves. They are still thinking about armed adventures.

This must be recorded by television. After so much endurance, so much forgiveness, so many manifestoes, and so much pain, if anyone dares to do anything-...[pauses] Today, the chairman of the Rukhi Kolkhoz, it used to be a Kolkhoz, a leader of the village, Mr. Todua was killed in his own house. That means that they are not asleep.

I apologize to the law enforcement bodies, but we will come to a situation when we will have to deal with them all, regardless of the law. This must be stopped. We have an immense task ahead. We have to unite and integrate Georgia, to return to Abkhazia, to take care of the country and the people. We will have to heal our wounds.

The one who thinks of returning to power, returning to his seat, who thinks of his own ambitions, can be regarded as an enemy of Georgia, and an enemy of the Georgian people without any trial. We will by no means pardon them. [passage omitted]

We have to cooperate more with Russia. I made a decision about joining the CIS. No one should criticize me for that. I made the decision to save the country, to save the people. The first results can already be seen. We failed to build relations with Russia in another way. Without this we cannot escape a period of starvation, without this Georgia will collapse and disintegrate. I see that there is no other way out. Let some people pardon me, that I have made a mistake, that it was a wrong decision. I can see no other way out. [passage omitted]

Those who speak of high ideas, must be aware that a human being needs to eat, to live in normal conditions in the first instance. [passage omitted]

We did a very important thing when we established peace and order in Poti. I had to make a decision about the Black Sea Fleet ships entering Poti. There are nine, no 11 ships in Poti at the moment. All with their equipment, marines, troops, and everything. There is perfect order in Poti.

The first commercial ships have already entered the port. An Italian ship entered the port yesterday. Poti is the wealth of the country. And these bandits began by capturing Poti and robbing everything, including Chinese warehouses and warehouses of other countries. We will need one or two years to assure those people that normal people and not savages live here, to get them to trust us so that they bring cargo, goods here. We pinned such hopes on Poti and the route, which could feed half of Georgia. Now, at last, order has been established there. It would have been better if we could have done it ourselves, but we could not take any more chances. [passage omitted]

Let it be done with Russia's assistance. I am not ashamed of that; the shame is when the country is collapsing.

Now about an airport. Senaki has a unique airport. The time will come, and this will become a principal source of income, a source of wealth for Senaki and other rayons too, and for Georgia as a whole. [passage omitted]

I asked [Prime Minister] Otar Patsatsia to stay in Zugdidi. He is holding a similar meeting now. He will work in this region two days a week. The prime minister is capable of solving any problems within the range of resources available and to make urgent decisions regarding Zugdidi, Senaki, Chkhorotsku, and other rayons. [passage omitted]

Plans for 'New March Against Abkhazia' Cause 'Alarm'

LD1111220693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Chairman of the Georgian State Council Shevardnadze has said starvation threatens the republic unless it receives urgent aid from Russia. Speaking in the town of Senaki, he made note of the contribution made by Russian troops in creating the atmosphere of order in the country. At the same time, Shevardnadze stressed the necessity to reunite a single Georgia. One of our further aims, he said, is to return Abkhazia.

These words by Shevardnadze cannot but cause a feeling of concern and alarm. Georgia lies in debris, refugees are rushing around the country looking for bread and a roof over their heads, enterprises are standing idle, normal trade has come to a standstill. Looters and simply criminals continue their outrages; Russian servicemen, daily risking their lives, are maintaining order on the main transportation lines with difficulty. Shevardnadze himself admits starvation and high mortality have fallen upon Georgia on the eve of winter.

Yet a new march against Abkhazia is being planned, with the use of tanks, heavy artillery, and even combat aviation. Yet again villages will be ablaze, there will be a tidal wave of refugees and thousands of people will be dead. Naturally, Russian troops will not participate in the new march against Sukhumi. The previous military action by Tbilisi against Abkhazia has completely failed, as everyone knows. What are the Georgian leaders expecting this time? A military miracle? Will not it be better to use a well-tried way of resolving armed conflicts and sit down at a negotiating table? Russia is prepared to play a mediatory role in this noble case. But the role of collaborator in exterminating the civilian population does not suit it.

Shevardnadze Spokesman Reacts

LD1111220993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2022 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By GIA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 11 Nov—The press secretary of the Georgian head of state today issued a statement in connection with the commentary in Russian Television's afternoon news bulletin which, the document says, contained "a fairly blatant hint at the planned possibility of a military invasion" of Abkhazia.

The statement says: "The press secretariat of the head of state is prepared to testify that Georgia will never reconcile itself to the violent tearing away of Abkhazia because sooner or later this autonomous republic will again become an inalienable component part of the united Georgian state. This intention corresponds to the interests of legality, historical justice, peace and stability in Georgia and the Caucasus region as a whole. The head of state, Eduard Shevardnadze, has actually stressed on more than one occasion that Abkhazia will be returned but the adherence of the leadership of the Republic of Georgia to the peaceful resolution of any problems, even the most acute, must not arouse any doubts.

"In his commentary on the report in 'Vesti,' Shevardnadze stated that he is appealing to the whole of the mass media not to worsen the situation which is already fraught with serious complications. Such groundless attacks are in sharp contradiction to the present condition of Georgian-Russian relations and the tendency towards their ongoing development and improvement."

Abkhazia Alarmed Over Troop Concentration

LD1111150193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1403 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—Abkhazia today voiced alarm over the concentration of Georgian troops and armour along the frontier between the two countries along the river Inguri.

The press service of the Abkhazian Parliament reported today that Georgia has also stepped up its land and air reconnaissance activity, and sent subversives to Abkhazian territory.

Georgian armed groups entrenched in the Kodori gorge are reportedly terrorizing civilians in the Gulripshi district. The Abkhazian Parliament today released a statement to say that it "viewed with understanding the announcement made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 9, and for its part expressed deep concern over the events taking place in close proximity to the border with Georgia, as well as sorties of (Georgian) gangs on Abkhazian territory, the provocative nature of which leaves no doubts."

The Abkhazian leadership said in the statement that it confirmed its stance of non-intervention on the civil war in western Georgia and reiterated that it would not allow the passage of militants and arms via its territory to Georgia, while "the Armed Forces of Abkhazia will not cross the river Inguri."

"The leadership of Abkhazia sees as its main task the preservation of peace and the resumption of dialogue with Georgia mediated by Russia and the United Nations in order to reach a political settlement on the basis of fulfilment of the main provisions of the Sochi (August 1993) agreement," the statement said.

Russian Marines Take Over Strategic Sites in Zugdidi

LD1111105793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengiz Dzhibuti]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov—Russian marine subunits who entered Zugdidi on Wednesday [10 November] have taken under their control the most important sites in the town and suburbs. "This is a strong force," Chief of State Eduard Shevardnadze said about the arrival of the marines and the military equipment, after his meeting with Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

The situation remains calm on the main railway lines between Poti and the station of Rioni, which is a starting point of a direct link with Tbilisi and, further on, with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The railway is under the secure protection of Russian troops, Colonel Gennadiy Dolgachev, head of the press center of the group of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus, said in a telephone conversation with the ITAR-TASS correspondent. According to him, during the last two weeks there was not a single attack on a guard post or armored escort.

Events on the Abkhaz border, where supporters of ex-President Gamsakhurdia continue to infiltrate across the Inguri River and terrorize the local population, demonstrate that Georgia cannot do without its northern neighbor. This conclusion has been reached not only by politicians and members of the parliament, but by the military as well. They say that Russian troops have a "peacemaking" mission in western Georgia.

Presence in Zugdidi Explained

LD1111173193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1550 GMT 11 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The Black Sea Fleet press center today denied reports in some of the mass media that subunits of Black Sea Fleet marines entered Zugdidi on 10 November and put the most important installations in the city under guard. The ITAR-TASS correspondent discovered today from informed sources in Russia's Black Sea Fleet that on 10 November the marines provided security for a meeting between Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze. After the meeting the marines left Zugdidi. It is entirely probable that it was their appearance in the region which was the basis of the erroneous reports.

Situation in West Remains Stable; Tbilisi Loses Power

LD1211121593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1116 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] As a Georgian Interior Ministry officer has reported to Interfax, the situation in west Georgia was stable overnight. After a high-voltage electic power transmission line in the Tsalenzhikhski area was blown up on Thursday [11 November], leaving Tbilisi without electricity, the Inguri Hydro Power Station and its surroundings have been put under special security. The spokesman said that Zviadists could again resort to acts of sabotage.

Meanwhile, Colonel Gennady Dolgachev, a spokesman for the Russian troops in Transcaucasia has reported to Interfax that the troops have as usual been guarding motor bridges and tunnels around Poti, Senaki, and Samtredia. They have been assisted by Georgian Interior Ministry troops. Dolgachev noted that there had been no incidents overnight.

Asked about the tasks set to the marines upon their landing in Poti, Dolgachev remarked that his command had no contact with them. Admiral Eduard Baltin has been acting on the Russian defense minister's instruction and has been subordinate directly to him, Dolgachev said.